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Theorists have shown how credit enhancement in the generic form of 
collateral can mitigate market failures in credit markets.  None of these models has 
explained, however, why a personal guarantee rather than collateral will appear in 
the equilibrium debt contract. In the first essay,  I develop optimal debt contracting 
models under moral hazard to show that lower transactions costs associated with 
guarantees make them more efficient than collateral.  The guarantee contract is 
feasible, however, only if the business owner is sufficiently wealthy relative to the 
loan amount.  This result suggests that market failure may occur if a small business 
owner with a high-return project has inadequate personal wealth to guarantee a 
loan. 
The second essay in this dissertation uses data from the 2003 Survey of 
Small Business Finances to empirically test the predictions of the first essay.  I 
estimate both multinomial logit and ordered probit models to examine the effect of 
guarantor wealth on the equilibrium enhancement structure for lines of credit.  I find 
that increasing owner wealth results in an increased likelihood that a line of credit 
will be enhanced with only a personal guarantee and a decreased likelihood that the 
line of credit will be secured with collateral.  I also find that use of the more efficient 
guarantee is less prevalent when the borrower is located in a non-competitive 
banking market.  Both results are consistent with predictions of the first essay. 
  
Relationships between small businesses and financial intermediaries are 
generally viewed only as mechanisms that arise to mitigate informational 
asymmetries in credit markets.  In the third essay, I use a pooled cross section of the 
1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances to study 
relationships between small businesses and their primary source of financial 
services.  I find evidence that mechanisms other than mitigation of informational 
asymmetries in credit transactions influence the structure and benefits associated 
with maintaining relationships.  I also find that the two empirical measures of 
relationship strength decreased between 1988 and 2003 as the small business credit 
market was being transformed by bank consolidation, financial deregulation and 
technological innovation in small business lending. 
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CHAPTER I 
ESSAY 1 - CREDIT ENHANCEMENT: COLLATERAL, GUARANTEES, AND THE 
ROLE OF OWNER WEALTH 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Credit enhancements in the form of collateral or personal guarantees are widely 
used contractual features in small business credit contracts.  While both of these forms of 
credit enhancement serve to alter the distribution of returns in the event of default, they 
may differ in both their relative transactions costs and potential repayment values.  These 
differences have not previously been formalized or addressed in the theoretical literature 
on credit contracting.  I develop debt contracting models under moral hazard for both 
collateral and personal guarantees.  A comparison of the two contracts shows that, if 
guarantor wealth is sufficiently large relative to the loan amount, the more efficient 
guarantee contract becomes Pareto improving.  The models also show why both forms of 
enhancement, collateral and guarantee, might appear in the equilibrium credit contract at 
lower levels of owner wealth.  This result suggests that the personal wealth of the small 
business owner plays a larger role in the allocation of credit in the small business credit 
markets than has been indicated by previous research.  The result also suggests that 
policy, such as public loan guarantees, could improve the allocation of capital by 
securing funding for wealth-constrained entrepreneurs who have high net present value 
project opportunities.  
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Introduction 
 Large firms that access public markets for equity and debt financing employ 
public accounting firms, investor relations professionals, and treasury departments to 
generate and disseminate credible information which investors, analysts and rating 
agencies use to access and communicate the firm’s financial prospects and risks.  In 
contrast, small private firms must raise funds from financial intermediaries in an 
environment of informational opacity in which information on cash flows, financial 
valuations, and management abilities are private and knowable only at a considerable 
cost to the lender and even then with considerable uncertainty.  In this environment, a 
range of tools are available to facilitate debt contracting.  These tools are collectively 
called credit enhancements.  Credit enhancement mechanisms can improve the efficiency 
of the capital market by reducing the costs to borrowers of external debt.  They do so by 
efficiently mitigating the informational problems which outside creditors face when 
financing a project.  The most common forms of credit enhancement are collateral, where 
a loan is secured by a pledge of specific business or personal assets, and personal 
guarantees, where security takes the form of a general claim on the borrower’s personal 
wealth. 
This essay examines the differences between securing a loan with collateral or a 
personal guarantee when there is a positive probability the borrower will default.  This 
essay shows, under conditions of moral hazard and a competitive credit market, that a 
personal guarantee will emerge as the efficient, and therefore the equilibrium, form of 
credit enhancement when the business owner-guarantor has sufficient outside wealth. The 
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models developed here to compare collateral and personal guarantees also show that 
equilibrium contracts employing both forms of credit enhancement could emerge at 
intermediate levels of guarantor wealth.   
 Berger and Udell (2003) categorize a personal guarantee as a distinct and 
“important contracting tool in small business lending” that is “similar to pledges of 
personal assets (as opposed to business assets) but with important differences.”  These 
differences have not, however, been systemically addressed by the debt contracting 
literature.  The theoretical literature on credit enhancement either ignores the use of 
personal guarantees or treats them as perfect substitutes for collateral, and therefore, 
equivalent to them.  With a few recent exceptions, the empirical literature has also 
ignored the existence of guarantees or treated them as an undifferentiated form of 
collateral.  As a consequence, we know little about the circumstances under which 
personal guarantees emerge as the optimal form of credit enhancement.  Similarly, we 
know little about the circumstances under which both collateral and personal guarantees 
appear in the equilibrium debt contract.  This gap in our knowledge persists despite the 
ubiquitous and growing use of guarantees in the US small business credit market.  
 This essay contributes to the current literature in two ways.  First, I clarify the 
salient differences between collateral and personal guarantees and how they should 
appear in theoretical models of credit enhancement.  In particular, I explicitly model and 
differentiate all of the transactions costs which are associated with the use of collateral 
and personal guarantees.  Secondly, I use this framework to develop a credit contracting 
model in which the deadweight social costs generated by using personal guarantees 
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decrease with the borrower’s wealth.  The deadweight costs of using collateral, in 
contrast, are independent of the borrower’s wealth.  As a result, entrepreneurs will be 
offered and will accept credit contracts in a competitive credit market which uses 
personal guarantees as credit enhancements when the entrepreneur’s wealth is great 
enough to support the guarantee.  The model generates several specific testable 
hypotheses about the use of guarantees and collateral which are examined in the second 
essay of this dissertation.  
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows.  The Use of Credit 
Enhancement in Debt Contracting develops the notion of alternative credit enhancement 
structures and differences between collateral and personal guarantees.  Review of the 
Literature on Collateral Theory summarizes the theoretical literature on collateral.  In A 
Collateral Model with Moral Hazard, I employ a simple loan contracting model in an 
environment of moral hazard to demonstrate transactions costs of collateral and its role in 
improving efficiency in the small business credit market.  Modifying the Collateral 
Model for Guarantee Attributes and Owner Wealth extends the model for the case of a 
personal guarantee and explicitly summarizes the implications of the model for credit 
enhancement structure as owner wealth increases.  The Relative Efficiency of Guarantees 
and Collateral develops the conditions under which a personal guarantee rather than 
collateral will emerge as the equilibrium form of credit enhancement.  Extensions of the 
Basic Model shows how both collateral and a personal guarantee might appear in the 
equilibrium loan contract and analyzes the effect of a monopolistic credit market on the 
optimal contract.  The section also examines extensions of the model to situations where 
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both guarantees and collateral might be used and the choice between the two when credit 
markets are not competitive.  Summary and Implications summarizes the results of the 
analysis, identifies its empirical predictions, and discusses its implications for public 
policy. 
The Use of Credit Enhancement in Debt Contracting 
 Were the credit market for small to medium sized enterprises (SME) complete, 
information regarding their financial condition and future prospects available in the 
public domain, and action choices of their management observable, all investments with 
positive net present values would be financed at a rate equal to the risk-free interest rate 
plus a borrower-state specific risk premium.  In this ideal Arrow-Debreu world, financing 
contracts, given amount and maturity, would be written in the dimension of state specific 
interest rates and directly placed with investors.  Credit enhancement in the form of 
collateral and/or personal guarantees of the owner(s) would have no role in improving the 
efficiency of credit markets.  Further, in view of the deadweight costs associated with its 
use, credit enhancement would be not only unnecessary, but inefficient.  
 However, credit markets involving SMEs are characterized by market 
imperfections in the form of informational asymmetries (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) and transactions costs.  SMEs are by definition small, and in practice, are 
highly opaque private businesses.  Potential lenders in this market face several substantial 
informational obstacles.  Prior to making a loan, the potential lender must assess the 
likelihood of full and timely repayment of the loan.  In the literature, this process is 
referred to as “screening” and involves obtaining and processing information regarding 
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the borrower’s business, finances, managerial capability, past performance, reputation, 
competitors, market position, investment plans, etc.  The goal of this process can be 
viewed as estimating the probability the borrower will repay the loan principle and 
interest when due from its normal operations.  The process is similar to that performed by 
rating agencies for the publicly traded debt obligations of larger businesses.  In the case 
of SMEs however, each potential lender must obtain and process the private information 
of the borrower.  This screening process is time consuming and costly.1  Credit contracts 
containing credit enhancement requirements as well as an interest rate can improve the 
efficiency of screening both by mitigating adverse selection and by providing lenders 
with an alternative source of repayment should the borrowing firm’s cash flows from 
operations be insufficient to repay its loan.2   
 The second form of informational problem, moral hazard, arises once the loan is 
made.  Moral hazard in the SME credit market can take three distinct forms: the 
assumption of additional business risk by the borrower after the contract has been signed, 
a hidden diversion of assets from the business to the business owner before repayment is 
made, and a hidden choice by the borrower of a suboptimal level of effort.  The 
incentives to engage in these behaviors arise from the overlap of managerial and 
ownership roles which are typical in small businesses and which confound the firm’s 
profit and the owner’s utility.  These incentives can be affected by the terms of the loan 
contract, and generally increase with the interest rate and other loan costs.  Credit 
                                                          
1 Berger and Udell (2005) provide a comprehensive overview of the different lending technologies used by 
financial intermediaries to screen loan requests for small businesses.  
2 This role of collateral is studied by Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) who develop the “Lazy Bank 
Hypothesis” under which banks inefficiently substitute collateral for screening and monitoring.  
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enhancement, in contrast, is a mechanism to mitigate moral hazard by providing 
offsetting the manager/owner’s perverse incentives. 3  As a result, credit enhancement 
reduces the need for the lender to engage in expensive monitoring of the borrower’s 
activities.  In doing so, it makes it feasible for an external investor to rely on a simple 
debt contract, as opposed to equity, which specifies outcomes in only two possible states 
of the world — when the borrower pays as the contract specifies or upon default.     
 Figure 1.1 provides a schematic of the steps in the credit contracting process when 
credit enhancement is included as a term in the credit contract.  In this simple model, the 
entrepreneur borrows L to finance a project that yields a gross return of R.  The loan calls 
for a repayment equal to L (1+i), where i is the interest rate charged on the loan.  Once 
the contract is signed the borrower operates the project and makes choices which affect 
its outcome and the lender can only observe by performing costly monitoring.  At the end 
of the project the borrower repays the loan in full when R ≥ L(1+i) or, if R is lower, gives 
the lender all of R and makes up the deficit out of the liquidated collateral or, under a 
guarantee, the liquidated personal wealth.    
The impact of credit enhancement on the credit contract can be illustrated by 
looking at the lender’s expected profit: )1(]*)1()1([][ rLEVpiLpE ss +−−++=Π  
where ps is the probability of repayment through firm operations, L is the loan principle, i 
is the loan interest rate, r is the lender’s marginal cost of funds and EV  is the liquidation 
value of the credit enhancement.  In a competitive credit market, which we assume for 
                                                          
3 Coco (2000) provides a survey of the literature on collateral.  
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most of this essay, E[Π]=0, and credit enhancement increases the lender’s return when 
R< in the default state when EV > R.  To maintain a zero expected profit, the contract 
must also call for a lower gross interest (1+i), thus a lower cost of capital.  As we see 
below, credit enhancement also provides the entrepreneur with incentives to provide 
more effort which increases ps.  The increase in the probability of full repayment also 
increases the lender’s expected profit, and so competition requires a further decrease in 
the interest rate charged to the borrower.  Therefore, credit enhancement lowers interest 
costs to borrowers in the small business loan market by simultaneously increasing the 
probability of full repayment as well as the amount repaid if default occurs.  
 Because credit enhancement can reduce the cost of capital and mitigate moral 
hazard, it is not surprising it is widely used in small business loan contracts.  The primary 
forms credit enhancement takes, moreover, are collateral and personal guarantees.  Table 
1.1 illustrates this generalization using information about more than 1300 contracts for 
lines of credit taken out by small businesses in 2003.4  Three-quarters of these firms, all 
of who operated under limited liability rules, used some form of credit enhancement to 
secure their loans — which underscores the pervasiveness of these mechanisms at least 
within this one very important market. 5  I am more concerned here however, with the 
type of enhancement that was used — 44 percent of the enhancements took the form of 
personal guarantees, while only 20 percent used collateral.  The remaining lines of credit 
                                                          
4 The information in Table 1.1 was extracted from the public use form of the Federal Reserve Board’s 2003 
Survey of Small Business Finance. 
5 Further evidence can be found in Leeth and Scott (1989) who report that over 60 percent of small business 
loans in the 1980 and 1982 National Federation of Business surveys were collateralized and Berger and 
Udell (1990) who report that 70 percent of US commercial and industrial loans were secured.  
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which were enhanced used both a guarantee and collateral.  Although the literature has 
recognized and explained the role credit enhancement plays in general, it has yet to 
confront the choice of using collateral or personal guarantees for this purpose.  
Differences Between Collateral and Guarantees as Credit Enhancements 
 Despite their pervasive use as a form of credit enhancement in the SME credit 
market, little has been said about guarantees in the theoretical literature on credit 
enhancement.  Mann (1997) does specifically identify personal guarantees of the owner-
manager as a “particularly effective tool for limiting the borrower’s risk preference 
incentives… by enhancing the likelihood that the principal will feel any losses 
personally.” 6  In their chapter on small business and debt finance, Berger and Udell 
(2000) write that “personal guarantees are an important contracting tool in small business 
lending.”  They further describe guarantees as similar to outside collateral with “three 
important exceptions.” The exceptions identified are: 1) a guarantee conveys a claim 
against the entire net worth of the guarantor rather than a claim only against the specific 
assets serving as collateral; 2) a guarantee imposes no constraint on the use or disposition 
of personal assets, as is the case with assets pledged as collateral; and 3) legislative 
provisions such as homestead exemptions under state personal bankruptcy law may limit 
access to some forms of guarantor wealth when the lender attempts to collect under a  
                                                          
6 Mann’s 1997 article in the Georgetown Legal Journal on the role of Collateral in Small Business lending 
is referred to by a sizable portion of the empirical literature.   
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guarantee.7  While these characterizations are generally accurate, a more complete and 
specific discussion is required to identify the differences between collateral and 
guarantees that determine the conditions under which one form of enhancement is 
preferred to the other. 
 Collateral involves the legal pledging or granting of a security interest in a 
specific asset (or assets) to the lender.  In the event of borrower default, the lender may 
take action to convert its contingent claim on the designated asset(s) into outright 
ownership and sell the asset in settlement of its claim on the borrower.  The amount 
received by the lender in liquidation depends on the market for the specific asset at the 
time of default and liquidation, the efficacy of the lender in disposing of assets with, 
generally, limited liquidity, and the costs of marketing and selling the asset.  The current 
conditions in the residential and commercial real estate markets provide an extreme 
example of the potential for erosion of the market value for assets serving as collateral 
and for the liquidity risks associated with collateral.  
Depending on the specific type of asset pledged (e.g. real property, titled vehicles, 
equipment, inventory, or accounts receivable), security interests are recorded through 
mortgage or deed of trust recordings, title registrations, Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) filings, or even possession by the lender.  The costs of perfecting the lender’s 
security interest in pledged assets are generally non-trivial and often significant.  
                                                          
7 This latter limitation would not pertain to collateral supported by a perfected security interest.  
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Furthermore, since they are incurred ex-ante, these transaction costs are incurred whether 
or not default and collateral liquidation subsequently take place.  Similarly, lender 
monitoring costs and borrower utility losses from use and disposal restrictions placed on 
pledged assets are incurred prior to any need to rely on collateral liquidation for 
repayment.  Though the lender is granted contingent property rights to specific assets, the 
lender’s liquidation value depends on the market value of the collateral at the time of 
liquidation less transactions costs incurred in transferring ownership to the lender and in 
the subsequent sale of the collateral.  These collateral liquidation costs can be substantial.  
The literature has generally held that the collateral liquidation costs incurred by lenders 
exceed those which would be incurred if the assets were liquidated in the normal course 
of business by the asset owner.  To summarize, collateral is costly to implement and 
maintain, these costs are incurred whether or not there is a default which results in 
liquidation of the collateral, and the amount realized in liquidation may be less that the 
borrower’s unpaid debt.  
More recently the literature has begun to differentiate between “inside” (business 
owned) collateral and “outside” (personally owned) collateral.  Inside collateral consists 
of assets owned and pledged by the borrowing business firm.  In the event of bankruptcy 
of a limited liability business, inside collateral orders the priority of payments to creditors 
from the liquidation of firm assets.  Inside collateral does not augment firm resources for 
affecting creditor payments.  Outside collateral consists of assets owned not by the 
borrowing firm, but by a third party.  In the small business market, this third party is 
almost invariably the firm’s owner(s).  Outside collateral augments the potential 
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resources available for creditor repayment in cases where firm resources alone are 
insufficient to affect full repayment in liquidation.   
 This distinction between inside and outside collateral is, generally, an implicit one 
in the theoretical literature.  The empirical literature on collateral has only recently begun 
to differentiate between inside and outside collateral.  In the case of SMEs, which are 
overwhelmingly owned by individuals or families, the distinction between collateralizing 
with firm-owned versus personally owned assets may be less important.  The 
concentrated ownership of these firms has the ability to divert unpledged business assets 
to either personal use or to personal ownership.  
 Guarantees do not convey a claim against specific assets.  Rather, they represent 
a contingent claim against the guarantor’s net worth.  The claim is contingent on the 
borrower’s default on the guaranteed loan.  Should the borrower default, the guaranteed 
lender has an unsecured claim against the guarantor.  Guarantees are generally written for 
n unlimited amount or for a specific amount corresponding to the amount of the loan.  In 
either case the potential amount of the contingent claim is limited to the loan amount.8 
 In the event of business default, the repayment value of the guarantee to the 
lender is the lesser of the amount owed to the bank or the guarantor’s net worth less 
transaction costs incurred by the guarantor in converting assets into liquid form.  Thus, 
the outside net worth of the guarantor at the time of default is positively associated with 
the lender’s return should the borrower fail.  Guarantees are an “outside” form of credit 
enhancement for debts of firms organized with limited liability.  Debts of firms organized 
                                                          
8 There is frequently a provision which extends the guarantee to cover accrued interest and collection 
expenses in addition to the unpaid balance on the defaulted loan.   
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without limited liability (i.e.  proprietorships and general partnerships) are implicitly 
guaranteed by their owners or general partners.  
 Transactions costs and utility losses associated with the execution and 
maintenance of guarantees are negligible and, importantly, considerably less than those 
incurred with collateral.  With no recording fees and no third party appraisals, the ex-ante 
cost to execute a guarantee is proximately zero.  The cost of monitoring the guarantee 
during the term of the loan is similarly negligible.  Further, with no requirement to pledge 
or otherwise encumber assets, a guarantee does not engender any utility loss to the 
business owner from diminished dominion over the assets which comprise his wealth.  
Finally, in the event of business default, the costs associated with asset liquidation to 
make payment under a guarantee are incurred by the guarantor.  A wealthy guarantor can 
choose those assets with the lowest liquidation costs should he have to perform under his 
contingent obligation.  This ability of the guarantor to select assets to liquidate is in direct 
contrast to the situation faced by a secured lender and can be expected to yield lower 
proportionate liquidation costs under a guarantee than under collateralization in the event 
of business failure. 
As forms of credit enhancement, collateral and guarantees differ in two 
fundamental ways.  The first is structural, collateral is asset specific but dollar uncertain, 
while a guarantee is asset uncertain but nominally dollar specific.  In the event of non-
payment of the loan, collateral provides the lender with the right to take possession and 
liquidate a specific asset (or specific assets).  The lender’s dollar repayment value from 
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the collateral depends on the market price for that asset at the time of liquidation less 
transactions costs associated with “foreclosure” and sale of the asset by the secured 
lender.  In contrast, a guarantee represents a non-specific, contingent claim on the 
guarantor’s general net worth.  It is the guarantor who chooses which assets to liquidate 
to meet obligations under the guarantee.  A guarantee is nominally dollar specific.  It may 
be written for a specific dollar amount, usually the loan amount, or for an “unlimited” 
amount.9  In either case, the actual repayment value of the guarantee will be less than its 
nominal amount if the guarantor has insufficient wealth to make full payment under the 
guarantee at the time of default.  
The second, and very important, difference between collateral and a guarantee is 
the amount of dissipative costs associated with their use and when these costs are 
incurred.  In this context, dissipative costs are dead-weight efficiency losses which arise 
from transactions costs or utility losses associated with the implementation of credit 
enhancements.10  As discussed above, the transactions costs and utility losses associated 
with collateral are strictly positive and can be substantial.  In the case of guarantees, these 
dissipative costs are absent or negligible.  Additionally, transactions costs associated with 
a guarantee are only incurred in cases where the business defaults, while the costs of 
obtaining and perfecting security interests in collateral are incurred without regard to 
subsequent business performance.  These differences have not previously been 
                                                          
9 The repayment value of an “unlimited” guarantee is limited to the amount owed at the time of default. 
10 In keeping with the extant theoretic debt contracting literature, I abstract from issues of non-optimal risk 
sharing by assuming that both the borrower and lender are risk neutral. 
 
 
15 
 
formalized or addressed in the theoretical literature on credit contracting which focuses 
on the use of collateral.  
Review of the Literature on Collateral Theory 
 Given the dissipative costs associated with its use, for collateral to appear in credit 
contracts in competitive SME credit markets, it must decrease the borrowers’ cost of 
capital.11  The pervasive observed use of collateral in small business loans has motivated 
an extensive theoretical literature which seeks to show how collateral can mitigate market 
failures and frictions in small business credit markets.  This literature offers a wide range 
of models to show how collateral can provide efficiency gains in diverse modeling 
structures and environments.  To provide some structure to this diverse literature, I have 
mapped these studies into four broad categories based on how collateral can improve the 
efficiency of credit market contracts; 1) by establishing the relative priority of claims 
among multiple creditors; 2) by accommodating differences in lender-borrower 
evaluations of project risk; 3) by overcoming informational problems associated with 
adverse selection; and 4) by mitigating moral hazard.  
 Several papers focus on the role of collateral in establishing priority among 
multiple creditors.  These theories are most applicable to public debt issued by large 
firms.  Large firms are more likely to contract with multiple creditors and to issue 
multiple layers of debt among them, than are small businesses which tend to raise all debt 
                                                          
11 Collateral use may decrease the “infinite” cost of capital faced by some borrowers who would otherwise 
be rationed out of the SME credit market.  
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with a single intermediary.12  Within these more complex debt structures, the order of 
priority under which debt holders will be repaid if the borrowing firm defaults needs to 
be specified within the many debt contracts so that potentially high bankruptcy costs can 
be lowered.  Scott (1977) and Schwartz (1981) show how issuance of secured debt can 
reduce the ex-ante cost of capital by reducing ex post expected bankruptcy costs.  Other 
studies in this category use an incomplete contract approach to show how the use of 
secured debt reduces incentives for inefficient liquidation and supports renegotiation in 
the face of financial distress.13  Finally, Smith and Warner (1979) argue the use of 
collateralized debt prevents borrowers from undertaking riskier projects with debt 
proceeds.  Their argument is based on the inability of the borrower to sell assets used as 
collateral to finance other, riskier asset investments.  The priority models implicitly deal 
with inside collateral and generate a positive correlation between the riskiness of the 
borrower and the benefits of collateralization.  
 A second class of models finds an efficiency improving role for collateral where 
the lender and borrower have differing beliefs regarding expected business returns, the 
probability of business success, or the variance of firm cash flows.  A common feature of 
these models is an optimistic entrepreneur whose belief about the probability of success 
or expected returns exceeds those of the lender.  If the lender can assess the repayment 
value of collateral with sufficient certainty, then credit contracts which use collateral will 
produce lower costs of capital than those in which interest rates alone must compensate 
                                                          
12 In the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, approximately three quarters of small businesses that 
borrow have only one institutional lender.  
13 Examples of these works include Bester (1985), Swary and Udell (1988), and Gorton and Kahn (2000). 
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the lender for its relatively pessimistic assessment of the probability of project success 
and expected project return.  Chan and Kanatas (1985) provide the standard in this class 
of models by showing how collateral lowers the cost of capital when the lender and 
borrower hold disparate beliefs about the future cash flows of the project being funded. 14  
Other papers in this category include those of Barro (1976), who models an environment 
where borrowers and lenders have ex-ante disparate beliefs regarding the variance in 
collateral values at loan maturity, and de Meza and Southey (1996), who model an 
environment where new small business entrepreneurs overestimate their probabilities of 
success.  These models deal with outside collateral, are primarily applicable to the 
informationally opaque SME credit markets, and generally find borrower risk and 
collateral use are positively related.  
 The majority of theoretical work, and the final two classes of models to be 
examined here, explain collateral as a mechanism which mitigates market failures 
associated with information problems in the small business credit market.  As Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) show, the credit supply function in the opaque environment of SME 
lending is not monotonically increasing in the interest rate.  As the interest rate (price of 
credit) increases, two forms of informational asymmetries can cause a lender’s profits to 
fall, which in turn, causes the borrower’s cost of credit to increase.  The first is 
deterioration in the quality of the borrowers seeking a loan as a result of adverse selection 
— riskier borrowers enter as applicants and lower risk borrowers drop out as the market 
                                                          
14 This paper was the first (and only) collateral theory paper to explicitly discuss the difference between 
inside and outside collateral.  
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rate of interest increases.  Moral hazard is the second information problem which is 
exacerbated by high interest rates.  In this case, borrowers have the incentive after the 
loan contract has been signed to increase the project’s risk, to reduce effort in the face of 
unfavorable states of the world, or to under report cash flows available to repay debts.    
 Models of adverse selection rationalize collateral use in a framework where 
lenders are less informed about borrowers’ credit worthiness than are borrowers.  Since 
the expected cost of collateral is higher for borrowers with higher default probabilities, 
willingness to pledge (outside) assets as collateral serves as a valid signal of the 
borrower’s riskiness.  Depending on the model, this positive correlation between the 
borrower’s default probability and expected cost of collateral, leads to credit contracts in 
the interest rate/collateral space which produce either a separating equilibrium or a 
complete sorting by risk.  Examples of collateral models showing how the use of 
collateral as a contracting variable can mitigate credit market failures caused by adverse 
selection include Wette (1983), Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas (1985), Bester (1987), 
Besanko and Thakor (1987), Sharpe (1990), and Coco (2000).  An empirical challenge 
faced by these adverse selection models is their conclusion that lower risk firms, for 
which collateral is less costly, pledge collateral and pay a low interest rate while higher 
risk firms pay high interest rates but pledge no collateral.  This pattern of correlation 
between borrower risk and collateral is counter to that reported by both practitioners 
(Morsman, 1986) and the preponderance of empirical evidence on the correlation 
between borrower risk and collateral use (Steijers and Voordeckers, 2009).  
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 Frameworks which rely on moral hazard represent the fourth, and last, broad 
categories of models which explain the use of collateral.  This literature considers three 
different types of moral hazard.  In each case, higher interest rates in the loan contract 
increase incentives for the borrower to take ex-post actions which reduce the expected 
return to the lender.  When effort is both costly to the owner-manager and a determinant 
of the expected return of the business, an increase in the interest rate has two effects on 
the lender’s expected return.  The direct effect is to increase the bank’s return in states of 
business performance where firm cash flows are sufficient to repay the debt.  The indirect 
effect, however, is to reduce the likelihood the borrower will experience a state where 
cash flows can repay debt.  The reduced likelihood of experiencing states where cash 
flows are sufficient results from the perverse effect of interest rate increases on the 
borrower’s return to effort.  Watson (1984) develops the first model showing how 
collateral can improve efficiency when borrower effort is endogenous.  Collateral 
improves efficiency by increasing the marginal returns to effort in states where the 
borrower defaults.  
Another form of moral hazard is the incentive for the borrower to undertake 
riskier business strategies once the credit contract has been accepted.  The borrower’s 
return from operating the business is the expected value of cash flows which exceed 
principal and interest payments on their debt.  Increasing the interest rate on the loan 
reduces the support over which the borrower earns a net return.  After receiving a loan to 
finance a given “project” with given risk and return characteristics, the borrower can 
increase expected return at the expense of the lender by investing in a project with a 
 
 
20 
 
higher return, if successful, but with a lower probability of success.  Adding collateral as 
a term in the debt contract removes the incentive for the borrower to pursue higher risk 
business strategies by increasing the degree to which losses are incurred by the owner-
manager rather than by the lender.  
The third class of moral hazard models builds on the costly state verification 
models of Townsend (1978), Diamond (1984), and Gale and Hellwig (1986).  The 
environment in these models is one in which the firm’s realized return or cash flow is   
ex-post private information of the borrower.  This framework highlights the borrower’s 
incentive to underreport returns to the lender or, alternatively, to divert firm funds to 
personal use rather than to repay the lender.  This incentive may be particularly 
applicable when firm cash flows are insufficient to meet debt repayments.  To reduce 
borrower incentives to appropriate returns, lenders engage in costly “state verification,” 
such as requiring audited financial statements, review of debits and credits to the 
borrower’s demand deposit account, etc., or threaten liquidation.  Barrow (1976) and 
Black and de Meza (1992) demonstrate how collateral can improve efficiency by 
counteracting borrower incentives to underreport or divert business returns. 
 All three types of moral hazard based models are consistent with the ubiquitous 
observed use of collateral in the SME credit market, (Coco, 2009).  Further, unlike 
models developed in the context of adverse selection, they do not predict a negative 
correlation between borrower risk and the use of collateral.  The model developed in the 
next section is within this tradition.   
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A Collateral Model with Moral Hazard 15 
As suggested in the preceding review of the theoretical literature on collateral, the 
literature has, to date, not addressed differences between collateral and personal 
guarantees of the business owner as types of credit enhancement.  Thus, we know little 
about the contracting circumstances under which credit enhancement will take the form 
of a guarantee rather than of collateral.  
 In this section, I extend a simple model of credit contracting under moral hazard 
to include the full range of costs associated with the use of collateral.  This extension 
adds the up-front, fixed costs incurred to appraise and perfect a security interest in the 
assets serving as collateral.  It also recognizes the borrower’s utility losses which arise 
from diminished ownership rights in assets pledged as collateral.  In the following section 
the same basic model is modified to incorporate the transactions costs associated with a 
guarantee.  I then show if the guarantor has sufficient outside net worth, the equilibrium 
form of credit enhancement will be a guarantee.  If the guarantor has insufficient wealth, 
enhancement will be achieved with collateral. 
 In a model with moral hazard, collateral plays an incentive role in the borrower’s 
ex post choice of action or effort level.  This environment is particularly applicable to 
lines of credit in the SME credit market.  Lines of credit afford the borrower access to 
new funds (up to the commitment amount) over the term of the line commitment (usually 
one year).  Funds are generally disbursed at the borrower’s demand without the 
disbursement controls associated with loans granted for specific asset acquisitions, such 
                                                          
15 This model is based on Boot and Thakor (1994).  
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as commercial mortgage loans, equipment loans, and vehicle loans.  The inherent 
flexibility in the line of credit structure provides increased opportunity for the borrower 
to take actions after the contract is signed which are not socially optimal.16  The privately 
held nature of MSEs and preponderance of owner management provides clear 
opportunity for confounding of the firm’s profit function with the utility of the owners.  
 A moral hazard model also has the advantage of consistency with the pattern of 
risk and collateral use most frequently found in the empirical literature.  In their recent 
survey of the literature, Steijers and Voordeckers (2009) conclude studies of the 
relationship between SME risk and the propensity for the firm’s debt to be enhanced with 
collateral have almost uniformly found collateral use is positively related to measures of 
firm risk.  These results are at odds with the relationship predicted by adverse selection 
models and suggest the adverse selection mechanism may not be prevalent in the SME 
credit markets.  
Model Assumptions  
A1)  The borrower and lender are both risk-neutral agents.  
A2)  Credit markets are competitive, so the lender’s participation constraint is 
binding.  
A3)  The bank lender has access to loanable funds at a constant marginal cost, r, 
the riskless interest rate, and lends at interest rates, i, with i ≥ r. 
                                                          
16 In the model that follows socially optimality means that an owner of the project expends “high” effort so 
that it will succeed rather than a lower level of effort.  
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A4)  The borrower has an investment opportunity costing $1 and, if successful, 
yielding a one-time gross return of R > 1 one year later.  If unsuccessful, the 
investment return is 0.  
A5)  The probability of project success, p, is a function of the effort level, e, 
chosen by the borrower with p(0) = 0, p΄(e) > 0 and p΄΄(e) < 0.  For simplicity, the 
set of effort levels is {0, e2, e1} with 0 < e2 < e1, where e1 represents the feasible 
first best effort level and e2 represents a second best effort level.  The probabilities 
of project success associated with these effort levels are, p(0) <  p(e2) < p(e1) .17  
A6)  Effort is costly to the owner-manager.  This cost or disutility of effort is 
given by V(e) with V(0) = 0 , V΄(e) > 0 and V΄΄(e) > 0, so V(e0) < V(e2) < V(e1). 
A7)  The borrower’s expected internal rate of return on the project is greater than 
the interest rate, i*, offered in the loan contract so the borrower will undertake the 
project if financing is offered.  Therefore the effective choice set for effort levels 
is {e2, e1}. 
A8)  The borrower is organized with limited liability and returns to unsecured 
claimants in bankruptcy are 0.  This means the only sources of repayment to the 
lender are project returns, R, and proceeds from the liquidation of collateral. 
A9)  The firm is privately and closely held.  Therefore, firm-owned assets not 
pledged as collateral can be liquidated and proceeds diverted to the owner. Thus, 
                                                          
17 I will refer to e as effort level; however, it may stand for other ex-post actions such as additional risk 
assumption or asset diversion. 
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collateral pledged, C, may be either inside collateral (firm-owned) or outside 
collateral (property owned personally by the business owner).18 
A10)  Collateral is costly in three ways:  
1)  The lender’s fixed transactions costs, δ1, incurred to both 
evaluate and legally perfect security interests in the collateral 
before the loan is closed as well as the expected costs of 
monitoring collateral during the loan term. 
2) A proportional utility loss, δ2, to the borrower associated with 
the loss of full property rights to the collateral while it is 
pledged to the lender. 
3) The proportional loss in the going value of the collateral, (1-
δ3), that occurs if default occurs and it has to be liquidated.  
Under this specification the proportion δ3 represents the 
salvage value of the collateral.   
A11)  The borrower has an initial endowment of wealth, W0 > 0.  The borrower 
could liquidate wealth to self-finance a portion of the project or, if W0  > 1, the 
entire project.  Liquidating wealth is, however, costly and yields investible funds 
of only δg ∙W0, with 0 < δg <1.  I assume that δg <1/(1+i*).  That is, proportionate 
wealth  liquidation costs are high enough that the effective cost of equity financing 
                                                          
18 This assumption differs from much of the literature but captures a key agency problem in dealing with a 
closely held, private business where personal utility and business objective functions are likely to be 
confounded.  
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provided by liquidating wealth is greater than the cost of debt capital. The 
borrower, therefore, will seek to finance the project in the intermediated credit 
market.  
The Optimal Debt Contract with Collateral 
 In an environment where effort level is the sole form of private information, the 
borrower seeks to undertake a project with an expected rate of return greater that the 
market rate of interest.  The project costs $1 and provides two possible returns at the end 
of one year: R > $1 if successful, and $0 if not.  The probability of achieving a project 
success, p(e), is an increasing function of the owner-manager’s effort level, e.  There is, 
however, disutility associated with effort, V(e), with V΄(e) > 0 and V΄΄(e) > 0.  The 
borrower chooses an effort level, e*, to maximize his utility after a credit contract is 
offered by the lender.  
 Since the credit market is assumed to be perfectly competitive and there is no 
informational advantage accruing to an existing bank, all banks will earn zero expected 
profits and all expected surplus will go to the borrower.  This environment is modeled as 
one in which a competitive bank designs and offers a contract which maximizes the 
borrower’s expected net return from its project subject to lender’s binding participation 
constraint. 
 More formally, the lender designs the credit contract, {i,C}, consisting of an 
interest rate, i, and collateral requirement, C.  The effort level chosen is not observable 
and thus cannot be an element of the credit contract.  Since there are no ex-ante 
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informational frictions, however, all potential lenders know the probability of project 
success, p(e), at each effort level in the borrower’s choice set; the borrower’s utility cost, 
V(e), associated with each effort level; and the return, R, on a successful project.  By 
assumption A3, lenders face the same infinitely elastic supply of loanable funds, at a cost 
of r in the deposit market.  Further, under perfect competition, all lenders employ 
identical lending technologies and thus face the same costs for perfecting their security 
interest in collateral and face identical foreclosure and liquidation costs.  As a result, δ1 
and δ3 are common to all lenders.  The lender then designs and offers a secured credit 
contract in the interest rate/collateral space, {i, C}, that solves the following program: 
 :},{ CiMax   *)(*)](1[()1*)((*)()( 2 eVCCepiepRepUE b −−−−+−= δ        (C1) 
Subject to: 
2a.  the bank’s participation constraint requiring non-negative expected profits:  
)1(*)](1[)1*)(()( 13 rCepiepE L +≥−−++=Π δδ                               (C2) 
2b.  the incentive compatibility constraint for the borrower’s choice of effort  
 
level:  
 
 
∈*e   )}()](1[)1)(()(max{arg 2 eVCCepiepRep −−−−+− δ               (C3) 
        
 
3b.  the non-negativity or feasibility constraints on the contracting variables: 
            i ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 
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 Were the borrower’s choice of effort level observable, the optimal equilibrium 
contract would be an unsecured loan.  The competitive lender would set C = 0 to avoid 
the dissipative costs, δ1, δ2 and (1- δ3), associated with collateralization.  The equilibrium 
interest rate would then be the zero profit solution to the lender’s participation constraint, 
(C2), with C = 0: 𝐸(𝜋𝐿) = 𝑝(𝑒𝑖)(1 + 𝑖) + �1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑖)�𝛿30 − 0 − (1 + 𝑟) = 0.  Solving 
for the interest rate we have: i* = (1+𝑟)
𝑝(𝑒𝑖)
 -1 where ei is the borrower’s effort level that 
maximizes his expected utility.             
 If effort level is observable, it can be a term in the credit contract and the 
borrower’s incentive compatibility contract, (C3), need not be considered.  Instead, the 
first best effort choice, e*, = )}(1)(max{arg ii eVRep −− : the effort level that maximizes 
the borrower’s expected net utility gain from undertaking the project.  We assume that   
e* = e1, the first best feasible effort level, so the optimal contract with observable effort is  
Collateral Result 1: {𝑖∗,𝐶∗} = �
(1+𝑟)
𝑝(𝑒1)
, 0 |𝑒 = 𝑒1
(𝑅 − 1), 0 |𝑒 ≠ 𝑒1
                                                         (C4) 
The equilibrium credit contract with observable effort is unsecured, with an interest rate 
just sufficient to provide the lender with zero expected profit if the borrower exerts effort 
level e1 and an interest rate set to take all project returns if the borrower exerts an effort 
level other than e1.  Under this contract, the borrower will choose effort level e1 and the 
lender’s realized profit will be 
 𝑝(𝑒1)
(1+𝑟)
𝑝(𝑒1)
− (1 + 𝑟) = 0                                                                     (C5) 
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 If effort level is not observable and moral hazard exists, an unsecured loan is no  
 
longer efficient.  If effort level is private information of the borrower, it cannot be an  
 
element of the credit contract as in C4.  Rather, the incentive compatibility constraint, C3,  
 
must hold so that 𝑝(𝑒1)�𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)� − 𝑉(𝑒1) > 𝑝(𝑒2)�𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)� − 𝑉(𝑒2) for the 
 
borrower to choose e1.  If, however, moral hazard exists, then by definition  
 
 
   𝑝(𝑒1) �𝑅 −
(1+𝑟)
𝑝(𝑒1)
�  − 𝑉(𝑒1) < 𝑝(𝑒2) �𝑅 −
(1+𝑟)
𝑝(𝑒1)
�  − 𝑉(𝑒2)                 (C6)  
 
and the borrower will choose the lower, second best effort level, e2.  The lender  
anticipates this and sets the interest rate,  
 
 
     i* = (1+r)/p(e2) -  1 > (1+r)/p(e1) - 1.                    (C7)  
 
 
 Thus, in the face of moral hazard and non-observable effort level, an unsecured 
credit contract cannot support a first best effort level.  The higher interest rate charged by 
the lender, (1+r)/p(e2) reduces the borrower’s return to effort in the successful state and 
so fails to support the choice of an efficient effort level.    
Collateral Result 2: In the face of moral hazard and non-observable effort level, an 
unsecured credit contract is inefficient.  
I now show how collateral can improve the efficiency of inter temporal trade in 
cash flows in a debt contracting environment characterized by moral hazard.  For a  
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secured debt contract, {i,C} with C > 0, to provide a more efficient equilibrium contract,  
 
it must be that 
 
 
𝑝(𝑒1)[𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)] − (1 − 𝑝(𝑒1))𝐶 − 𝛿2𝐶 − 𝑉(𝑒1) > 𝑝(𝑒2)[𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)] − 𝑉(𝑒2).            (C8)  
 
That is, the borrower’s expected utility gain with a secured loan and a first best effort 
choice must be greater than the borrower’s expected utility gain from an unsecured loan 
and the second best effort level.  
I begin by restating the lender’s participation constraint, (C2), and the borrower’s 
incentive compatibility constraint, (C3), to reflect the first best feasible and second best 
effort levels:19  
The bank must earn non-negative expected profits: 
    𝑝(𝑒1)[(1 + 𝑖)] + [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3𝐶 − 𝛿1 − (1 + 𝑟) ≥ 0                      (C9) 
Under the terms of the credit contract, the borrower must be at least as well off if 
e1 is chosen instead of e2:   
𝑝(𝑒1)[(𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)]) − [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝐶 − 𝛿2𝐶 − 𝑉(𝑒1) ≥ 
𝑝(𝑒2)�𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)� − [1 − 𝑝(𝑒2)]𝐶 − 𝛿2𝐶 − 𝑉(𝑒2)                                      (C10) 
  
                                                          
19 The term ‘feasible first best effort level’ is used to emphasize that the optimal of first first-best effort 
level can only be obtained in the case of observable effort choice.  
 
 
30 
 
 The Lagrangian for deriving the optimal credit contract in the {i,C}space can 
now be written as follows:  
    ℒ = 𝑝(𝑒1)[𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)]− [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝐶 − 𝛿2𝐶 − 𝑉(𝑒1)                                        (C11) 
        − 𝛾{(1 + 𝑟) + 𝛿1 −  𝑝(𝑒1)(1 + 𝑖) − [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3𝐶 
       –  𝜑{−[𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)][𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖)] − [𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)]𝐶 + [𝑉(𝑒1) − 𝑉(𝑒2)]}   
With the two first order conditions: 
FOC 1:  𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑖
= −𝑝(𝑒1) + 𝛾𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝜑 [𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)] = 0                                          (C12) 
FOC 2:   𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐶
= −[1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]− 𝛿2 + 𝛾[1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3 + 𝜑[𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)] = 0        (C13) 
The two first order conditions can be used to derive expressions for the two 
Lagrangian multipliers:  
               𝛾 = 1+𝛿2
((1−𝑝(𝑒1))𝛿3+𝑝(𝑒1)
   > 0                                                 (C14) 
             𝜑 = 𝑝(𝑒1)
[𝑝(𝑒1)−𝑝(𝑒2)]
� 1+𝛿2[1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3+𝑝(𝑒1) −  1�  > 0                     (C15) 
Since both multipliers are non-zero, the lender’s participation constraint, (C9), and the 
borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint, (C10), can be written as equalities and 
solved for the optimal interest rate and collateral amount, {i*,C*}.  The results below 
give the optimal equilibrium credit contract.  
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Collateral Result 3:   𝑖∗ = 1+𝑟+𝛿1
𝑝(𝑒1)
− [1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3𝐶
∗
𝑝(𝑒1)
− 1                                   (C16) 
            𝐶∗= 𝑝(𝑒1)[1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3+𝑝(𝑒1) [
𝑉(𝑒1)−𝑉(𝑒2)
𝑝(𝑒1)−𝑝(𝑒2)
−  𝑅 + (1+𝑟)+𝛿1
𝑝(𝑒1)
]            (C17) 
These results show that an optimal contract involving the use of collateral can 
reduce moral hazard and elicit the borrower’s choice of e1.  Collateral enables this result 
in two related ways.  First, collateral increases the utility loss to the borrower in the 
unsuccessful state.  The borrower consequently has incentive to expend greater effort to 
increase the probability of investment success.  Secondly, by increasing the lender’s 
return in the unsuccessful state, the use of collateral allows a competitive lender to meet 
its participation constraint with a lower interest rate in the successful state.  This lower 
interest rate increases the borrower’s marginal return to effort.  The effects of the interest 
rate and collateral on returns to effort can be more formally derived by taking the partial 
derivative of the borrower’s utility function (1) with respect to effort: 
   𝜕𝑈𝑏
𝜕𝑒
= 𝑝′(𝑒)[ 𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖) + 𝐶] −  𝑉′(𝑒)                    (C18)  
 
 
which is decreasing in i and increasing in C. 
 
If the borrower has sufficient collateralizable wealth to make the return to the 
lender independent of project success, then a simple form for the optimal contract,          
i* = r + δ1 and C* = (1 + r + δ1)/δ3, can be derived from the lender’s zero profit 
participation constraint at an effort level of e1.  In this situation, the lender’s claim is no 
longer risky.  This result highlights the role of collateral as an incentive device in 
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environments of moral hazard.  This role is independent of the degree of fundamental 
repayment risk, p(e1).  The guarantee model developed in the next section will show 
however, that such a wealthy borrower will be better off guaranteeing the loan rather than 
providing this amount of collateral. 
It is also important to note that the efficiency gain provided by collateral must 
exceed the dissipative or dead weight costs associated with its use.  In the model above, 
these costs are parameterized as δ1, transactions costs incurred in the ex-ante evaluation 
and legal perfection of security interests; δ2, utility losses associated with the borrower’s 
diminished property rights to the pledged assets; 20 and δ3, transactions and liquidation 
costs incurred by the lender in obtaining and disposing of the collateral in the event of 
default.  If these costs, individually or in combination, are sufficiently large relative to the 
loan amount, the efficiency enhancing role of collateral will be overturned and projects 
with otherwise positive net present values will not be financed.  In such cases, collateral 
cannot efficiently mitigate credit market failures associated with moral hazard in the 
SME loan market.  Such failures are not however, examples of credit rationing.  
Collateral, Market Failures, and Credit Rationing 
Credit rationing occurs in equilibrium whenever “some borrower’s demand for 
credit is turned down, even though the borrower is willing to pay all the price and non-
price elements of the loan contract” (Baltensperger, 1978).  This definition limits the 
occurrence of rationing to those situations in which the borrower is willing and able to 
                                                          
20 Benjamin (1978) discusses this cost at some length. Pawning assets is an extreme example of diminished 
property rights.  
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accept the terms of credit contracts offered in a competitive credit market, yet is still 
unable to obtain credit.21  If a potential borrower does not seek credit because equilibrium 
interest rate, i*, is greater than the expected return on the project to be financed, net of 
collateral costs, they have not been rationed.  Similarly, borrowers with positive net 
present value projects at i* who lack sufficient collateral or outside net worth to meet 
prevailing (equilibrium) market requirements for non-price loan terms have not been 
rationed.  In these cases, the price and non-price elements of the prevailing credit contract 
have appropriately served to allocate scarce savings to other investment uses.  
In general, rationing in the Baltensperger framework is associated with a 
backward-bending credit supply curve, a situation which arises when the bank’s profit 
function (credit supply curve) does not increase monotonically with an increase in the 
interest rate.  In this case, there will be borrowers willing and able to pay an interest rate 
greater than or equal to the market rate to whom the bank will not lend.  This result can 
arise in several environments.  Where there are ex-ante informational asymmetries 
regarding the risk characteristics of credit applicants and the attendant problem of adverse 
selection, increases in the interest rate may increase the average risk of the firms 
demanding credit.  If the average risk of borrowers increases sufficiently, the bank’s 
expected lending profit will decline and its credit supply function will decrease after 
some interest rate.  Similar results can be obtained in modeling environments of moral  
  
                                                          
21 Keeton (1979) further distinguishes between cases where all members of a given group are denied full 
credit access (type I rationing) and cases where only some members of an otherwise homogenous group are 
denied credit access(type II rationing).  
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hazard where increases in market interest rates provide borrowers with increased 
incentives to take ex-ante actions which redistribute expected returns from the bank to 
themselves. 
Collateral (and guarantees) can mitigate the effects of informational problems in 
environments of both adverse selection and moral hazard and avoid a backward-bending 
credit supply curve.  In conditions of adverse selection, the expected cost of providing 
collateral is higher for riskier borrowers, and hence, menus of contracts with different 
combinations of collateral requirements and interest rates can be used as a mechanism for 
opaque borrowers to reveal their riskiness.  In modeling environments of moral hazard, 
collateral increases the borrower’s losses in the event of default, and hence, offsets ex-
post incentives for the borrower to take actions which reallocate expected returns to the 
borrower at the expense of the lender.   
Modifying the Collateral Model for Guarantee Attributes and Owner Wealth 
 In this section, I modify the collateral model to reflect the specific attributes of a 
guarantee and to incorporate the effect of the guarantor’s outside net worth.  
Model Assumptions 
Assumptions A1– A7, A9, and A11 are unchanged. 
A8)  is changed trivially to limit sources of repayment to $R if the investment is 
successful and to payments from the guarantor’s outside net worth if the 
investment is not successful.   
 
 
35 
 
A10)  is changed significantly.  The guarantee is costly only in the case of default, 
transactions costs of converting assets into liquid form are incurred by the 
guarantor rather that the lender, and the repayment value of the guarantee depends 
on the guarantor’s net worth at the time of default.  The repayment value of the 
guarantee, G, is thus given by argmin{(1+i),Wδg,} where W is the guarantor’s 
wealth at the end of the loan term, δg = (1 – personal asset liquidation costs) and 
(1+i) is the loan repayment amount.  Finally, other than asset liquidation costs, δg, 
there are no other transactions costs associated with executing a guarantee. 
The Optimal Debt Contract with a Personal Guarantee and Variable Wealth 
 As before, we have a risk-neutral business with a positive net present value 
investment project requiring a $1 investment today and providing a return in one year.  
The project return is either R > $1 if successful, or $0 if not.  The probability of success, 
p(e), depends on the owner-manager’s choice of effort, e.  The effort level, },,0{ 12 eee∈  
is chosen after the owner-manager is offered financing and p(0) =0 < p(e2) < p(e1).  Effort 
is costly to the owner-manager with this cost represented by V(e) with V(0) =0 < V(e2) < 
V(e1) and V'(e) >0 and V''(0) > 0.   
The firm owner has an initial endowment of collateralizable wealth, W0; however, 
liquidating this wealth to finance the firm’s project with equity is costly to the borrower.  
The owner’s cost of converting wealth to cash is greater than the firm’s cost of capital, i.  
There are no other outside sources of funding; hence the borrower will seek to finance its 
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project in the intermediated credit market.  The amount and composition of the 
guarantor’s personal wealth is known to potential lenders.  
 The bank credit market is competitive.  Banks face an elastic supply of loanable 
funds at a constant marginal cost r, the riskless interest rate.  Banks are assumed to be 
risk neutral.  The bank offers a credit contract consisting of a repayment (1 + i) and a 
guarantee requirement G.  After accepting this contract, the borrower chooses a non-
observable effort level which, in turn, affects the probability of investment success.  The 
lender, then offers a credit contract, {i, G} that solves the following program:  
 :},{ GiMax     gb GepiepeVRepUE δ/*)](1[)1*)((*)(*)()( ∗−−+−−=         (G1) 
Subject to: 
The bank’s participation constraint requiring non-negative expected profits:  
          )1(*)](1[)1*)(()( rGepiepE L +≥−++=Π                               (G2) 
The incentive compatibility constraint for the borrower’s choice of effort level:  
 
 
                       ∈*e  )(/)](1[)]1()[(max{arg eVGepiRep g −−−+− δ      (G3)   
The non-negativity constraints: 
IIc.  i ≥ 0, G ≥ 0           (G4) 
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The guarantee valuation correspondence, which limits the feasible repayment 
value of the guarantee to the owner’s outside net worth less costs of asset liquidation:  
 IId.  G = min{(1+ i), Wδg}              (G5) 
 One way to characterize the solution is to analyze the effects of guarantor wealth 
on the lender’s participation constraint, (G2). In a competitive credit market, this  
 constraint will be binding at the zero profit level and will determine the borrower’s cost 
of capital.  Here I rewrite this constraint as:  
                        0)1(}),1min{(*)](1[)1*)(()( =+−+−++=Π rWiepiepE gL δ           (G6)  
 In the case of a “wealthy guarantor” where Wδb ≥ (1+i), the return to the bank is 
state independent and independent of the effort level:  
  Guarantee Result 1: 
 
 riririepiepE L =⇒+−+==+−+−++=Π *)1()1(0)1()1)]((1[)1)(()(    (G7)  
 
 
The lender incurs no risk and the firm borrows at the minimum, riskless cost of capital, r.  
Since this wealthy guarantor realizes all gains and losses, they earn all marginal returns to 
effort and choose the first best effort level.  This result contrasts with that in the collateral 
based model.  In the collateral model, dead weight losses from the ex-ante transactions 
costs of pledging collateral reduced the marginal expected return to effort, causing 
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distortions in optimal effort.  Using equation (G3), the first best effort level is that which 
maximizes the firm’s expected return from the project: 1)}1()()(max{arg* ereVRepe =+−−∈ . 
 In the case of risky debt where (1+i) > Wδg > 0, the solution {i*, G*} can be 
derived as follows, let {e1,e2} be first and second best effort levels such that the incentive 
compatibility constraint is satisfied so G3 can be rewritten as  
)(/)](1[)]1()[()(/)](1[)]1()[( 222111 eVGepiRepeVGepiRep gg −−−+−≥−−−+− δδ        (G8) 
The Lagrangian for G1 – G4 can be now be written as follows:  
)]()([/)]()([)]1()][()([0[
])](1[)1)(()1[(
)(/)](1[)]1()[(
212121
11
111
eVeVGepepiRepep
Gepiepr
eVGepiRepL
g
g
−+−−+−−−−
−−+−+−
−−−+−=
δµ
λ
δ
(G9) 
The first order conditions are:  
 FOC 1:  0)]()([)()( 2111 =−−+−=∂
∂ epepepep
i
L µλ     (G10) 
 FOC 2:  0/)]()([))(1(/))(1( 2111 =−+−+−−=∂
∂
gg epepepepG
L δµλδ
 (G11) 
 Solving FOC 1 and FOC 2 for λ produces: 
)1,0(0)]())(1([
1
22
∈∀>+−= gg epep
δδλ                                   (G12)           
µ = )1,0(0]1
)())(1([
1[
)]()([
)(
1121
1 ∈∀>−
+−
∗
− gg epepepep
ep
δ
δ     (G13) 
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 Since λ > 0 and µ > 0, both the lender’s participation constraint, (G2), and the 
incentive compatibility constraint, (G8), are binding and can be rewritten as equalities 
and solved for i* and G*.  From the lender’s participation constraint, solving for i* gives:  
 Guarantee Result 2:         1
)(
*)](1[)1(*
1
1 −
−−+
=
ep
Gepri  if  𝑊𝛿𝑔 ≥ 𝐺∗    (G14)                                
Substituting GR2 into the incentive compatibility constraint and solving for G* results in 
  Guarantee Result 3:            
      

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 if  Wδg  ≥ G*
(G15)
 
 The final case is that of an impoverished owner where G = Wδg =  0.  In this case, 
the presence of a guarantee in the credit contract affects neither the lender’s expected 
profit nor the borrower’s expected utility.  In effect, the situation is analogous to that of 
an unsecured loan in the collateral model.  With similar assumptions regarding the 
existence of moral hazard, the equilibrium effort level will be e2 and the incentive 
compatibility constraint is no longer germane to the solution.  Since the credit market is 
competitive, the lender’s participation constraint will be binding.  With G = 0, this 
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constraint can be written as  )1()1)(( riep +=+  so 1
*)(
)1(* −+=
ep
ri and the effort level 
chosen will be second best e2.22 
Guarantee Result 4: Where the guarantor has no wealth, the optimal contract is  
   { )}1,0(*,1
)(
1*
2
ε=−+= G
ep
ri
       (G16)
 
The Effect of Owner Wealth on the Cost of Capital 
 As owner wealth increases, the repayment value of the guarantee increases.  A 
simple way to identify the effect of owner wealth on the firm’s cost of debt capital is to 
look at the lender’s participation constraint, (G2), where the repayment value of the 
guarantee, G, = δgW: 
          )1(*)](1[)1*)(()( rWepiepE gL +≥−++=Π δ       (G17) 
 In a competitive market, this constraint will be binding and can be written as an equality.  
Writing this as an equality and rearranging terms, yields 
      𝑖 = 1+𝑟
𝑝(𝑒∗)
 – [1−𝑝(𝑒
∗)]𝛿𝑔𝑊
𝑝(𝑒∗)
−  1.        (G18) 
  
                                                          
22 The choice of second best effort level follows from the higher interest rate required by the lender’s 
participation constraint in the absence of any repayment from an impoverished guarantor in the default 
state.  This higher interest rate reduces the borrower’s return from effort.  Further, the higher likelihood of 
default from a lower effort level does not increase the loss of personal wealth in the event of default.  
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Taking the partial derivative with respect to outside net worth, we have:  
                          𝜕𝑖
𝜕𝑊 
=  −  [1−𝑝
(𝑒∗)]𝛿𝑔
𝑝(𝑒∗)
< 0.       (G19) 
The greater the outside net wealth of the guarantor (up to the loan repayment amount), 
the lower the interest rate charged by the competitive lender.  
If the repayment value of the guarantee is the full amount of the loan repayment,  
1 + i, then 
    𝑖 = 1+𝑟
𝑝(𝑒∗)
 – [1−𝑝(𝑒
∗)](1+𝑖)
𝑝(𝑒∗)
−  1      (G20) 
 
 
 which reduces to i  = r, the riskless rate.  If the repayment value of the guarantee is 0, 
then  
 
 
  𝑖 = 1+𝑟
𝑝(𝑒∗)
− 1 > r.         (G21) 
 
 
Thus, where credit enhancement consists of a personal guarantee only, the borrower’s 
cost of capital falls from 𝑖 =  1+𝑟
𝑝(𝑒∗)
−  1, in the case of an impoverished guarantor, to 
𝑖 = 𝑟 in the case of a guarantor with sufficient wealth to make loan repayment 
independent of the success or failure of the borrowing firm.  
The Relative Efficiency of Guarantees and Collateral 
 I have shown how both forms of credit enhancement can improve efficiency in 
the SME credit market in the presence of moral hazard.  The remaining task is to identify 
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the conditions under which guarantees will emerge as the more efficient, or equilibrium, 
enhancement vehicle in the SME credit contract.  This will depend on the interplay of 
three factors; 1)the amount of the utility loss associated with collateralization, 2) the 
dissipative transaction costs associated with collateralization, and 3) the relative 
repayment values of a guarantee and collateral in the event of default.  This latter factor 
depends, in turn, on the amount of guarantor wealth.  
 Under the assumption of a competitive credit market, the relative efficiency of the 
two forms of enhancement will be reflected in the borrower’s relative utility level.  This 
utility is given by the objective functions in the guarantee and collateral models:  
For Collateral:     𝑈𝑐∗ =  𝑝(𝑒1)[𝑅 − (1 + 𝑖𝑐∗)]− [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝐶∗ − 𝛿2𝐶∗ − 𝑉(𝑒1)          (E1) 
For a Guarantee: 𝑈𝑔∗ =  𝑝(𝑒1)�𝑅 − �1 + 𝑖𝑔∗�� − [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]𝐺∗ 𝛿𝑔⁄ − 𝑉(𝑒1)                (E2) 
The relative efficiency improvement from enhancement with a guarantee is thus given  
 
by: 
 
 
               𝑈𝑔∗ −  𝑈𝑐∗ =  𝑝(𝑒1)�𝑖𝑐∗ − 𝑖𝑔∗� + [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)]�C∗ − 𝐺∗/𝛿𝑔� + 𝛿2𝐶.                 (E3) 
 
 
If 𝑈𝑔∗ −  𝑈𝑐∗ > 𝑂 , a guarantee will emerge as optimal form of enhancement in the 
equilibrium credit contract, provided that Wδg > G*.  If  𝑈𝑔∗ −  𝑈𝑐∗ < 0, collateral 
enhancement will emerge in the equilibrium credit contract.23  
                                                          
23 At this point, I do not consider the conditions under which both forms of enhancement might emerge in 
the equilibrium debt contract.  
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 In this format, the relative efficiency of collateral and a guarantee is determined 
by the net of three effects.  The first is the difference in the expected interest payments in 
the successful state, 𝑝(𝑒1)�𝑖𝑐∗ − 𝑖𝑔∗�.  The second is the difference is the expected utility 
lost from wealth losses in the event of default, �1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)��C∗ − 𝐺∗/𝛿𝑔�.  The third is the 
loss of utility arising from reduced dominion over borrower property pledged as 
collateral.  This later term always serves to diminish the relative efficiency of collateral.   
This leaves us to consider the efficiency effects of the two former terms.  
 The first term is the difference in the optimal interest rate solutions to the 
guarantee and collateral contracting problems, weighted by the probability of business 
success.  The two solutions were:  
 For a guarantee:  𝑖𝑔∗ =
1+𝑟
𝑝(𝑒1)
− [1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝐺
∗
𝑝(𝑒1)
− 1              (E4) 
            For collateral:     𝑖𝑐∗ =
1+𝑟+𝛿1
𝑝(𝑒1)
− [1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3𝐶
∗
𝑝(𝑒1)
− 1              (E5) 
The difference in the cost of capital, 
 𝑖𝑐∗  −  𝑖𝑔∗ =  
1+𝑟+𝛿1
𝑝(𝑒1)
− 1+𝑟
𝑝(𝑒1)
 + [1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝐺
∗
𝑝(𝑒1)
−  [1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3𝐶
∗
𝑝(𝑒1)
                
                        =  𝛿1 𝑝(𝑒1)⁄ + [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)][𝐺∗ −  𝛿3𝐶∗]/𝑝(𝑒1)                                     (E6) 
Substituting (E6) into the utility difference equation, (E3), without the third term, yields:  
 𝑈𝑔∗ −  𝑈𝑐∗ =  �𝛿1 + [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)][𝐺∗ −  𝛿3𝐶∗]� + �1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)��C∗ − 𝐺∗/𝛿𝑔� 
                             =  𝛿1 +  [1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)][ 𝐶∗(1 −  𝛿3) −  𝐺∗��1 −  𝛿𝑔� 𝛿𝑔� �]                (E7) 
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 The effect of the first term, δ1, unambiguously increases the borrower’s utility 
when enhancement takes the form of a guarantee rather than collateral.  This term reflects 
the lender’s need to set the interest rate high enough to recover the fixed costs incurred to 
evaluate, perfect a security interest in, and to monitor collateral.  There are no 
corresponding costs associated with a guarantee.  
 With two of the terms, 𝛿1 and 𝛿2𝐶∗ increasing the relative utility of a guaranteed 
credit contract, the remaining task is to evaluate the second term, which is the difference 
in the expected wealth losses that the borrower will incur in the event of default, 
[1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)][ 𝐶∗(1 −  𝛿3) −  𝐺∗��1 −  𝛿𝑔� 𝛿𝑔� �].  The directional effect of this term 
depends on both the relative efficiency of the guarantor and lender in liquefying, 
respectively, wealth and collateral and the difference in the amount of collateral and 
guarantee in the respective optimal contracts.  
 In the absence of empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of lenders (banks) 
and business owners in selling assets, several practical considerations suggest the owner 
of property is generally able to realize a greater return on its disposition than is a lender.24  
First, the owner does not need to go through a legal process such as foreclosure prior to 
sale.  The costs associated with the title transfer to the lender before a sale can take place 
strictly reduce 𝛿3 compared to 𝛿𝑔.  Secondly, the guarantor-owner of an opaque SME is 
likely to have prior knowledge of the possibility of default and can begin marketing 
assets before it is known that they are being sold at a “foreclosure sale.”  Finally, where 
the guarantor has multiple asset classes from which he can choose to liquidate, he can 
                                                          
24 See Benjamin (1978) for a similar argument.  
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choose the one with the lowest liquidation costs.  I assume then, that δ3 is sufficiently 
small relative to δg that(1 −  𝛿3)  >  �1 −  𝛿𝑔� 𝛿𝑔� .  
 The final step in finding the sign of 𝑈𝑔∗ −  𝑈𝑐∗  is to compare the equilibrium  
 
amounts of collateral and guarantee enhancement, C* and G*.  From the solutions to the  
 
collateral and guarantee contracting problems, we have the following:    
 
 
  𝐶∗= 𝑝(𝑒1)[1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3+𝑝(𝑒1) [
(1+𝑟)+𝛿1
𝑝(𝑒1)
−  𝑅 +   𝑉(𝑒1)−𝑉(𝑒2)
𝑝(𝑒1)−𝑃(𝑒2)
]                                (E8) 
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With the presence of δ1 in the numerator of the first term of the C* equation, 
 
 
    [(1+𝑟)+𝛿1
𝑝(𝑒1)
−  𝑅 +  𝑉(𝑒1)−𝑉(𝑒2)
𝑝(𝑒1)−𝑃(𝑒2)
] > [(1+𝑟)
𝑝(𝑒1)
−  𝑅 +   𝑉(𝑒1)−𝑉(𝑒2)
𝑝(𝑒1)−𝑃(𝑒2)
]               (E10) 
C* will be unambiguously larger than G* if 𝑝(𝑒1)[1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿3+𝑝(𝑒1) >  
𝛿𝑔𝑝(𝑒1)
[1−𝑝(𝑒1)]𝛿𝑔+𝑝(𝑒1)
 .  
Rearranging terms restates this condition as  𝛿𝑔�𝑝(𝑒1) +  𝛿3�1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)�� <  𝑝(𝑒1) +
 𝛿𝑔[1 − 𝑝(𝑒1)].  Since 1 > δg > 0 and 1 > δg  > δ3 > 0, this inequality holds. C* is, 
therefore greater than G*.  This completes the proof that 𝑈𝑔∗ > 𝑈𝑐∗  provided that the 
guarantor has sufficient outside net worth to provide a guarantee with a repayment value 
of at least G*.  
 Efficiency Result 1:      𝑈𝑔∗ > 𝑈𝑐∗    if  𝛿𝑔W ≥ G*                    (E11)  
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In deriving ER1, I have imposed the condition that borrowers are more efficient in 
liquidating assets than are lenders as a necessary condition: δg > δ3.  Since the other 
dissipative costs, δ1 and δ2 are only incurred with credit enhancement in the form of 
collateral and are strictly positive, this condition is sufficient to show that 𝑈𝑔∗ > 𝑈𝑐∗ .  The 
condition δ3 < δg is also consistent with modeling assumptions commonly made in the 
literature.  This condition is not, however, strictly necessary.  It can be shown that the 
ER1 result can be obtained for δg < δ3 if δ1 and δ2 are sufficiently large.  
 There are cases in which the assumption that borrowers are more efficient in 
liquidating assets than are lenders does not hold and in which both the fixed costs 
associated with taking collateral, δ1, and the utility loss from diminished property rights 
in the collateral, δ2C, are small enough that collateral will be a more efficient form of 
credit enhancement.  Such cases will likely exist even for a borrower with sufficient 
wealth to the make a guarantee contract feasible.  One such type of loan is the lease of a 
company car for the business owner.  In this case, the leasing company is likely to be 
more efficient in liquidating the car and both the marginal costs of collateralization and 
utility loss from impaired ownership rights to the car are negligible.  In general, these 
conditions are likely to exist when dealers or manufacturers finance the acquisition of 
their products. 
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Extensions of the Basic Models 
Contracts with Both Collateral and Guarantees  
 One empirical observation is the frequency with which both collateral and a 
personal guarantee appear in the equilibrium credit contract.  Table 1.1 shows that 26 
percent of lines of credit with the firm’s lead bank in the 2003 Survey of Small Business 
Finances are credit enhanced with both collateral and a guarantee.  This leads to the 
consideration of the circumstances under which both forms of enhancement will appear 
in the equilibrium debt contract.  
 In the previous section, I showed that the credit contract, {i*, G*} is, in general, a 
more efficient than the contract {i*, C*}.  It will thus arise as the equilibrium contract in a 
competitive SME credit market if the guarantor is sufficiently wealthy.  This follows 
from the lower level of dissipative costs associated with collateral.  The credit contract 
{i*, G*} is only feasible, however, if the guarantor has sufficient outside wealth relative to 
the loan amount.  
 When the wealth of the potential guarantor is insufficient to make {i*, G*} a 
feasible contract, we can easily show that a contract in the {i, C, G} space where both C* 
and G* are strictly positive may arise as the equilibrium contract.  This result will obtain 
since owner wealth backing a guarantee can both support some positive level of expected 
lender repayment in the case of default and serve as an incentive mechanism toward 
eliciting a first best effort choice by the borrower.  Importantly, the guarantee can do so 
with lower dissipative costs than a comparable amount of collateral.  In this intermediate 
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case, borrowers who have significant though insufficient wealth to support a guarantee-
only credit contract may be offered and accept a credit contract in which their guarantee 
substitutes for some amount of collateral value.  In terms of the models developed in this 
paper, contracts in the {i, C, G} space are most likely to arise in situations where the 
costs of taking, maintaining, and liquidating collateral assets costs, δ1, δ2 and δ3 are 
comparatively large relative to the loan amount and the owner-guarantor has significant 
outside net worth relative to the loan amount.  
The Effect of Monopolistic Credit Markets on the Optimal Debt Contract 
 The contracting models employed in this essay characterize the SME 
intermediated credit market as one of perfect competition.  While these credit markets in 
the US tend to be competitive, there are geographic areas where competition may be less 
than robust and there are trends in bank consolidation which warrant at least a 
consideration of the effects of less competitive banks on predictions of this model.  Non-
competitive markets will affect, in similar ways, the optimal contract results in both the 
collateral and the guarantee models.  Below I illustrate the effect of a monopolistic credit 
market in deriving the optimal contract using collateral as the form of credit 
enhancement. 
 To examine the effects of a monopolistic credit market, the basic model could be 
recast as one in which the monopolistic lender designs a contract that maximizes its  
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expected profits subject to the borrower’s participation constraint of non-negative  
 
expected utility gain from undertaking the project.  That is,  
 
 
  { } )1(*)](1[)1*)(()(:, 13 rCepiepECiMax Lender +≥−−++=Π δδ        (M1) 
                                    subject to:     
*)(*)](1[()1*)((*)()( 200 eVCCepiepRepUE werrrB −−−−+−= δ   (M2) 
The incentive compatibility constraint is, however, more problematic.  In the 
competitive market, with all surplus accruing to the borrower, the equilibrium contract 
supports the borrower’s choice of the first best feasible effort level, e1.  This result 
follows from the ability of the borrower to retain the increase in expected project return 
that is generated by her marginal increase in effort.  If the credit market is monopolistic, 
instead, the lender’s attempt to extract all surplus in the form of a higher interest rate will 
reduce the borrower’s marginal return to effort and thus cannot support the borrower’s 
choice of the first-best effort level, e1.   
 This result can be illustrated by examining the incentive compatibility constraint 
for the choice of e1 as the effort level.  For a given contract (i,C) to support a first best 
effort choice, it must be that: 
 [𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)][(𝑅 − 1) − 𝑖] + [𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)]𝐶] ≥ 𝑉(𝑒1)− 𝑉(𝑒2)      (M3)  
That is, the borrower’s marginal expected return from additional effort must be at least as 
great as the marginal cost of increased effort.  The marginal return is increasing in 
 
 
50 
 
collateral, but decreasing in the contractual interest rate (i).  For a given level of 
collateral, C, an increase in the contractual interest rate will drive the borrower’s return in 
the successful state,  [𝑝(𝑒1) − 𝑝(𝑒2)][(𝑅 − 1) − 𝑖]]  toward zero so that they will choose 
the lower effort level, e2.  The inefficient effort levels and lower societal returns on 
investment generated by this solution reflect the deadweight losses generally associated 
with market power.   
Depending on the value of the parameters in the model, another contract solution 
may be possible at the first best effort level.  This contract would be the solution to the 
program of maximizing the lender’s profit function at the first best effort level, subject to 
the borrower’s non-binding, expected utility participation constraint at the second best 
effort level and the binding incentive compatibility constraint that ensures that the first 
best effort level is chosen.  In this contract, the monopolistic lender extracts surplus only 
to the point at which the borrower would be better off by switching to the less costly, 
lower effort level.  The monopolistic lender will offer this contract if it provides greater 
expected profit than the contract designed for the choice of the second best effort level.  
 It is also worth noting that the monopolistic lender can unambiguously increase its 
return by increasing the amount of contractual credit enhancement.25  An increase in the 
amount of credit enhancement has a positive effect on both the lender’s expected profit 
function and on the borrower’s choice of a higher effort level.  This represents a specific 
testable implication of the model developed here that will be examined in Essay 2. 
                                                          
25 The repayment value of collateral is, however, limited to the lesser of the collateralizable wealth or the 
loan amount.  
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 Deriving a solution for credit market structures between perfect competition and 
monopoly is beyond the scope of the modeling framework used in this study.  The 
analysis of the monopolistic case suggests however, that there might be a sharing of 
surplus by lender and borrower when competition is imperfect.  
Summary and Implications 
 This essay has shown that a personal guarantee is a more efficient form of credit 
enhancement than collateral when the borrower has sufficient outside wealth to fully 
secure the loan’s repayment.  This follows from the lower dissipative costs associated 
with guaranteeing a loan which lowers the deadweight welfare losses relative to 
collateral, lowers the interest rate charged to the borrower, and encourages the borrower 
to supply an optimal level of effort.  This analysis suggests that owner wealth is an 
important element in the allocation of credit in the SME credit market and that relatively 
wealthy business owners are able to obtain lower cost debt capital for their businesses 
than are business owners who are more wealth constrained.   
This main result follows directly from two key modeling assumptions: 1) there are 
lower transactions costs associated with writing a guarantee than in designating specific 
assets to serve as collateral, and 2) owner-borrowers bear lower costs when liquidating 
personal wealth than lenders face when they liquidate collateral.  These two assumptions 
are common in the literature, but there are some loan types for which they may not apply.  
In the case of vehicle loans or leases, for example, transactions costs associated with 
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collateralization are negligible and specialized or captive auto lenders are likely to be 
more efficient in liquidating vehicles than the borrower.     
The modeling assumptions made in this essay, therefore, correspond most closely 
to short-term working capital finance such as provided by lines of credit.  In these loan 
types, the “project” generally involves the acquisition of inventory and/or accounts 
receivable in order to make additional sales at a reasonably well defined profit margin.  
The fungible or intangible nature of the assets acquired with loan proceeds engenders 
high costs of collateralization and substantial diminution in value if liquidated by the 
lender.  Further, the outside net worth of the business owner is likely to be more stable 
over the one-year time frame for which lines of credit are committed than over the life of 
loans made for real estate or equipment acquisition.26  
For these reasons, in Essay 2 of this dissertation I examine four empirical 
implications of this model on a sample of lines of credit that small businesses secured 
from their lenders in 2003.  The first, and most direct, implication is that the probability 
of using a guarantee rather than collateral will increase as the owner-borrower’s net 
worth increases relative to the loan amount.  This effect should be greatest for lines of 
credit where there is ample opportunity for moral hazard.  A second, and closely related, 
implication is that at intermediate levels of owner wealth it will be optimal for loans to be 
secured with both collateral and personal guarantees.  The last two implications focus on 
the higher costs that are associated costs with using collateral rather than guarantees.  
                                                          
26 A conceptual way to incorporate the effect of volatility of owner wealth within the context of this model 
would be to increase the level of owner wealth at which the guarantee-only contract becomes feasible to, 
for instance 2 or 3 times the loan amount.   
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First, to the degree these costs are fixed in amount, the analysis predicts that guarantee 
enhancement would be particularly advantageous for smaller lines of credit.  Finally, the 
model predicts that the guarantee will become more attractive relative to collateral when 
the loan period is shorter, and less attractive when the term is longer and the borrower has 
a longer horizon over which to pay the fixed costs associated with collateral.   
  A final, important modeling choice was to characterize the intermediated SME 
credit market as being perfectly competitive.  While the intermediated SME credit market 
in the US tends to be competitive, there may be geographic market areas where 
competition is lacking.  The modeling framework employed in this essay to derive 
optimal credit contracts under perfect competition does not neatly accommodate cases of 
imperfect competition or monopoly where some surplus would be expected to accrue to 
the lender.  The framework does, however, suggest that less competitive credit markets 
would generate inefficient effort levels and lower societal returns on investment.  This 
result suggests another rationale for regulatory efforts to maintain competitive conditions 
in the intermediated credit markets on which small businesses depend for external debt 
capital.  
The principal result of this essay — that an owner’s wealth is an important 
element in determining whether a project will secure funding in the small business credit 
market — represents an potentially important impediment to the key efficiency condition 
that capital should be allocated based only on expected project returns.  The prospect of 
this market failure, moreover, suggests that policy interventions could improve of the 
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private small business loan market.  The most obvious intervention here is that the 
general public provides guarantees for loans so that projects with high expected returns 
that are owned by entrepreneurs with low levels of wealth can be funded at low cost.  
Such guarantees are already available in the U.S. through programs in the Small Business 
Administration of the Department of Commerce.  The analysis here provides both a 
justification for the existence of such programs as well as a theoretical framework that 
can be used in future work to assess whether the program is socially beneficial. 
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Table 
 
Table 1.1.   Estimated Prevalence of Lead Line Enhancement Structures: Limited 
Liability Firms 
 
Enhancement Structure Proportion Std. Err. 95% Confidence Interval 
No Enhancement 0.210 0.019 0.173 0.246 
Collateral only 0.119 0.014 0.091 0.147 
Collateral & Guarantee 0.303 0.020 0.264 0.343 
Guaranty only 0.368 0.021 0.326 0.410 
 
Notes: Column two reports the estimated proportions of enhancement structures on lines of 
credit with lead banks for the subpopulation of MSEs that are organized with limited 
liability.  The estimates are based on a weighted sample of 1326 observations from the 
2003 Survey of Small Business Finances. 
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Figure 
 
Figure 1.1.   Credit Contracting Time Line.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
ESSAY 2 - THE EFFECT OF OWNER WEALTH ON THE FORM OF EQUILIBRIUM 
CREDIT ENHANCEMENT 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 The ubiquitous presence of collateral requirements in small business credit 
contracts is well documented and its use is the subject of a rich theoretical and empirical 
literature.  However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the pervasive and 
growing use of owner guarantees as an alternative or complementary form of credit 
enhancement.  Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business finances, I extend the empirical 
small business debt contracting literature by studying the effect of guarantor wealth on 
the equilibrium enhancement structure for lines of credit.  Using a multinomial logit to 
model the effect of guarantor wealth on the equilibrium enhancement structure, I find that 
 increasing owner wealth results in an increased likelihood that a line of credit will be 
enhanced with only a personal guarantee and a decreased likelihood that the line of credit 
will be secured with collateral.  This finding is consistent with the theoretical predictions 
of Essay 1 and robust to re-estimation using an ordered probit model. These results 
suggest that owner wealth plays a larger role in the allocation of credit in the small 
businesses credit market than has been indicated by previous research.  Further, the 
impact of owner wealth on the allocation of debt capital creates a market failure that 
policies, such as the Small Business Administration’s loan guarantee program, can 
mitigate.  
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Introduction 
 Large publically traded corporations typically raise external debt capital by 
issuing debt claims directly to investors.  The risk associated with the promised 
repayments is summarized in credit ratings provided by one or more debt rating agencies.  
Rating agencies, in turn, have access to a wealth of publicly available information on the 
operations, finances, and competitive standing and prospects of these borrowers.  In this 
so-called “direct” credit market for highly transparent borrowers, borrowing contracts are 
generally unsecured, the promised yield increases monotonically as the risk rating 
increases and the promised yield varies significantly over the range of risk ratings.27  This 
direct market for raising external debt capital contrasts sharply with that faced by small, 
privately held firms.  
 Credit markets involving small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) operate in a 
highly opaque environment in which informational problems abound and in which the 
effect of transactions costs is magnified by the small size of most transactions.  SMEs 
are, almost without exception, privately owned businesses whose financial condition, 
results, and prospects are outside the public domain.  Further, the closely held nature of 
vast majority of these firms is likely to cause confounding of a firm’s profit function with 
the utility function of its ownership.  These informational problems can lead to a failure 
of price, in the form of interest rates, to balance supply and demand efficiently.  Theorists 
have shown that increases in the contractual interest rate offered on loans have two 
                                                          
27 From 1996 to 2003, the interest rate spread between Aaa rated corporate bonds (the lowest risk level) and 
Caa rated bonds (the highest risk rating not in not default) averaged 12.38%.  This spread increased steadily 
from 1996 through 2002 and then fell appreciably in 2003 and 2004.  
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perverse effects in credit markets with informational asymmetries.  The adverse selection 
effect increases the risk level of firms seeking credit.  The moral hazard effect increases 
ex-post incentives for borrowers to shirk, to undertake riskier investment projects and to 
under report cash flows or divert business assets to personal use.  Both these effects make 
price alone, in the form of the contractual interest rate, an inefficient mechanism for 
allocating credit in the SME credit market.  
 In face of these informational and transactions cost problems, SMEs obtain 
external debt capital indirectly by contracting with financial intermediaries, primarily 
commercial banks.28  These financial intermediaries specialize in obtaining and 
processing private information on small business borrowers and in the design, execution 
and monitoring of credit contracts in the dual space of interest rates and credit 
enhancement.  While marketable debt claims issued by public companies are generally 
unsecured and offer a wide spectrum of promised yields based on their risk ratings, debt 
contracts involving privately-owned, small to medium sized businesses are frequently 
characterized by credit enhancement as a key term in the credit agreement and a limited 
range of promised interest rates.  Credit enhancement, in the form of collateral, has been 
shown to improve the efficiency of credit markets characterized by informational opacity 
and to ameliorate the attendant problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 Credit enhancement provides the lender with an alternative source of potential 
repayment in states of the world where the borrower’s cash flows are insufficient to meet 
                                                          
28 Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, Prager and Wolken (2008) estimate that 60% of all 
external credit to SMEs is provided by commercial banks.  
  
60 
 
contractual principal or interest payments.  If the borrower fails to make timely payment 
of principal or interest to the lender, the borrower is said to be in default. In the case of 
default, the lender can then seek repayment by accessing the source of the credit 
enhancement.  Credit enhancement smoothes lender returns across states of borrower 
performance and thus “reduces the risk of lending.”29  Its power, however, arises from 
the symmetric nature of payoffs in the credit contract.  By smoothing returns to the 
lender, credit enhancement accentuates the difference in borrower returns across states.  
This increased cost of default to the borrower is the basis for theories that rationalize the 
use of collateral to mitigate problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and asymmetric 
beliefs about the degree of business risk between the borrower and its lender. 
There are two primary forms of credit enhancement in SME debt contracts: 
collateral and personal guarantees from the business ownership.  Collateral consists of 
specific assets in which the lender is granted a security interest.  In the event of borrower 
default under the loan contract, the lender may pursue ownership of and then liquidate 
pledged assets to obtain loan repayment.  A guarantee from the business owner, in 
contrast, conveys no interest in specific assets.  Rather, the guarantee creates a contingent 
claim against the guarantor’s general net worth.  In the event of loan default by the 
borrowing business, the guarantee provides the lender with an unsecured claim against 
the personal net worth of the business owner(s).  
Despite the extensive financial economics literature that studies debt contracting 
and the use of credit enhancement, there is a paucity of studies addressing the use of 
                                                          
29 Avery et al (1998) 
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guarantees.  Theoretical works have focused exclusively on collateral when showing how 
credit enhancement can mitigate informational asymmetries between the lender and SME 
borrower.  To my knowledge, Essay 1 in this dissertation is the first theoretical work that 
studies the personal guarantee as an alternative enhancement device to collateral.  The 
analysis in Essay 1 shows that a guarantee is a more efficient enhancement device than 
collateral if the guarantor’s outside net worth is sufficiently large relative to the loan 
amount.  This result obtains because transactions and other dissipative costs are lower for 
guarantees than for collateral and are incurred only if default and liquidation occur.     
In this essay, I test the predictions of Essay 1 using data drawn from the Federal 
Reserve’s 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance.  The loans in the sample are lines of 
credit with the lead bank of 1224 small businesses who operated under limited liability.  
In the analysis I use a multinomial logit model to estimate the determinants of four 
different enhancement alternatives: guarantee only, collateral only, guarantee and 
collateral, or no enhancement.  The model assesses how the choice among these are 
related to a rich set of firm, lender, relationship loan and owner covariates, including the 
outside net worth of the primary business owner and the amount of the loan commitment. 
he main finding is consistent with the prediction of Essay 1 — the propensity to use a 
personal guarantee rather than collateral (or both collateral and a personal guarantee) 
increases with the firm owner’s wealth.  I also find, as suggested by the analysis of Essay 
1, that the probability of enhancing a loan with only a guarantee is lower in non-
competitive banking markets.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Background and Literature 
briefly discusses the differences between collateral and guarantees and reviews the 
existing empirical literature that investigates when and how they are used.  Data, 
Variables, and Sample Restrictions discusses the data set, characteristics of the sample 
observations and the variables used in estimations.  The Empirical Model develops the 
empirical model.  Empirical Results From the Multinomial Logit Model presents and 
interprets primary empirical results.  Post-estimation Specification Testing and a 
Robustness Test reports on post-estimation specification tests and the results of a 
robustness test using an ordered probit specification.  Summary summarizes the main 
results and implications of the essay.  
Background and Literature 
 Outside creditors have great difficulty assessing the future cash flows, the 
financial valuations and the management capabilities of small, privately-owned firms.  
For this reason firms like this generally borrow from financial intermediaries that assess 
their requests for credit and monitor their behavior at significant cost.  In this 
environment, a range of tools called credit enhancements are available to mitigate the 
impact of private information and reduce the inefficiencies and high costs of credit 
associated with them.  The primary tools for credit enhancement are collateral and 
guarantees.  I provide an extended discussion of the differences between these 
mechanisms in Essay 1 of this dissertation, and the reader should consult that discussion  
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for details about the two forms of enhancement.  For purposes of this essay it will be 
sufficient to understand that collateral involves the legal pledging or granting of a 
security interest in a specific asset to the lender, while a personal guarantee represents a 
contingent claim on the guarantor’s net worth.  These two devices enhance the security of 
a loan because the lender can minimize or avoid losses in the event of a default by 
liquidating the collateral that was pledged or requiring that the guarantor surrender his 
personal wealth. 
 In addition to the predictions of Essay 1, the empirical analysis of the choice 
between guarantees and collateral presented here is motivated by the simple fact that the 
use of both devices is ubiquitous in the credit market that serves small-to-medium 
enterprises (SME).  The more recent empirical literature distinguishes between two types 
of collateral, inside and outside, based on the entity that owns the collateral assets.  Inside 
collateral consists of assets such as production machinery or short-term investments 
owned by a manufacturing company that are pledged to a lender as credit enhancement 
for a business loan.  Outside collateral consists of assets owned not by the borrowing firm 
but by a third party which are used to collateralize a loan to the business.  In the small 
business market, this third party is invariably the firm’s owner(s).  Examples of outside 
collateral in the SME credit market would include marketable securities or a personal 
residence owned by the business owner pledged to a bank as credit enhancement for a 
loan made to the business.  Leeth and Scott (1989) report that over 60 percent of the  
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small business loans in the National Federation of Business surveys in 1980 and 1982 had 
some form of collateral.  Using data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Bank 
Lending, Berger and Udell (1990) find that almost 70 percent of US commercial and 
industrial loans were made on a secured basis.  Researchers using small business loan 
data from Japan, Germany, Argentina, Italy, and Belgium find similar or greater rates of 
collateral incidence.    
 The two primary types of credit enhancements, collateral and guarantees can be 
used individually, in combinations or not at all.  Table 2.2 shows the estimated 
distribution of the four mutually exclusive enhancement structures for lines of credit that 
limited liability SMEs maintained with their lead bank in the 2003 SSBF.  This essay 
seeks to expand our understanding of factors, most notably owner outside net worth, 
leading to this heterogeneity of enhancement structures.   It turns out that there has been 
very little previous empirical research on the use of personal guarantees by small 
businesses.  Therefore, I first examine the empirical literature on the use of collateral in 
SME credit contracts.  This literature highlights some of the definitional problems and 
data limitations in both literatures.       
Review of the Empirical Literature on Collateral    
 
 Despite the longstanding and robust attempts of theorists to explain the ubiquitous 
use of collateral in the SME credit markets, empirical studies of collateral have been  
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slower to develop.  This is most likely due to a paucity of suitable data sets.  To support 
empirical study of collateral use, data sets must contain not only extensive information on 
complex borrower, owner, lender, loan, collateral, and debt contract characteristics, but 
also sufficient usable observations to enable efficient estimation in the face of an 
arguably complex data generating process.  Studies of collateral use in the US have 
almost exclusively used the National Survey of Small Business Finances, which was first 
available in 1992.  The more recent European studies have generally used (non-random) 
sets of individual bank credit files or even researcher surveys to generate data.  
 Empirical studies of collateral have been motivated by one of two fundamental 
research agendas.  The first seeks to identify the relationship between firm or loan risk 
and the use of collateral.  These studies seek evidence for or against the negative 
risk/collateral correlation predicted by adverse selection theories of collateral use.  The 
second research agenda seeks to find meaningful effects of borrower-lender relationships 
on the propensity for collateralization.  These studies seek to identify the degree to which 
relationship surplus is captured by borrowers in the form of lower collateral requirements 
and, hence, lower dissipative costs.  Jointly these studies comprise the literature on 
determinants of collateral use.  
 Regardless of the research paradigm motivating the study, empirical studies of 
collateral have, until recently, employed a consistent, reduced form approach.  
Researchers have generally used single equation models to examine whether various 
combinations of borrower, owner, lender, relationship, loan, and contract characteristics 
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can explain whether or not collateral has been used to enhance loans.  In general, when 
classifying observations no distinction is made between inside or firm-owned collateral 
and outside or owner-provided collateral.30  These studies also differ from each other in 
important ways — differences in sample restrictions on loan types, differences in the set 
of explanatory variables, and differences in data sets.  The observational units in these 
studies are loan (primarily line of credit) contracts and are assumed to represent 
equilibrium positions between credit demand and credit supply.  These are, therefore, 
reduced form models.  With few recent exceptions, the models have been estimated as 
logit, probit, or linear probability models.   
These studies find, on balance, that collateral use is positively correlated with the 
risk of the loan and of the borrower.  These findings are at odds with well-known 
theoretical predictions of credit contracting under adverse selection.31  Under adverse 
selection, higher risk borrowers, for whom the expected cost of providing collateral is 
relatively high, will select contracts with high interest rates but pledge no collateral.  
Conversely, low risk firms, that can offer collateral at relatively low cost, will select 
contracts with low interest rates and collateral.  This prediction has been tested by 
examining whether ex-ante risk measures affect the propensity for collateral to be 
included in the credit contract.  Leath and Scott(1989) use data from the 1980 and 1982 
                                                          
30 The more recent empirical literature distinguishes between two types of collateral, inside and outside, 
based on the entity that owns the collateral assets.  Inside collateral consists of assets such as production 
machinery or short-term investments owned by a manufacturing company that are pledged to a lender as 
credit enhancement for a business loan.  Outside collateral consists of assets owned not by the borrowing 
firm but by a third party which are used to collateralize a loan to the business.  In the small business 
market, this third party is invariably the firm’s owner(s).  Examples of outside collateral in the SME credit 
market would include marketable securities or a personal residence owned by the business owner pledged 
to a bank as credit enhancement for a loan made to the business. 
31 Coco, G. (2000) provides a comprehensive review of this literature.  
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membership surveys by National Federation of Small Business and find firm age, a proxy 
for decreasing firm risk, is negatively related to the prevalence of collateral use.  Other 
studies that use firm age as a risk proxy and find a positive relationship between risk and 
collateral include Berger and Udell (1995),  Cowling (1999) using English data, Degryse 
& Van Cayseele (2000) using Belgian bank credit files, and Hernadez-Canovas and 
Martinez-Salano (2006) using survey data from Spanish SMEs.  Voordeckers and 
Steijivers (2006), however, find a positive relationship between firm age and collateral 
after controlling for relationship measures in a sample of loan contracts from the credit 
files of a large Belgian bank.  Several studies using the 1988 or 1993 SSBF, Berger and 
Udell (1995), Chakraborty and Hu (2006), and Brick and Palia (2007) use financial 
leverage as a direct measure of firm risk.  All find a positive relationship between 
financial risk and collateral.  Finally, using proprietary US data, Berger and Udell (1990) 
and Booth (1992) find a positive relationship between the risk premium and the use of 
collateral.32   
 Empirical results on the impact of borrower-lender relationship strength on the 
propensity to include collateral in the credit contract are less clear.  Peterson and Rajan 
(1994), using the 1988 SSBF, find that relationship duration has no effect on collateral.  
Berger and Udell (1995), using the same data, find that relationship duration decreases 
the likelihood of collateral for lines of credit but not for other loan types.  Chakraborty 
and Hu (2006), using the 1993 SSBF, find that relationship duration reduces the 
probability that collateral will be used for lines of credit.  This relationship is reversed for 
                                                          
32 Both these studies use the risk premium (the spread over the risk free rate for a loan or similar duration) 
as a dependent variable and collateral as a left hand side variable.  
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term loans.  Studies using European data generally find that relationship duration reduces 
collateral requirements.  Hernadez-Canovas and Martinez-Salano (2006), however, find 
that relationship duration increases the probably of collateral use in their sample of 
Spanish SMEs.  
 Recent studies have begun to consider issues of simultaneity in contracting terms 
and have begun to incorporate distinctions between inside and outside collateral.  Cressy 
and Toivanen (2001) use two-stage least squares to estimate a system of three equations 
for determining collateral, the interest rate, and loan amount in the credit contract for a 
sample of loans from a large U.K. bank.  In the collateral equation, they find that loan 
duration is positively associated with collateral but firm risk has no effect.  Hernadez-
Canovas and Martinez-Salano (2006) use a traditional model but study the effects of firm 
and relationship characteristics on outside collateral for a sample of Spanish SMEs.  
Voordeckers and Stijvers (2006) use data from credit files of a Belgian bank to estimate 
an ordered probit and continuation ratio logit model with collateralization and the form of 
collateral (inside or outside) as dependent variables.  Finally, Brick and Palia (2007) 
using the 1993 SSBF, use two-stage least squares to estimate a system of three equations 
for determining the loan rate and the use of outside and inside collateral.  
 The empirical literature on collateral has generated considerable heterogeneity in 
results.  Perhaps this should be expected given the complexity of the process under study, 
the differences in control variables across studies and data sets, the differences in legal 
and institutional structures in countries where data sets have been garnered, the potential 
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for simultaneity in the terms of the credit contract and, perhaps, a general inability or 
failure to distinguish between types of credit enhancement; collateral and personal 
guarantees. This later issue has, however, begun to be addressed.  
Review of the Empirical Literature on Guarantees    
 
 Despite the pervasive use of personal guarantees as a form of credit enhancement 
in the SME credit market, there are few empirical studies of guarantees.  Three studies 
represent the development of this empirical literature.  Though it did not distinguish 
between personal collateral and personal guarantees,  Ang et al. (1995) was the first to 
specifically study the use of outside collateral and/or personal guarantees as a credit 
enhancement device.  Avery et al, (1999) extends this work by treating outside collateral 
and personal guarantees as distinct enhancement devices.  Voordeckers and Steijvers 
(2006) study determinants of enhancement structures when options include no 
enhancement, inside collateralization, and the use of outside collateral and/or personal 
guarantees.  Like Ang et al. (1995), this last paper does not distinguish between outside 
collateral and personal guarantees.  
 Ang (1995) provides the first empirical look at credit enhancements other than 
business collateral in small business credit contracts.  This strictly descriptive study uses 
data from the 1988 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) to explore the degree to 
which enhancements in the form of “personal commitments” are used in various lending 
circumstances.  Ang was the first author to explicitly differentiate between credit 
enhancements that take the form of business collateral and those that represent a granting 
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of “personal commitments” either by pledging personal assets or granting personal 
guarantees.  The analysis established that organizational form, the S-Corporation in 
particular, is an important determinant of personal commitment use.  In concert with the 
majority of collateral studies, there was increased use of personal commitments to secure 
loans made to smaller firms and to unprofitable or highly leveraged (risky) firms.  This 
important pattern suggests that the widespread use of personal commitments in SME 
lending undoes much of the separation of business and personal risks in the SME credit 
market thought to have been afforded by limited liability.  Ang et al. reports two final 
results of particular importance here: 1) personal commitment use is far most prevalent 
for lines of credit than term loans and 2) the pervasive use of personal commitments 
indicates that personal wealth may play a strong role in the allocation of credit to small 
businesses.  
 Avery et al. (1998) extends the pioneering work of Ang et al. in several important 
ways.  First, by using a regression methodology, they are able to study the effects of 
owner, lender, and additional loan characteristics on the propensity for personal 
commitments to appear in the credit contact.  Second, they study personal guarantees as a 
distinct form of credit enhancement.  Lastly, when assessing the economic importance of 
personal commitments, they supplement the metric of incidence of use with one related to 
the dollar amount of financing associated with personal guarantees and outside collateral.  
Using 1988 and 1993 SSBF data, as well as 1989, 1991, and 1993 Survey of Consumer 
Finances data, Avery et al. report a number of findings.  Like the results reported in Ang 
et al, personal commitment use is found to be far more prevalent for corporations than for 
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non-limited liability firms.  The incidence of personal commitments generally and of 
personal guarantees specifically was found to have increased from 1988 to 1993.  
Personal commitments were found to substitute for business collateral for lines of credit 
but often found to complement inside collateral for other loan types.  Avery et al. found 
that loan size and the likelihood of a guarantee were positively correlated for all loan 
types other than mortgage loans.  Guarantee use was particularly prevalent for lines of 
credit and for loans provided by commercial banks.  Finally, using the SCF data to 
investigate the observation in Ang et al., that personal wealth may play a significant role 
in the allocation of credit to small businesses, Avery et al. found no systemic relationship 
between owner wealth and the incidence of personal commitments.33   
  The most recent contribution to this literature is a 2006 study by Voordeckers and 
Steijvers.  Using proprietary data from 234 credit files from loans to medium sized firms 
made by a large Belgian commercial bank, the study is the first to use a polychotomous 
dependent variable to study determinants of multiple enhancement structures. The first-
stage model is an ordered probit with a trinomial enhancement choice: 0 if there is no 
enhancement, 1 if only business collateral is used, and 2 if any type of personal 
commitment (personally-owned collateral or a personal guarantee) is included in the debt 
contract.34  The second-stage uses a continuation-ratio logit model to identify 
determinants of business collateral versus personal commitments conditional on having 
chosen to use some form of credit enhancement.  Results from the continuation-ratio logit 
                                                          
33 The SCF data was used since the SSBF data did not contain data on owner wealth.  While the SCF did 
contain owner wealth data, it did not contain data such as the amount of the business loan.  
34 This choice includes cases where only personal commitments are used and where personal commitments 
are used in conjunction with business collateral.  
  
72 
 
model suggest that the presence of trade credit, competitive bidding of the loan, the size 
of the loan, and the age of the firm each tend to increase the use of business collateral 
rather than personal commitments.  Firm asset size tends to favor the use of personal 
rather than business forms of enhancement.  The study does not distinguish between 
enhancement in the form of a personal guarantee and enhancement in the form of 
personal collateral.    
Data, Variables, and Sample Restrictions 
 This essay uses the public version of the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF) as the sole source of data.  The 2003 survey is the fourth and final in a series of 
four surveys directed and underwritten by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.  These surveys were conducted at five-year intervals beginning in 1988.  The 
2003 survey provides detailed data on 4,240 independent, domestic, for profit, non-
financial, non-agricultural businesses with fewer than 500 employees.  The four SSBF 
surveys are the only publicly available sources of detailed data on the finances and 
financial service use of US small businesses.  They contain extensive information on firm 
characteristics, ownership characteristics, firm finances, financial service usage, and the 
terms of credit facilities.  The survey also contains data on the institutions providing 
financial services and characteristics of the business relationship between the firm and its 
suppliers of financial services.   
 The 2003 survey is a nationally representative sample of approximately 6.3 
million US independent small businesses in operation as of December 31, 2003.  
Sampling is a stratified random sample.  Strata consist of both rural and urban locations 
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within each of the nine census regions, as well as four employee size categories.  Firms 
with 20 to 499 employees are oversampled to facilitate research focusing on larger firms 
and throughout the essay estimates of population statistics are calculated by weighting 
observations with the inverse of the probability of being selected for the sample.  
Standard errors for estimates of population statistics require adjustment for clustering at 
the urban/rural census region level.  The source for sample selection was the Dun’s 
Market Identifier Files, which tends to under-represent the newest and smallest firms.  Of 
particular importance to this essay, the 2003 survey also contains information on the 
outside, non-business, net worth of the principle business owner.  This data on owner 
wealth was not available in the earlier 1988 and 1993 surveys that were used by Ang et 
al. (1995) and Avery et al. (1998).  
 Less than 1.8 percent of all survey values were missing with thirty percent of 
observations having no missing values and sixty-five percent of the observations missing 
less than 1 percent of responses.  In almost all cases, values for missing responses have 
been imputed via randomized regression.35  The Federal Reserve project team also 
checked data for internal consistency and for overly influential cases and outliers, making 
data edits where clearly appropriate for the sample as a whole.   
Sample Restrictions and Missing Values  
 Following Berger and Udell (1995) and most of the subsequent related empirical 
literature; I study debt contracting features of lines of credit.  Lines of credit are the most 
                                                          
35 The randomization of the imputation is captured in five separate imputations for each imputed variable, 
which facilitates more accurate estimation of standard errors.  
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common and important source of external financing for small businesses.36  Lines of 
credit also exhibit the greatest variation in collateral types and in enhancement structures. 
Table 2.2 estimates the distribution of the four enhancement structures for lines of credit 
obtained by all limited liability firms from their primary bank.  The point estimate of this 
distribution is as follows: 33 percent of lines of credit are enhanced with only a 
guarantee, 15 percent are enhanced with only with collateral, 26 percent are enhanced 
with both collateral and a guarantee, and 25 percent have no enhancement.  This contrasts 
with the other forms of loans: mortgage loans, equipment loans, and vehicle loans which 
are defined by both their purpose and collateral type.   
Lines of credit are generally renewed annually with terms updated to reflect both 
changing borrower and credit market conditions.  Thus, lines of credit have the further 
advantage of generally being committed for a common one-year period so that the 
contracting variable of loan maturity is consistent across observations.  Finally, the 
revolving nature of borrowing under lines of credit affords greater opportunity for moral 
hazard in the forms of project substitution or asset diversion than occurs for single 
advance loans to purchase specific assets.  Loan disbursement procedures associated with 
these latter loan types: mortgage loans, equipment loans, and vehicle loans, insure that 
loan proceeds are used for their intended purpose.  In cases where firms have lines of 
credit with multiple lenders, I use the one with the firm’s lead bank and add an indicator 
                                                          
36 1910 of the 4240 firms in the 2003 SSBF have a line of credit.  Outstanding line of credit debt financed 
14.5% of small business assets in the 2003 survey with average usage of only 46% of committed lines.  The 
second largest source of outside funds was trade credit which funded 13.6% of assets.  Table 1.1 shows all 
sources of capital for SMEs in the 2003 SSBF and demonstrates the importance of lines of credit in the 
SME credit market.  
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variable for the presence of other line lenders.  The existence of multiple line of credit 
providers creates additional incentives for collateralization (Haroff and Korting, 1999).   
 Both Ang et al. (1995) and Avery et al. (1998) find that the presence of personal 
commitments (the pledge of personal collateral and/or the provision of a personal 
guarantee) in the enhancement structure is far more prevalent when firms are organized 
with limited liability.  Businesses organized as sole proprietorships or general 
partnerships do not distinguish between assets or liabilities of the business and those of 
the proprietor or general partner.  Hence, loans to businesses organized as proprietorships 
or general partnerships are implicitly “guaranteed” by the proprietor or general partner, 
and the execution of a formal guarantee agreement for these firms is generally redundant.  
I therefore limit the observations to those where the organizational form of the business 
limits the liability of the business owners for debts incurred by the firm.37  In these cases, 
the choice to include a guarantee in the enhancement structure is an overt choice to undo 
the separation of business and personal risks afforded by limited liability.  
 In the 2003 SSBF, 1634 firms have lines of credit with their primary source of 
financial services.  The self-identified primary source for 22 of these observations was an 
individual.  These and 2 other observations that identified a government agency as their 
primary line of credit source were dropped from the sample.  Of the remaining 1612 
observations, 286 were firms organized without limited liability and were also dropped 
from the estimating sample.  This leaves 1326 firms in the 2003 SSBF that are organized 
                                                          
37 The organizational forms which afford limited liability to their owners are : section S and C corporations, 
LLCs and LLPs.  
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with limited liability and that have line of credit with a lead source that is a private 
institution.  These observations were used to estimate the population distribution of 
enhancement structures for this frame reported in Table 2.2.  In the regression sample, 4 
observations have missing values for either leverage or return on sales and 98 
observations had missing values for owner outside net worth.  The final estimating 
sample for the regression analyses thus has 1224 observations.  
Variables  
 The extensive number of variables in the 2003 SSBF provides the researcher with 
an extensive set of covariates that can be expected to influence the equilibrium choice of 
enhancement structure.  To organize the included variables, I categorize them into four 
groups: characteristics of the firm, characteristics of the firm’s ownership, characteristics 
of the lender, and characteristics of the relationship between the firm and its lead bank.  
Past studies have, in general, used a more parsimonious set of right hand side variables.  
 Firm characteristics can be expected to affect the enhancement structure though 
at least two mechanisms: the type of assets available to serve as inside collateral (which 
affects the dissipative costs of collateralization) and indicators of relative firm risk.  The 
amount and type of assets available to serve as collateral and the transactions costs 
associated with the granting and perfecting of a security interest therein can be expected 
to influence the trade-offs between collateral and guarantees in the equilibrium contract.  
As mentioned in the literature review section, the effect of firm risk on collateralization 
has been empirically studied with the mass of the evidence supporting a positive 
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correlation between firm risk measures and the propensity for collateralization.38  The 
vector of firm characteristics that I employ consists of eight indicators for industrial 
classifications, the log of the age of the firm, the log of total firm assets, return on sales, 
leverage ratio, and an indicator for owner management.  Industry classifications reflect 
both assets available for collateral and potential risk differentials (Cole, 1996).  The age 
of the firm has been used as a negative risk proxy (Leeth and Scott, 1989).  The size (in 
assets) of the firm influences the amount of assets available to collateralize debt and is 
also a negative risk proxy.  The return on sales and leverage ratios are direct measures of 
observable firm risk (Berger and Udell, 1995).  The owner managed indicator has not 
been traditionally used in the literature.  I include it as a marker for risks associated with 
moral hazard arising from the confounding of the firm’s profit function with the owner’s 
own utility function.  
 Owner characteristics are particularly important to the credit enhancement 
structure for SME which are overwhelmingly private and closely held business.39  As 
private, often family-owned and owner- managed businesses, the ability, interests, and 
resources of the owners are of consequence for the operations and structure of the 
business and are likely to influence the enhancement structure in several distinct ways.  
Of central interest in this essay, is the role of owner wealth on the propensity for personal 
guarantees to be used as the sole form of credit enhancement.  The owner wealth variable 
is constructed for the primary owner as the log of the sum of equity in personal 
                                                          
38 However, none of these studies have distinguished between collateral and personal guarantees as distinct 
enhancement devices. 
39 Table 2.3 shows that 75% of the firms in the estimating sample are family owned and 86% are managed 
by a major owner of the business. 
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residential plus other personal assets less the value of his/her investment in the business.  
If transactions costs and utility losses of guarantees are significantly lower than those of 
providing collateral and owner wealth is sufficient to assure the lender of repayment 
under the guarantee in the event of unsatisfactory performance of the business, then the 
use of a guarantee rather than collateral to enhance the credit is Pareto efficient.  Multiple 
owners, particularly if they have very different levels of outside personal wealth, may 
create agency problems among the partners that outweigh the relatively lower transaction 
costs associated with guarantees.40  
 Lender characteristics can be expected to influence observed enhancement 
structures in two important ways.  The type of lender will likely impact the incidence of 
collateralization.  If the line of credit is provided by a specialized lender, such as 
commercial finance company or a securities firm, types of lenders that employ specific 
asset-based lending technologies, the enhancement structure can be expected to contain 
the correspondingly specialized collateral (Berger and Udell, 2006).  For example, 
commercial finance companies specialize in providing lines of credit collateralized by 
accounts receivable and inventory, while brokerage firms specialize in providing lines 
secured by marketable securities.  To control for the effect of differing lender types on 
enhancement structure, lenders are categorized as depository institutions or specialized 
institutions.  Depository institutions include commercial banks, savings banks, savings 
and loans, and credit unions. While these institutions have some different characteristics, 
regulatory changes have served to make their behavior more homogenous in the SME 
                                                          
40 See Ang et al. (1995) for further discussion of this problem  
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credit market.  Depository institutions generally and commercial banks specifically 
provide the overwhelming majority of lines of credit to SMEs.41 
Theory suggests that a second lender characteristic, the degree of lender 
competition, should have an effect on equilibrium enhancement structures.  Additional 
enhancement improves the lender’s expected return but the costs of enhancement are, in 
general, born by the borrower.  Models of collateral assume competitive credit markets so 
the lender’s participation constraint is binding at the zero profit level and all surpluses 
accrue to the borrower.  To the extent that credit markets are not competitive, credit 
contracts may stipulate a combination of higher interest rates and, as shown in Essay 1, 
higher enhancement requirements.  The SSBF contains a categorical variable for the 
degree of bank plus savings and loan deposit concentration in the MSA or county of 
borrower’s headquarters.42  I use this variable as a proxy for the level of competition in 
the relevant credit market.  If the index is 1800 or more, the market is deemed to be non-
competitive; if it is less than 1800, the market is deemed to be competitive.  This 
distinction is consistent with regulatory definitions of market concentration. 
 Relationship Characteristics have been shown to affect credit contract terms 
through two primary mechanisms.  The first can be characterized as the transmission of 
private information regarding the risk characteristics of the borrower through repeated 
interactions between the borrower and the bank over time and across some services.  This 
transmission of private information to the lender mitigates ex ante informational 
                                                          
41 In the 2003 SSBF, depository financial institutions provide 95% of all lines of credit   
42 This variable is based on the Herfindahl index, which is calculated as the square of the bank and savings 
and loan deposit shares in each MSA or rural county.  
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asymmetries than can otherwise cause SME credit market failures.  The second, 
potentially related mechanism is the reduction in marginal screening and monitoring 
costs afforded by debt re-contracting and by the sourcing of multiple types of debt from 
the same lender.   
A large number of empirical studies have tested the efficacy of these mechanisms.  
Berger and Udell (1995) find that relationship duration is negatively related to both the 
stated interest rate and the propensity for collateral for lines of credit.  Chakraborty and 
Hu (2006) find that the number of services provided by a line lender (the relationship 
breadth) has no effect on whether or not the line is collateralized.  Haroff and Korting 
(1998) find that lines of credit are more likely to be collateralized as the firm deals with 
more lenders.  To study the effects of relationship variables on enhancement structures,  
I use the duration of the relationship between the lead bank and the firm and an 
indicator for the number of line lenders.  Though not a relationship variable, I also 
control for the amount of the line of credit.  Essay 1 shows that a guarantee-only 
enhancement structure become feasible only if owner outside net worth is sufficiently 
large relative to the amount of the loan.  The line size variable is also included capture the 
effects of credit size in averaging down the fixed costs associated with collateralization.   
 Means standard errors and numbers of observations for each independent variable 
in the estimating sample are shown in Table2.3.  The table also shows the means and 
number of observations for each enhancement structure.  Observations with missing 
owner outside net worth are not included in this table.     
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The Empirical Model 
Data Generating Process  
 Selection of the econometric model can be motivated by considering the process 
generating observations in the data.  Observations are equilibrium credit contracts for 
lines of credit between limited liability firms and their lead bank.  The terms of these line 
of credit contracts are consequences of the intersection of borrower demand functions and 
lender supply functions for lines of credit.  Though the supply and demand functions for 
these small business credit lines cannot be identified, the process generating these credit 
contracts can be conceptualized as follows: Certain small privately and closely held firms 
seek short-term external debt financing in the form of lines of credit.  These firms seek 
offers from competing lenders in the intermediated loan market.43  Offers consist of 
contracts in the {i,E} space where i consists of fees and the interest rate on borrowings 
and E consists of required credit enhancement.  Credit enhancement can take one of four 
forms: no enhancement, collateral, a guarantee from the business owner and, finally, both 
collateral and a guarantee.  The firm accepts and closes the contract offer providing the 
firm/owner with the greatest expected utility or, alternatively, with the greatest expected 
surplus from undertaking the financed investment project.  We observe the enhancement 
structure of the accepted equilibrium contract.  In cases where the borrower’s demand for 
a line of credit does not generate an offer or if no offer is acceptable,  there is no 
                                                          
43 Even if the borrowing firm does not formally request offers from other potential lenders, the borrower 
could do so.  Knowing that this is a credible “threat,” the lead bank’s offered contract will, in a competitive 
credit market; attempt to maximize borrower utility subject to the lead bank’s expected profit function 
(participation constraint).  
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equilibrium contract to observe and these firms are excluded from the estimating sample.  
These exclusions may be a source of selection bias and are discussed in Post-estimation 
Specification Testing and a Robustness Test. 
  The contract term which we observe is the form or nature of the enhancement 
structure rather than its amount.  Given the dollar amount of the committed line of credit, 
the amount of the enhancement depends on both future asset values and the costs of asset 
liquidation.  Both of these variables are random and are, ex-ante, unobservable.  The 
enhancement structure — guaranteed, collateralized, both or neither — is an observed 
category describing alternative types or forms of credit enhancement in the credit 
contract.  In this environment, there is no systematic ordering to the forms of 
enhancement; 44 rather, they represent four mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive categories of credit enhancement.  This makes the chosen enhancement 
structure a polychotomous variable taking one of four values (0, 1, 2 or 3), depending on 
the observed form of credit enhancement associated with the firm’s line of credit 
agreement with its lead bank.  
 The contracting process is a complex one.  Contracts offered and selected will 
depend on a host of firm, borrower, lender, loan, market, and relationship characteristics.  
Firm characteristics include industry, size, age, legal structure, and financial condition.  
Lender characteristics may include type of institution, its financial condition, the degree 
of experience it has with the borrower’s industry and market, and the lender’s size and 
                                                          
44 Later in the paper I estimate an ordered model as a robustness check.  To do this I offer a plausible 
dimension for ordering the alternative enhancement structures.  
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organizational structure.  Owner characteristics affecting the contract include the number 
of owners, the nature of the relationships among the owners (if in the same family for 
example), the “character” and reputation of ownership, the degree to which ownership is 
active in management and, of primary importance to this study, the wealth of the primary 
owner outside his/her ownership interest in the borrowing business.  Given that 
observations are limited to a single loan type (line of credit) that is generally offered for a 
12-month period, the primary loan attribute outside of the contracting variables is its size.  
Credit market characteristics affecting the contract include the degree of lending 
competition and time in the credit cycle at which the line was granted.  Finally, 
characteristics of the relationship between the borrower and the lender — its duration, 
scope and degree of exclusivity — are likely to affect the amount of surplus between the 
lender and borrower and its allocation between them.   
Notably, all of the variables above describe characteristics of the contracting 
parties, their relationship and the credit market in which the contracting takes place.  
None of the variables describes attributes of the enhancement structures themselves.  
These and other characteristics affecting enhancement choice are not observed.45  The 
cumulative effect of the unobserved characteristics on the equilibrium enhancement 
structure must be captured in an error term.   
  
                                                          
45 The absence of variables capturing characteristic of the alternative enhancement structures will rule out 
the use of some otherwise attractive estimators. 
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Derivation of the Multinomial Logit Estimator from a Random Utility Model for 
Enhancement Choice  
 The competitive contracting process generating the data provides a framework 
from which we can develop the observed enhancement structure as the outcome of a 
random utility model.  The competitive financial intermediary, subject to its own zero 
expected profit participation constraint, designs a loan contract that maximizes the 
borrower’s expected return on an investment project financed with a line of credit.  The 
borrower’s expected return or utility from the project depends, in part, on the interaction 
of characteristics of the borrower with the form of credit enhancement in the credit 
contract.  The lender must choose among a set of four mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive enhancement structures denoted by j ∈ {0,1,2,3} when designing the loan 
contract, where the borrower’s expected utility from each enhancement alternative is 
given by 𝑈𝑖𝑗∗ = 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) +  𝜀𝑖𝑗. 𝑈𝑖𝑗∗  is an unobserved, latent index of the expected utility 
that borrower i will obtain from enhancement structure j.  
The utility index, therefore, is a function, [V(.)] of borrower, owner, loan, and 
relationship characteristics contained in the data.  Since the data does not contain 
information on the attributes of the alternative credit enhancement structures, the 
independent variables in the vector X are indexed by the firm, i, and not by each form of  
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potential enhancement.46   𝜀𝑖𝑗 is an additive, random disturbance arising from unobserved 
factors influencing the expected utility of enhancement alternatives, errors in 
optimization arising from bounded rationality, and errors in measuring observed 
characteristics.  We assume that 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is independently and identically distributed with a 
type 1, extreme value (Gumbel) distribution.  The CDF of 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , F(𝜀𝑖𝑗 < 𝜀), is then equal 
to exp(−𝑒−𝜀) and its PDF, 𝑓�𝜀𝑖𝑗� = exp (−𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑒−𝜀𝑖𝑗).  
 In the data, we have an observed multinomial variable, 𝑌𝑖, for the actual 
enhancement structure for each firm with a line of credit where: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑖𝑗∗  = max(𝑈𝑖0∗ ,𝑈𝑖1∗ ,𝑈𝑖2∗ ,𝑈𝑖3∗ ) or, equivalently, if  𝑈𝑖𝑗∗ > 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
               (2.0) 
So 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏�𝑈𝑖𝑗∗ > 𝑈𝑖𝑘∗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗�        (2.1)     
 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 > 𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗)       (2.2) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑖𝑘 < 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗)              (2.3) 
 Because of the 𝜀𝑖𝑗 are assumed to be independently distributed, the joint 
probability that 𝜀𝑖𝑘 < 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗) is the product of the 
probabilities that 𝜀𝑖𝑘 < 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗).    
                                                          
46 Were the data such that observations consisted of alternative-specific attributes of each enhancement 
structure but no variation in characteristics of the borrower, the expected utility would be modeled as 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , which would lead to the conditional logit model.  Were the data such that each observation 
contained variation in both the characteristics of the agent and the attributes of the alternatives for each 
agent, the expected utility of each choice for each agent (borrowing firm) would be given by 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 +
 𝑍𝑖𝜃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , which leads to the development of mixed or nested logit model.  
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So we can now write: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) = ∫−∞
∞ ∏ 𝐹𝑘≠𝑗 (𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) − 𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖))𝑓(𝜀𝑖𝑗)𝑑𝜀𝑖𝑗                  (2.4) 
which, under assumptions for 𝐹 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓   
 =  ∫−∞
∞ ∏ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑘≠𝑗 (−𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) + 𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖))) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝( −𝜀𝑖𝑗 − 𝑒−𝜀𝑖𝑗)𝑑𝜀𝑖𝑗 
           (2.5) 
=  ∫−∞
∞ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜀𝑖𝑗 − exp (−𝜀𝑖𝑗 −𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑗(∑
𝑒𝑉𝑗�𝑋𝑖�
𝑒𝑉𝑘�𝑋𝑖�𝑗≠𝑘
)))𝑑𝜀𝑖𝑗     (2.6) 
                                     Which, becomes  
                                =  𝑒
𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖)
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑘(𝑋𝑖)𝐾𝑘=0
       (2.7) 
If we now assume that 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) is a linear combination of the observed characteristics of 
the ith borrower so 𝑉𝑗(𝑋𝑖) = 𝑋𝑖′𝛽𝑗, then: 
  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =   
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑘𝐾
𝑘=0
          (2.8) 
 which gives the logit form for the observed credit enhancement structure.  
 In this equation, the parameter vectors for each alternative, βj , are not unique.  
For any vector c with the same dimension as parameter vectors βj, the vectors (𝛽𝑗 +  𝑐) 
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will also be a solution to this equation.47  This indeterminacy can be solved by 
normalizing the set of parameter vectors by choosing one of the parameter vectors 
associated with an alternative, such as β0, as a normalizing vector and redefining the J 
parameter vectors as  𝛽𝑗  =  (𝛽𝑗° – 𝛽0) so 𝛽0 = 0.
48  The alternative associated with 𝛽0 is 
called the base alternative or comparison category.  Though this normalization identifies 
the parameter vectors, it does so at a cost of complexity in their interpretation.  The 𝛽𝑗 are 
no longer associated solely with alternative j.  Rather they reflect the non-linear effect of 
a change in a characteristic of the borrower on the log of the odds ratio with which 
alternative j is chosen rather than the base choice.  This can be illustrated as follows:  
   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑖) =   
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βj )
1+∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βk )𝐾𝑘=1
        (2.9) 
Where the parameter vectors are normalized with βo = 0.  From this we can compute J 
log odds ratios:    
ln �𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏
�𝑌𝑖𝑗=1|𝑋𝑖�
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖𝑘=1|𝑋𝑖)
� = ln�𝑒
𝑋𝑖
′�βj �
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′�βk �
� =  𝑋𝑖′�βj – βk� =  𝑋𝑖′𝛽𝑗   𝑖𝑓  βk = 0.   (2.10) 
                                                          
47 This can be shown by substituting �𝛽𝑗 +  𝑐�𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛽𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑  (𝛽𝑘 +  𝑐)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛽𝑘 in this equation.  The 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(C ) 
terms in the numerator and denominator will cancel out.   
48 Statistically, any alternative can be chosen as the base alternative.  Changing the base category changes 
the parameters being estimated and, hence, their values.  Since probabilities must sum to one, predicted 
probabilities for selection of an alternative as well as the marginal effects of a change in xi  on the predicted 
probabilities are, as we would hope, unaffected by the choice of the normalizing alternative.  
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This shows that the coefficient vector for a choice j ≠ 0 gives the non-linear effects of a 
change in borrower characteristic on the odds with which alternative j is chosen rather 
than the base choice.49   
 The difficulty of coefficient interpretation in the multinomial logit model can be 
further highlighted by deriving the marginal effects of the characteristics on the 
probability of an alternative. 
 𝜕(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖=𝑗))
𝜕𝑋𝑖
= � 𝑒
𝑋𝑖
′�βj �
1+∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′�βk �𝐾𝑘=1
� �βj − ∑ (𝛽𝑘𝐾𝑘=1 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑘))�    (2.11) 
which depends on the parameters for the other alternatives and the on the values of the 
elements of Xi for both its magnitude and even for its sign.  
Model Choice  
 Both the data generating process and its extension to a random utility model lead 
me to assess the effect of owner outside net worth on the equilibrium choice of 
enhancement structure by estimating the following reduced form multinomial model for 
limited liability firms with lines of credit from their lead bank: 
 
exp( )
|Pr( | )
exp( )
|1
x
m by m x
J
x
j bj
Β
= =
Β∑
=  (2.12)
 
                                                          
49 This expression also shows that the odds ratio for any two alternatives depends only upon the relative 
frequency with which those two alternatives are selected and will thus be unaffected by the addition or 
deletion of one of the alternatives.  This independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition is a 
consequence of the assumption that errors in the random utility model are independent across alternatives.  
IIA is discussed further in the post-estimation testing portion of this section. 
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where m indicates one of the set of three mutually exclusive enhancement structures: no 
enhancement, collateral only, and guarantee only; “b” is the base or comparison 
enhancement structure (both collateral and a guarantee): 50 and x is a vector of expanded 
firm, owner, lender, relationship, and loan characteristics, including the outside net worth 
of the primary business owner, as the variable of interest in this study. 
 Essay 1 develops equilibrium credit contracts in a competitive SME credit 
market where borrowers demand a line of credit type loan in an environment of moral 
hazard.  In that essay, I show that the equilibrium credit contract will be enhanced with 
only a guarantee if the borrower has sufficient outside net worth relative to the line of 
credit amount.  The theoretical analysis in Essay 1 would predict the coefficients on 
owner net worth and on the amount of the line of credit commitment in the guarantee- 
only comparison to be statistically significant and to have, respectively, positive and 
negative signs after controlling for firm, other ownership, lender, and relationship 
characteristics.  Since the interpretation of multinomial coefficients with this number of 
choices is difficult at best, I will rely on graphs of the predicted probabilities for 
enhancement outcomes to demonstrate the ceteris paribus effects of increasing owner 
wealth and several other variables on the equilibrium credit enhancement structure.   
Estimation of the model is done by maximum likelihood.  The closed form of the 
probabilities for each of the choices is a consequence of the assumed distribution or the 
errors in the random utility model.  The assumption that the errors are randomly drawn 
                                                          
50 I used both collateral and guarantee as the base outcome for two reasons: this outcome had the second 
most observations and to assist in the gross interpretation of the coefficients.  
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from a type I extreme value distribution leads, after normalizing the estimated 
coefficients, to a logistic function for the choice probabilities.  The resultant likelihood 
function is straightforward to maximize using numerical methods.  Denoting the observed 
choice by 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1 if alternative j was chosen and 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise, the log-likelihood 
function for N observations and J alternative enhancement structures is  
ln𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=0
𝑁
𝑛=1 ln�𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑖)� = ∑ ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝐽−1
𝑗=0
𝑁
𝑛=1 ln�
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βj )
1+∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βk )𝐾𝑘=1
�                  (2.13) 
and     
              𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑒 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛽 [∑ ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝐽−1
𝑗=0
𝑁
𝑛=1 ln�
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βj )
1+∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βk )𝐽−1
𝑘=1
�] 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝛽 = [𝛽0 𝛽1 …𝛽𝐽]    
  (2.14) 
Alternative Estimators 
An ordered probit will also be considered as a specification for this study.  An 
attractiveness of this model is both its use of information inherent in the ordering of the 
dependent variable categories to provide more efficient coefficient estimates and its non-
imposition of the IIA assumption.  Use of an ordered specification, however, requires that 
the categorical values of the dependent variable, in this case the form of credit 
enhancement; represent a one dimensional ordering across categories.  The ordered probit 
model is developed by assuming that the categories of the dependent variable are derived 
from a latent index for an underlying, quantifiable characteristic.  For example, when 
using an ordered probit to estimate the effects of firm and bond characteristics on its 
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credit rating (AAA, AA, A …. BAA etc), it is straight forward to conceptualize the 
ratings as ordered categories derived from an underlying, latent index of default risk.  
In the previous discussion of the data generating process for the four mutually 
exclusive enhancement structures — no enhancement, collateral only, guarantee only, 
and both collateral and a guarantee — these outcomes were more naturally interpreted as  
distinct categories rather than sequential degrees of some underlying latent index.  We 
observe the form of the enhancement structure but not the “amount” of enhancement.  
There is no obvious underlying latent index from which derive an ordering of the 
enhancement structures.  While the  theoretical Essay 1 finds that guarantees can be a 
more efficient form of credit enhancement that collateral, this result is only obtained 
when the guarantor has sufficient wealth to make the collateral only enhancement 
structure a feasible alternative.  In this model owner wealth re-orders the efficiency of the 
alternative enhancement structures for a given borrower in the equilibrium credit 
contract.  This suggests the absence of an ordering based on efficiency of enhancement 
structures that applies to all borrowers.  Given this, I conclude that an unordered, 
multinomial logit is the most appropriate estimator for this study.   
Voorddeckers and Steijvers (2006) argue that the enhancement structures — no 
enhancement, business collateral, and personal commitments — are ordered by the 
degree to which they mitigate the moral hazard of SME lending in the Belgian banking 
system.  In the current essay, where the choice of enhancement structure is assumed to be 
heavily influenced by relative transactions costs, a plausible dimension in which to order 
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enhancement structures may be in the degree of dissipative costs associated with their 
use.  Based on the modeling in Essay 1, this leads to the following, highest to lowest cost 
ordering: collateral only, collateral and guarantee, guarantee only, and no enhancement.  
An ordered probit using this plausible ordering of the alternatives is estimated in Post-
estimation Specification Testing and a Robustness Test  of this essay as a robustness 
check for the results of the multinomial specification.  
A second alternative, the nested logit, was also considered.  Like the multinomial 
logit, this estimator can be derived from a random utility model and it possesses the 
computational advantage of having a closed form logit expression for the likelihood 
function.  Moreover, unlike the multinomial logit, it can accommodate correlated errors 
among alternative enhancement structures.  Correlations between or among alternatives 
are addressed by partitioning alternatives that are closest substitutes (have correlated 
errors) into common groups or “nests.”  The choice probabilities for each alternative are 
then estimated as the product of the probability that a group or nest is chosen and the 
probability that a specific alternative is chosen conditional on the probability that the 
“nest” to which it belongs is chosen.  If the nesting structure is properly specified, the 
nested logit estimator accommodates correlated errors among alternatives within a 
common group or nest; overcoming the problem of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives assumption in the multinomial logit.  To identify the probability that nests are 
chosen, the data must contain variables that are specific to the alternatives.  The SSBF 
data used in this study does not contain variables that are attributes of the enhancement 
alternatives.  It is, therefore, not possible to estimate a nested logit model.  
  
93 
 
Empirical Results from the Multinomial Logit Model 
Coefficient estimates and standard errors associated with each variable and each 
non-base enhancement structure are reported in Table 2.4.  Marginal effects of the 
independent variables at the means of the sample are reported in Table 2.5.  As predicted 
by Essay 1, there is a systematic relationship between owner wealth and the observed 
enhancement structure.  The coefficients on the log of owner outside net worth and on the 
log of amount of the line of credit are both statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
guarantee only - both collateral and guarantee comparison.  The signs of the coefficients 
indicate that the ceteris paribus effect of increasing owner net worth, for a given line of 
credit commitment amount, is to increase the odds that the line will be enhanced with 
only collateral rather than both collateral and a guarantee.  The ceteris paribus effect of 
the amount of the line of credit decreases this odds ratio.  These directional results are 
mirrored in the marginal effects.  The marginal effects of owner wealth and the amount of 
line of credit amount on the probability of a guarantee are, respectively positive and 
negative and are significant at the 1% level.  In the both collateral and a guarantee 
outcome, the signs of the coefficients on the wealth and line size are reversed, but remain 
significant at the 1% level. 
  Given the large number of comparisons and the difficulty in interpreting 
coefficients in the multinomial logit, I will use graphs showing the ceteris paribus effects 
of changes in selected independent variables on the predicted probabilities of equilibrium 
enhancement structure outcomes to convey the finding of this study.  
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 Figure 2.1 summarizes the main results of this study.  This graph shows the 
distribution of the predicted enhancement structure as the log of owner net worth 
increases.  The predicted probabilities for enhancement structures are calculated at the 
mean of the other variables in the model.  As predicted in Essay I there is a systematic 
relationship between the outside net worth of the borrower’s primary owner and the 
enhancement structure of the firm’s line of credit with from its lead bank.  As owner net 
worth increases, holding the size of the line of credit constant at the sample mean of 
$268,337, enhancement increasingly takes the form of a personal guarantee, only.  
Conversely, the prevalence of collateral, either as the sole form of enhancement or in 
tandem with a guarantee, falls.   
 These findings contrast to those in Avery et al. (1998) who report “ no consistent 
relationship between personal commitment use and owner wealth.”  The Avery et al. 
study predated the inclusion of owner wealth data in the SSBF and relied on the 1989 - 
1995 business owner section of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  While the SCF 
provided data on the wealth of business owners, it did not include data on many other 
loan characteristics, most importantly, the size of the loan.  Essay 1 establishes that it is 
owner wealth compared to the amount borrowed that will lead to a guarantee only 
equilibrium enhancement structure for lines of credit.  
 While the effect of owner net worth is the primary question of interest, results of 
this estimation find several other variables that have independent effects on the 
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equilibrium enhancement structure.  Further, these results are as expected based on the 
contracting model in Essay 1.  
 In Essay 1 and in the discussion of the data generating process in this essay, the 
existence of a competitive intermediated credit market for small business lines of credit 
plays an important role in determining the equilibrium form of credit enhancement.  
Since transactions costs associated with a guarantee are less that those associated with 
collateral, competitive banks will offer guarantee only credit contracts to borrowers with 
sufficient wealth to make the repayment value of the guarantee credible.  In monopolistic 
bank markets with moral hazard, Essay 1 argues that the bank can more efficiently 
extract surplus if it increases enhancement requirements rather than increasing the 
interest rate charged on the loan.   
The effect of competition is captured by a dichotomous variable for the bank 
deposit share concentrations in the MSA or county where the borrower has its main 
office.  The coefficient on the competitive bank market indicator variable reported in 
Table 2.4 is positive and statistically significant in the comparisons of all enhancement 
structures to the base structure, both collateral and a guarantee.  This implies that non-
competitive markets are associated with a greater proportion of lines of credit enhanced 
with both collateral and a guarantee and lower proportions that are unenhanced, enhanced 
with only collateral and enhanced with only a guarantee; at all levels of owner wealth. 
Figures 2.2a-2.2d graphically display this association. 
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 Figures 2.2a-2.2d show the difference in the effect of owner wealth on the 
predicted probability for each of the four possible enhancement structures for firms 
located in concentrated deposit markets compared to non-concentrated markets. 51  The 
effect of less competition among lenders is an increase in the use of both collateral and a 
guarantee to enhance a line of credit contract at each level of owner wealth, as shown in 
Figure2.2b and a corresponding decrease in the probability the other three enhancement 
structures at each level of wealth as shown in Figures 2.2a, 2.2c, and 2.2d.  This result is 
consistent with the analysis of contracting in a monopolistic SME credit market in    
Essay 1. 
To further examine the effect of local credit market concentration on 
enhancement outcomes, two other specifications of the multinomial logit were run.  In 
the first, the estimating sample was bifurcated into competitive and non-competitive 
subsamples and the full model estimated for each.  This specification allows all 
coefficients to differ between markets.  The second specification used all observations in 
a single model, but added an interaction of the indicator for a competitive market with 
both outside owner wealth and the amount of the line of credit.  Because of the binary 
nature of the competition indicator variable in the original model, these alternative 
specifications failed to provide additional insight into the effects of local credit market 
concentration on enhancement outcomes beyond those reported generated by the main 
specification.  
                                                          
51 The level of competition is represented by a binary variable for the combined Herfindahl index for 
commercial and savings banks. Markets are assumed to be competitive if the Herfindahl index is less than 
1800.  
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The analysis in Essay 1 emphasized that enhancement in the form of a guarantee 
is more efficient than collateral, provided that the guarantor has sufficient outside net 
worth relative to the size of the loan.  Further, because many of the dissipative costs 
associated with collateral are fixed costs, the proportionate efficiency gains from 
guarantee use should be greater for smaller lines of credit than for large ones.  The 
propensity to see guarantees rather than collateral in equilibrium line of credit contracts 
should thus be greater for small lines of credit than for larger ones.  Figures 2.3a – 2.3d 
show the differential in effect of owner net worth on the predicted probability that each 
enhancement structure will appear in the equilibrium contract between a $30,000 line of 
credit and a $1,000,000 line of credit.  Again, predicted probabilities are calculated at the 
means for other variables in the model.  These results indicate that guarantee use is more 
prevalent for smaller lines of credit where the fixed costs associated with collateral have a 
proportionately greater impact on the borrower’s total cost of debt capital.  This effect 
occurs at all levels of owner net worth but increases as owner net worth increases.  
 Earlier in this paper, I argued that owner management tends to confound the 
firm’s profit function with the owner’s personal utility function.  This confounding 
increases the risk of moral hazard faced by the firm’s creditors.  The owner-manager is in 
a position to have an early warning of adverse business results and has both the incentive 
and means to divert both business assets and cash flows to personal use.  Collateralization 
with business assets is a particularly useful device to mitigate the risk of asset diversion.  
An owner guarantee is a similarly useful devise to mitigate the risk of cash flow diversion 
from the business to the owner-manager.  We would thus expect to see an increased 
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propensity for the use of both collateral and a guarantee for owner managed firms.  
Figures 2.4a-2.4d provide empirical support for this argument.  Figure 2.4b illustrates  the 
increased propensity of the lead line of credit to be enhances with both collateral and a 
guarantee when the firms is managed by a major owner.    
Post-estimation Specification Testing and a Robustness Test 
 Diagnostic testing of the MNL model takes several forms. I discuss tests for non 
correlation of the errors across enhancement structures (Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives), tests for combining enhancement structures, and tests for the irrelevance of 
independent variables in distinguishing among enhancement structures.  
Testing for the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA) Assumption 
 The multinomial logit model assumes that the error terms in the underlying 
random utility model are not correlated across alternatives or, conversely, that adding or 
removing an outcome from the choice set should not change the odds ratio between two 
existing outcomes.  In the literature these assumptions are known as the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and they can be seen in the structure of the MNL model 
where the odds ratio 
 Prob(𝑦=𝑚|𝑥)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦=𝑛|𝑥)
= exp {𝑥(𝐵𝑚|𝑏 − 𝐵𝑛|𝑏}        (2.15) 
does not depend on alternatives other than m and n.  
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This condition is most likely to hold when the options in the choice set represent distinct 
alternatives rather than close substitutes.  If this is the case, adding another distinct 
alternative is less likely to affect the relative frequency with which any two of 
alternatives are chosen.  
 In this paper, I show that collateral and owner guarantees are distinct alternatives 
for the contracting parties when guarantors are wealthy relative to the amount of the line 
of credit commitment.  It is not clear that this distinction applies when owner wealth is 
relatively low or, more generally, on average across the distribution of guarantor wealth.  
Since IIA is an assumption of the Multinomial Logit Model, I have used two distinct tests 
for the validity of this assumption, the Hausman-McFadden (HM) test and the Small-
Hsiao (SH) test.  
 Both the HM and SH tests employ a general strategy of comparing the estimated 
coefficients of a restricted model to those of the full or unrestricted model.  The full 
model contains all alternative choice outcomes; in this case, the four forms of credit 
enhancement — no enhancement, collateral only, both collateral and a guarantee, and a 
guarantee only. The restricted model omits one of these enhancement alternatives.  If the 
coefficient estimates for the two models are not statistically different, then both models 
will predict similar odds ratios between each pair of choices, and IIA is deemed to hold.  
If the estimated coefficients of the restricted and unrestricted models are sufficiently 
different, then omitting an alternative changes the estimated odds ratio between at least 
one choice and the base alternative and the test reject IIA.  
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More specifically, the HM test statistic is given by: 
 𝐻 = (𝐵�𝑅 − 𝐵�𝐹)′�𝑉𝑎𝑟(  𝐵�𝑅) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(�𝐵�𝐹)}−1 (𝐵�𝑅 − 𝐵�𝐹)     (2.16) 
where 𝐵�𝑅 is the vector of estimated coefficients in the restricted  model and 𝐵�𝐹 is the 
vector of coefficients in the full model using the full sample.  H has an asymptotic, chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated 
coefficients in both the unrestricted and restricted models.  Table 2.6 reports the results of 
this test: the guarantee only alternative is independent of the other alternatives and the 
chi2 statistics for the other three alternatives are negative.  
 If the test statistic, H, is negative, Stata reports that the asymptotic assumptions of 
the test are not met.52  Hausman and McFadden (1984) note that that the test statistic may 
be negative in finite samples as the result of inverting the often very small difference 
between the estimated variance-covariance matrixes for 𝐵�𝑅 and 𝐵�𝐹and should be 
regarded as evidence for the independences of alternatives.  The Hausman test thus 
provides evidence that the odds between the four enhancement types in the model are not 
affected by the addition of or deletion of one of the alternative enhancement types in the 
choice set.  
 The Small-Hsiao test for validity of the IIA assumption is based on a likelihood 
ratio test and avoids the computational and inference problems that may arise in the HM 
test when inverting the difference between the estimated variance-covariance matrixes for 
                                                          
52 The asymptotic distribution of H is Chi-squared where the p-lim of the variance covariance matrix for 𝐵�  
is a vector of the variances of the elements of 𝐵� .  
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𝐵�𝑅 and 𝐵�𝐹.  The SM test involves a random bifurcation of the observations into two 
subsamples.  The two samples are then used to obtain two estimates of the coefficient 
vectors for the unrestricted model, 𝐵�𝑢
𝑆1and 𝐵�𝑢
𝑆2 from which a weighted average vector, 
𝐵�𝑢
𝑆1𝑆2 is calculated as � 1
√2
� 𝐵�𝑢
𝑆1 + �1 − �� 1
√2
���𝐵�𝑢
𝑆2.  
Next, the second subsample, less the observations with the omitted outcome, is 
used to obtain estimates of the coefficient vector for the restricted model, 𝐵�𝑟
𝑆2 and the 
likelihoods associated with the unrestricted and restricted models fitted with 𝐵�𝑢
𝑆1𝑆2 and 
𝐵�𝑟
𝑆2, respectively.  The test statistic for the Small-Hsiao test is 𝑆𝐻 = −2�𝐿�𝐵�𝑢
𝑆1𝑆2� −
𝐿�𝐵�𝑟
𝑆2��, which has a chi-square asymptotic distribution with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of elements in 𝐵�𝑢
𝑆1𝑆2 plus the number of elements in 𝐵�𝑟
𝑆2. 
In small samples, such as in this study, results of the SH test are sensitive to the 
composition of the two subsamples.  The test also loses power as the number of 
covariates increases.  The model estimated here has 21 variables. Table 2.7 reports the 
results of three successive calls of the SM test using different seeds for the random 
assignment of observations to the two subsamples.  The base enhancement alternative is 
both collateral and a guarantee.  The three calls of the SH test demonstrate the sensitivity 
of the test results to the composition of the bifurcated sample particularly when the 
estimating sample is relatively small.  
 The results of both the HM test can be interpreted as supporting that the model 
conforms to the assumptions of IIA.  The SH tests are ambiguous.  Cheng and Long 
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(2005) used Monte Carlo studies to evaluate both the HM and SH tests and find that both 
have poor small sample properties and often do not improve as sample size increase.  
They conclude that the neither test is particularly useful for determining consistency with 
the IIA property.  Based on these tests, I can neither accept nor reject that the model 
conforms to the IIA assumption.  
Testing for Combining Enhancement Categories   
 An implicit assumption in my empirical model is that the coefficients on the 
independent variables are useful in explaining the relative likelihood that a particular 
enhancement structure will emerge in the equilibrium line of credit debt contract.  
Specifically, if the fitted model does not provide meaningful information regarding the 
relative odds of any two alternative enhancement structures, these alternatives are said to 
be indistinguishable.  Failure of the independent variables in the model to distinguish 
between two alternatives, m and n, corresponds to the hypothesis: 𝐻𝑜:𝛽𝑚|𝑛 = 0 where 
𝛽𝑚|𝑛 is the vector of coefficients on the non-intercept explanatory variables in the 
comparison of alternative m to alternative n.  Table 2.8 reports the results of likelihood 
ratio test for combining all pairs of enhancement structures in the model.  The test rejects 
indistinguishably between any two alternatives.  The guarantee-only and no enhancement 
categories are, however, distinguishable at only a 9% significance level.    
Testing for Irrelevance of Independent Variables  
 In the multinomial logit model with J outcomes, J–1 coefficients are estimated for 
each explanatory variable.  If an explanatory variable is superfluous, its coefficient in 
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each of the J-1, comparisons is proximately zero.  Formally, for a MLM model with four 
outcomes, one of which is the base outcome, b, we have 𝐻0:𝛽𝑖,𝑚|𝑏 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 =
1,2,3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 4 where i indexes the explanatory variables.  Results of a Wald test of this 
hypothesis for each independent variable are reported in Table 2.9.  The following 
variables have the greatest statistical power in distinguishing among alternative 
enhancement structures: owner outside net worth, amount of the line of credit, a 
competitive banking market, financial leverage, a transportation and communications 
rather than retail industrial classification, and age of the firm.  
This test finds several variables that have limited explanatory power in 
distinguishing among alternative enhancement outcomes.  The indicators for being a 
wholesale or mining rather than a retail business have limited explanatory value but are 
just two of a vector of industry dummies that likely have joint discriminatory power.  The 
other variable with limited explanatory power is the indicator for the business being 
family owned.  The lack of discriminatory power for this indicator is likely related to the 
preponderance of family owned businesses in the sample.53  To avoid over-fitting of the 
model to the data, I have chosen to retain these irrelevant explanatory variables the 
inclusion of which is based in theory.  
Simultaneity and Selection  
 Since credit contracts are written in the joint space of credit enhancement and 
interest rates, one might expect that simultaneity of the form of credit enhancement and 
                                                          
53 Table 2.3 shows that 75% of the firms in the estimating sample are family owned.  
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the interest rate to be a concern for empirical estimates of the effect of owner wealth on 
the equilibrium enhancement structure.  In the moral hazard based models of Essay 1, 
however, the lender’s binding zero profit constraint generates a deterministic relationship 
between the model parameters and both the equilibrium interest rate and credit 
enhancement.54  While the interest rate reflects the costs of enhancement incurred by the 
lender, there are no other links between the enhancement structure and the rate charged.  
Were there data on the contractual interest rate, it would be possible to add it as an 
independent variable in the model as a test for simultaneity.55  Such a test would also 
need to control for lender costs incurred to obtain credit enhancement since such costs are 
frequently embedded in the contractual interest rate.  The theory developed in Essay 1, 
however, suggests that this test would not find evidence of simultaneity provided that 
moral hazard is the dominant form of informational problem in the SME credit market.  
 The lack of simultaneity between credit enhancement and interest rates can also 
be illustrated in a manner that is less specific to the model of Essay 1 but, rather, draws 
from the general literature on moral hazard in credit markets.  In an environment of moral 
hazard, credit contract terms of collateral and interest rates are not substitutes; rather, 
they have opposite effects on the borrower’s ex post incentives to shift expected returns 
to itself at the expense of the lender.  Higher loan interest rates reduce the borrower’s 
returns from a successful “project” and hence increase his incentives to take ex-post 
                                                          
54 In Essay 1, the equations for the equilibrium interest rate, i*, in both the collateral and guarantee models, 
can be rewritten solely in terms of the model parameters by substituting the full expression for C* and G*, 
respectively, into these two equations.  The expressions for C* and G* do not contain i*.   
55 Berger and Udell (1995) employ this strategy and conclude that simultaneity of contract terms is not a 
significant problem.  
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actions such as diverting returns, increasing business risk, and shirking. That is, higher 
interest rates increase the degree of moral hazard.  Increases in the amount of credit 
enhancement, conversely, increase the borrower’s expected loss in the event of a project 
failure and provide incentives for the borrower to accurately report returns, decrease 
project risks, and exert additional effort.  Consequently, neither the lender nor the 
borrower is indifferent between credit contracts with differing combinations of interest 
rates and credit enhancement.  In equilibrium, the optimal contract is a unique pair        
{i, enhancement}.  
The model that I estimate can be stated as a conditional expectation function:  
  𝐸[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑖)] =   
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βj )
1+∑ 𝑒𝑋𝑖
′(βk )𝐾𝑘=1
     (2.17) 
 with dummy variables in X set equal to 1 for each of the following conditions: a line of 
credit was demanded from the lead bank; the lead bank offered a line of credit; and, 
finally, the line of credit offer was accepted.  Formatting the model in this manner 
highlights that this reduced form model estimates the statistical association between the 
propensity for a certain enhancement structure, “ j “, to appear in the debt contract and 
the characteristics in X given that the firm demanded a line of credit from its lead bank 
and received an acceptable contract offer in return.  Estimates of this association pertain 
only to firms that exhibit these three conditions.  If, in particular, a significant number of 
firms declined contract offers for lines of credit from their lead bank and if these firms 
would have borrowed with systemically different enhancement structures than those 
accepting the offered contract, then the estimated effects of observables on the propensity 
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for a certain type of enhancement structure to appear in the line of credit contract are 
potentially biased. 56  For example, if firms owned by high wealth but older entrepreneurs 
tended to decline offers requiring personal endorsements for estate planning reasons, my 
estimate of the effect of owner wealth on the propensity for guarantees rather than 
collateral to appear in the equilibrium line of credit contract may be biased upwards.  
This potential bias can be thought of as endogenous selection bias.  
Two conditions are necessary for this selection to bias the estimated effect of 
owner net worth on the equilibrium form of enhancement.  The first is that a significant 
number of firms in the 2003 SSBF received line of credit offers from their lead bank but 
declined to accept them.  Secondly, the effect of owner wealth on the offered 
enhancement structure would have to be materially different for the firms declining offers 
than those accepting them.  While the data does not support addressing the second 
condition, the degree to which the first condition obtains can be addressed.   
To assess the potential for selection bias in the estimates of the effect of owner 
wealth on the propensity for the equilibrium credit enhancement structure to consist of 
only a guarantee, I have used the most recent loan approval records in the 2003 SSBF.  
This section of the 2003 SSBF provides data on the ultimate outcome of the firm’s most 
recent credit demand, provided that the credit demand was made in the three years prior 
to the survey date.  The possible outcomes for a credit demand are approved and 
accepted, subsequently approved and accepted (I interpret this to be cases of ultimately 
                                                          
56 Firms not receiving a contract offer are viewed as having been rationed out of the market by price and 
non-price elements prevailing in the market and do not represent a source of selection bias.   
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successful, protracted negotiation with a single lender or search across multiple lenders), 
and an ultimately unmet credit demand.  In this latter case of an unmet credit demand, it 
is not possible to determine if no offer was forthcoming or if the best offer was still 
unacceptable.  This third category does, however place an upper bound on the portion of 
credit demands that may have led to offers that the borrower declined.  
The outcomes for credit demands are summarized in Table 2.10.  This data 
indicates that there is an upper bound of 6.3 percent to 6.2 percent for unaccepted offers 
for all credit demands by limited liability firms for all loans and for lines of credit from 
all sources.  Since I estimate the effect for lines demanded for the firm’s lead bank, the 
upper bound for non- accepted offers is only 4.7 percent in the estimating sample.  This 
suggests that selection bias in my empirical model is limited.   
Robustness Testing Using an Ordered Probit Specification 
  Though I have argued that the multinomial logit specification better reflects the 
non-ordered relationship among the alternative enhancement structures, an ordered probit 
specification was run as a robustness test.  For the ordered probit model, the alternative 
enhancement structures were ordered as follows: 1) collateral only, 2) both collateral and 
a guarantee, 3) guarantee only, and 4) no enhancement.  This ordering represents an 
underlying index of declining dissipative cost of credit enhancement.  I used the same 
estimating sample as that used in the multinomial logit specification.  The coefficients on 
both owner outside net worth and the line of credit commitment amount, as reported in 
Table 2.11, are significant at the 1 % level.  Their signs indicate that increases in owner 
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outside net worth compared to the amount of the line of credit increase the likelihood that 
the form of enhancement is a guarantee only rather than collateral only or both collateral 
and a guarantee.  This result is consistent with that obtained from the multinomial logit 
specification and provides further support for the major results of this study.   
  The coefficient on the competitive banking market indication is also positive and 
is significant at the 10% level.  This implies that banks in non-competitive markets are 
more likely to require line of credit enhancement structures of collateral and both 
collateral and a guarantee than will banks in competitive markets.  This result is also 
consistent with both the predictions of Essay 1 and the results of the multinomial logit 
model.  
  In contrast to the multinomial logit model, the estimated coefficients in the 
ordered probit are constrained to be constant across alternatives.  That is, the model 
implies that the coefficient vectors βm for the J-1 binary regressions:𝑝𝑟(𝑦 ≤ 𝑚|𝑥 =
𝐹(𝜏𝑚 − 𝑥𝛽𝑚) for m = 1, J-1 are all equal.  This is a consequence of the ordering in the 
categories of the polychotomous dependent variable and the assumption of a continuous 
index underlying these ordinal categories.  The model is, in essence, estimating the 
constant effect of changes in the independent variables on the underlying index.  The 
equality of the coefficients can be tested by estimating these J-1 binary models and 
comparing them to the constant vector, β, for the full ordered model.  To test the parallel 
regression assumption, a likelihood-ratio test was used to test for equality of coefficients 
across alternatives.  This test compares the coefficient estimates for a nested model with 
  
109 
 
those estimated for the full choice model.  If the parallel regression assumption is valid, 
the estimated coefficients are the same.  The likelihood ratio test rejected the equality of 
coefficients across alternatives at less than a 1% significance level.  It is important to 
note, however, that the LM test requires that all coefficients are equal in all binary 
comparisons.  Consequently it is a very serve test of the parallel regression assumption 
and is often violated.57  
  In summary, the results of the ordered model confirm and strengthen those found 
in the multinomial model.  The partial effect of increasing owner wealth is to increase the 
probability that a line of credit will be enhanced with only a guarantee and to decrease the 
probability that the enhancement structure will include collateral.  The ordered probit 
model also predicts that this effect will be lower in non-competitive markets that in 
competitive bank markets.  
Summary 
  This essay highlights the role of owner wealth in determining the equilibrium 
credit enhancement structure for lines of credit.  While the role and determinants of 
collateral have long fascinated economists and spawned a deep and rich literature, there 
has been remarkably little study of the reasons for and determinants of the observed 
heterogeneity in the types or structures of credit enhancement.  Surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to the pervasive and growing use of owner guarantees as an 
alternative or complementary form of credit enhancement to collateral.  This essay finds 
                                                          
57 Long and Freese (2006)  
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evidence that owner wealth an important determinant of tradeoffs between the use of 
guarantees, collateral and both guarantees and collateral to enhance lines of credit of 
small businesses operating with limited liability. 
 This empirical study of the effect of owner wealth on SME credit market 
outcomes was motivated by the theoretical predictions of Essay 1.  Essay1 predicts that a 
guarantee-only enhancement structure will emerge in the equilibrium credit contract if 
the owner is sufficiently wealthy compared to the amount borrowed.  Using the 2003 
SSBF, which includes information on the outside net worth of the primary business 
owner, on the size of the line of credit provided by the SME’s primary bank and on the 
form of credit enhancement, I am able to empirically test this prediction.  Using a sample 
of 1224 limited liability firms having a line of credit with their primary or lead bank, I 
first estimated a multinomial logit model for four alternative credit enhancement 
structures — no enhancement, collateral only, both collateral and a guarantee, and a 
guarantee only.  
 The results of this estimation are entirely consistent with the predictions of Essay 
1 - for a given sized line of credit commitment, increases in owner wealth are associated 
with an increase in the prevalence of a guarantee only enhancement structure and 
corresponding decrease in the prevalence of collateral only and collateral and guarantee 
enhancement structures.  The empirical results also show the converse of this: for each 
level of owner wealth, a decrease in the size of the line of credit is also associated with an 
increase in the prevalence of a guarantee-only enhancement structure and corresponding 
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decrease in the prevalence of collateral-only and collateral and guarantee enhancement 
structures.  To test the robustness of these results to alternative model specifications, an 
ordered probit model was estimated.  In this model, the ordering of the alternative 
enhancement structures was motivated by the relative dissipative cost associated with 
their use as discussed in Essay 1.  The results of the ordered specification were the same 
as those in the unordered model: increases in owner wealth are associated with an 
increase in the prevalence of enhancement in the form of a guarantee and a decrease in 
the prevalence of enhancement structures with collateral.  The same result is also 
obtained when the amount of the line of credit decreases.  
 For credit markets to function efficiently, scarce savings must be allocated to 
investment projects with the highest expected returns.  The results of this essay suggest 
that the effect of owner wealth on the equilibrium enhancement structure in line of credit 
contracts may be a source of market failure in the SME credit market.  Firms with 
wealthy ownership can obtain a line of credit and use ownership wealth to credibly 
enhance their line of credit.  Otherwise similar firms with wealth constrained ownership 
will be required to provide collateral to enhance their line of credit.  Since the dissipative 
costs associated with guarantees are generally less than those associated with collateral, 
firms with wealthy ownership can obtain external capital at a lower effective cost and be 
able to profitably undertake investment projects with lower expected returns than will 
firms with wealth constrained ownership. 
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 A second important result of this essay was that the degree of banking market 
competition is systematically associated with the differences in the relative use of 
guarantees and collateral to enhance lines of credit.  Specifically, this essay found that 
non-competitive banking markets are associated with a greater propensity to enhance 
lines of credit with collateral rather that guarantees.  This empirical association was found 
at high levels of statistical significance in both the multinomial logit and ordered probit 
specifications and was consistent with the prediction of Essay 1.  Given the higher 
dissipative costs associated with collateral use, this result points to another source of 
efficiency loss from market concentration and suggests another rationale for regulatory 
efforts to maintain competitive conditions in the intermediated credit markets on which 
small businesses depend for external debt capital.  
 The important implication of the main result of this essay — that an owner’s 
wealth is an important element in determining whether a project will secure funding in 
the small business credit market — represents an potentially important impediment to the 
key efficiency condition that capital should be allocated based only on expected project 
returns.  The prospect of this market failure, moreover, suggests that appropriate policy 
interventions could improve the efficiency of the private small business loan market.  
One such intervention is the provision of public guarantees for loans to projects with high 
expected returns that are proposed by entrepreneurs with low levels of wealth.  Such 
guarantees are already available in the U.S. through programs in the Small Business 
Administration of the Department of Commerce.    
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Tables 
 
 
Table 2.1.   Aggregate Capital Structure of SMEs in the 2003 
SSBF 
 
Source  $(mmm) %  
Line of credit borrowing 403 14.5% 
Commercial Mortgages 305 11.0% 
Vehicle Loans 40.1 1.4% 
Equipment Loans 61.5 2.2% 
Capital Leases 13.2 0.5% 
Other Loans 82.5 3.0% 
                Total Funded Debt: 905.3 32.5% 
Trade Credit 380 13.6% 
Owner Loans 0 0.0% 
Total Debt 1285.3 46.1% 
Equity  1500 53.9% 
                 Total Capital 
Sources:  
2785.3 100.0% 
Unused lines of credit 485 17.4% 
   
 
Notes: The reported totals are point estimates using all 4240 observations 
in the 2003 SSBF, each weighted by the inverse of its sampling probability.   
Line of credit borrowing includes only outstandings under line of credit 
commitments.  The unused portion of committed lines is shown in the  
last row of the table. 
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Table 2.2.   Estimated Prevalence of Lead Line Enhancement Structures - All Limited 
Liability Firms 
 
Enhancement Structure Proportion Std. Err. 95% Confidence Interval 
No Enhancement 0.210 0.019 0.173 0.246 
Collateral only 0.119 0.014 0.091 0.147 
Collateral & Guarantee 0.303 0.020 0.264 0.343 
Guaranty only 0.368 0.021 0.326 0.410 
 
Notes: The second column reports the estimated proportions of enhancement structures on lines 
of credit with lead banks for the subpopulation of MSEs that are organized with limited 
liability. The estimates are based on a weighted sample of 1326 observations from the 2003 
Survey of Small Business Finances. 
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Table 2.3.  Sample Means of Independent Variables for Estimations 
 
Variable 
Whole Sample Not Enhanced Collateral Only 
Collateral & 
Guarantee 
Guarantee 
Only 
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean 
Construction & 
Mining 1228 0.139 0.346 198 0.136 182 0.121 454 0.141 394 0.147 
Manufacturing 1228 0.199 0.399 198 0.157 182 0.308 454 0.236 394 0.127 
Transport & 
Communications 1228 0.055 0.229 198 0.020 182 0.071 454 0.064 394 0.056 
Wholesale 1228 0.116 0.320 198 0.121 182 0.126 454 0.128 394 0.094 
Retail 1228 0.162 0.369 198 0.202 182 0.126 454 0.152 394 0.170 
Insurance & 
Real Estate 1228 0.040 0.196 198 0.045 182 0.005 454 0.031 394 0.061 
Professional 
Services 1228 0.140 0.347 198 0.146 182 0.115 454 0.106 394 0.188 
Other Services 1228 0.150 0.357 198 0.172 182 0.126 454 0.143 394 0.157 
Age of Firm (log 
years) 1228 2.659 0.812 198 2.637 182 2.864 454 2.638 394 2.601 
Total Assets 
(log) 1225 13.868 1.982 198 13.516 180 14.641 454 14.271 393 13.233 
Return on Sales 1227 0.025 1.555 198 0.108 182 0.101 453 -0.072 394 0.060 
Leverage 1225 0.618 1.563 198 0.424 180 0.636 454 0.737 393 0.566 
# of Owners 
(log) 1228 0.831 0.857 198 0.766 182 1.131 454 0.867 394 0.685 
Owner Wealth 
(log) 1228 13.930 1.331 198 13.776 182 14.138 454 13.965 394 13.869 
Owner Managed 1228 0.860 0.347 198 0.859 182 0.802 454 0.877 394 0.868 
Family Owned 1228 0.750 0.433 198 0.778 182 0.709 454 0.736 394 0.772 
Specialty Lender 1228 0.033 0.178 198 0.010 182 0.033 454 0.048 394 0.025 
Competitive 
Deposit Market 1228 0.742 0.438 198 0.778 182 0.769 454 0.696 394 0.764 
Relationship 
Duration 1228 11.429 10.676 198 12.608 182 11.442 454 10.748 394 11.637 
Has Other Line 
Lenders 1228 0.144 0.351 198 0.197 182 0.104 454 0.132 394 0.147 
Size of Line 
Commitment 
(log) 
1227 12.521 1.799 198 11.815 182 13.353 454 13.109 394 11.813 
 
Notes:  Unweighted sample averages for observations used in estimation of both the multinomial logit and 
the ordered probit models.   
Means and the number of non-missing observations are shown for the entire estimating sample and for each 
of the four enhancement structures. 
  
116 
 
Table 2.4.  Estimated Coefficients for Multinomial Logit Model 
 
Variable 
No Enhancement Collateral Only Guarantee Only 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
Construction & 
Mining   -0.109
*** 0.324 0.74 -0.052 0.354 0.88     0.144 0.270 0.59 
Manufacturing -0.308*** 0.309 0.32 0.368 0.305 0.23 -0.360 0.264 0.17 
Transport & 
Communications -1.465
*** 0.588 0.01 0.269 0.426 0.53 -0.219 0.355 0.54 
Wholesale 0.045*** 0.338 0.89 0.067 0.358 0.85 -0.042 0.293 0.89 
Insurance & 
Real Estate -0.081
*** 0.514 0.88 -1.817 1.091 0.11 0.275 0.417 0.51 
Professional 
Services 0.087
*** 0.338 0.80 0.264 0.377 0.48 0.408 0.282 0.15 
Other Services   -0.235*** 0.314 0.46 0.071 0.356 0.84 -0.247 0.270 0.36 
Age of Firm (log 
years) 0.023
*** 0.123 0.85 0.314** 0.129 0.02 0.001 0.100 0.99 
Total Assets 
(log) 0.142
*** 0.089 0.11 -0.012 0.098 0.91 -0.016 0.073 0.83 
Return on Sales 0.194*** 0.259 0.45 0.709* 0.384 0.07 0.079 0.078 0.31 
Leverage -0.287*** 0.138 0.04 0.013 0.056 0.82 -0.129 0.060 0.03 
# of Owners 
(log) 0.158
*** 0.137 0.25 0.213* 0.112 0.06 0.019 0.117 0.87 
Owner Wealth 
(log) 0.181
*** 0.086 0.04 0.027 0.084 0.75 0.327*** 0.071 0.00 
Owner Managed -0.429*** 0.276 0.12 -0.385 0.247 0.12 -0.364 0.231 0.12 
Family Owned 0.021*** 0.247 0.93 0.002 0.234 0.99 -0.021 0.205 0.92 
Specialty Lender -0.931*** 0.778 0.23 -0.570 0.492 0.25 0.259 0.434 0.55 
Competitive 
Bank Market 0.602
*** 0.214 0.01 0.476** 0.212 0.03 0.408** 0.171 0.02 
 Relationship 
Duration 0.013
*** 0.009 0.14 0.004 0.009 0.64 0.009 0.008 0.24 
Has Other Line 
Lenders 0.442
*** 0.252 0.08 -0.120 0.292 0.68 0.029 0.223 0.90 
Size of Line 
Commitment 
(log) 
-0.732*** 0.097 1.00 0.009 0.099 0.93 -0.628*** 0.081 0.00 
Constant 3.604*** 1.163 0.00 -2.556 1.184 0.03 3.350 0.958 0.00 
 
Notes: The base outcome is both the collateral and guarantee enhancement categories.  Sampling weights 
were used to estimate coefficients.  The estimating sample consists of 1224 firms organized with 
limited liability that have a non-governmental institutional lead line provider.  The omitted industry is 
Retail. 
 
***Significant at the 1% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
*Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 2.5.   Marginal Effects at the Means of the Independent Variables 
 
Variable No Enhancement Collateral Only 
Collateral & 
Guaranty Guarantee Only 
Mean 
Value 
of X dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z dy/dx P>z 
Construction & 
Mining -0.020 0.57 -0.010 0.78 -0.010 0.85 0.040 0.46 0.14 
Manufacturing -0.030 0.35 0.070* 0.09 0.039 0.46 -0.079** 0.09 0.20 
Transport & 
Communications -0.119
*** 0.00 0.068 0.27 0.068 0.37 -0.018 0.80 0.06 
Wholesale 0.007 0.87 0.009 0.83 -0.001 0.81 -0.014 0.80 0.12 
Insurance & 
Real Estate -0.008 0.89 -0.116
*** 0.00 0.011 0.91 0.113 0.20 0.04 
Professional 
Services -0.015 0.66 0.010 0.82 -0.070 0.21 0.076 0.18 0.14 
Other Services -0.020 0.55 0.024 0.57 0.041 0.47 -0.045 0.35 0.15 
Age of Firm (log 
years) -0.003 0.81 0.035
*** 0.01 -0.018 0.39 -0.014 0.47 2.66 
Total Assets 
(log) 0.019
** 0.05 -0.004 0.74 -0.006 0.70 -0.010 0.47 13.87 
Return on Sales 0.007 0.83 0.073* 0.08 -0.058** 0.05 -0.022 0.38  0.03 
Leverage -0.031* 0.07 0.013* 0.06 0.033*** 0.01 -0.015 0.27 0.62 
# of Owners 
(log) 0.015 0.35 0.020
* 0.09 -0.023 0.31 -0.013 0.58 0.83 
Owner Wealth 
(log) 0.007 0.50 -0.015
* 0.10 -0.054*** 0.00 0.062*** 0.00 13.94 
Owner Managed -0.030 0.39 -0.019 0.50 0.088** 0.04 -0.040 0.38 0.86 
Family Owned 0.004 0.90 0.001 0.98 0.001 0.97 -0.006 0.88 0.75 
Specialty Lender -0.091* 0.05 -0.053 0.14 0.024 0.80 0.120 0.23 0.03 
Competitive 
Bank Market 0.046
** 0.04 0.025 0.23 -0.114*** 0.00 0.042 0.19 0.74 
Relationship 
Duration 0.001 0.24 0.000 0.86 -0.002 0.17 0.001 0.43 11.46 
Has Other Line 
Lenders 0.065
* 0.06 -0.023 0.40 -0.027 0.54 -0.014 0.74 0.14 
Size of Line 
Commitment 
(log) 
-0.064*** 0.00 0.042 0.00 0.123*** 0.00 -0.102*** 0.00 12.52 
 
Notes: dy/dx gives the marginal effect of a one unit change in each independent variable on the 
probability that the respective enhancement structure will appear in the equilibrium debt 
contract.  dy/dx is for a discrete change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1.  These marginal 
effects are calculated at the mean value of all independent variables.  The mean values are 
shown in the far right column. 
 
***Significant at the 1% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
*Significant at the 10% level 
  
  
118 
 
Table 2.6.   Hausman Tests of IIA Assumption (N = 1224) 
 
Omitted Choice  chi2 df P>chi2 Evidence 
No enhancement -21.52 42 --- --- 
Collateral only -17.91 42 --- --- 
Guaranty only 1.57 42 1 for Ho 
Collateral & Guarantee -36.16 42 --- --- 
 
Notes: 
Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.  If 
chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet the asymptotic assumptions of the 
test. 
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Table 2.7.   Small-Hsiao Tests of IIA Assumption  
 
Omitted Choice: lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2 Evidence 
       
No Enhancement -598.1 -479.6 237.1 42 0 against Ho 
Collateral only -603.8 -479.4 248.9 42 0 against Ho 
Guaranty only -415.4 -392.4 46.1 42 0.39 for Ho 
No Enhancement -574.7 -477.8 193.8 42 0 against Ho 
Collateral only -530.7 -501.4 58.7 42 0.07 for Ho 
Guaranty only -463.6 -364.3 198.6 42 0 against Ho 
No Enhancement -590.6 -466.9 247.4 42 0 against Ho 
Collateral only -565.1 -493.1 144.1 42 0 against Ho 
Guaranty only -496.4 -377.0 238.8 42 0 against Ho 
 
Notes: 
Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives.  This test is 
particularly sensitive to the random assignment of observations into two comparison groups 
when using small samples.  I have repeated the test three times to show the non-stability of 
test results in my 1224 observation sample. 
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Table 2.8.   LR Test for Combining Alternatives 
 
Alternatives Tested chi2 df P>chi2 
No Enhancement – Collateral only 120.5 20 0 
No Enhancement – Guaranty only 26.8 20 0.09 
No Enhancement – Both Collateral & 
Guarantee 140.2 20 0 
Collateral only - Guaranty only 154.5 20 0 
Collateral  only – Both Collateral & Guaranty 39.5 20 0.01 
Guaranty only - Both Collateral & Guaranty 182.1 20 0 
Notes: (Ho: all Coefficients = 0). This tests for the inability of the independent 
variables to distinguish outcome m from outcome j.  
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Table 2.9.   Wald Test for Irrelevant Independent Variables 
 
Variable chi2 df P>chi2 
Firm Age (log) 6.47 3 0.09 
Mining & Construction 0.76 3 0.86 
Manufacturing 5.49 3 0.14 
Transport & Communication 7.62 3 0.05 
Wholesale 0.11 3 0.99 
Finance, Insurance, & RE 3.98 3 0.26 
Professional Services 2.47 3 0.48 
Other Services 1.32 3 0.73 
Asset Size (log)  3.93 3 0.27 
# of Owners (log)  4.54 3 0.21 
Owner Net Worth (log)  22.83 3 0.00 
Owner Managed  4.17 3 0.24 
Family Owned  0.03 3 1.00 
Specialty Lender  3.80 3 0.28 
Competitive Bank Market  11.62 3 0.01 
Lead Relationship Length (yrs) 2.51 3 0.47 
Other Line Lender(s)  4.41 3 0.22 
Return on Sales  4.34 3 0.23 
Financial Leverage  8.18 3 0.04 
Lead Line Amount (log)  91.46 3 0.00 
Note: Ho: Coefficient = 0 in each comparison.  
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Table 2.10.   Relative Frequency of Credit Approval: Limited Liability Firms 
in Sample 
 
 
 
All Credit Demands Line of Credit Demands 
Lead Line 
Demands 
Number % Number % Number % 
Approved 1383 90.70% 914 91.00% 764 93.50% 
Subsequently 
Approved 47 3.10% 29 2.90% 15 1.80% 
Denied  96 6.30% 62 6.20% 38 4.70% 
Totals 1576 100% 1005 100% 817 100% 
 
Notes: Most recent loan records in 2003 SSBF.  Unweighted sample counts and percentages. 
 
  
  
123 
 
Table 2.11.   Results of Ordered Probit Regression 
 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Err. 
Construction & Mining -0.006 0.114 
Manufacturing  -0.247** 0.106 
Transport & Communications -0.41*** 0.153 
Wholesale  -0.023 0.12 
Insurance & Real Estate 0.159 0.177 
Professional Services 0.017 0.117 
Other Services  -0.111 0.112 
Age of Firm (log years) -0.071 0.042 
Total Assets (log) 0.049* 0.03 
Return on Sales  0.015 0.02 
Leverage  -0.052** 0.022 
# of Owners (log)  -0.041 0.045 
Owner Wealth (log)  0.087*** 0.029 
Owner Managed  -0.053 0.092 
Family Owned  -0.019 0.083 
Specialty Lender  0.078 0.178 
Competitive Deposit Market 0.086 0.071 
Relationship Duration 0.005 0.003 
Has Other Line Lenders 0.154* 0.091 
Size of Line Commitment (log) -0.290*** 0.032 
n = 1224 
 
Notes:  
The order of alternatives is: collateral only, both, guarantee only, and 
none.  
The excluded industry group is Retail. 
Sampling weights were used to estimate coefficients. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level.  
* Significant at the 10% level.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  The partial effect of increasing owner wealth on the distribution of credit 
enhancement structures for the lines of credit of limited liability firms. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.2a.  The effect of banking market competition on the probability that a line of 
credit will be enhanced with only a guarantee. 
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Figure 2.2b.  The effect of banking market competition on the probability that a line of 
credit will be enhanced with both collateral and a guarantee. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.2c.  The effect of banking market competition on the probability that a line of 
credit will be enhanced with collateral only.  
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Figure 2.2d.  The effect of banking market competition on the probability that a line of 
credit will not be enhanced. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.3a.  The effect of the amount of line of credit on the probability that a line of 
credit will be enhanced with a guarantee only. 
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Figure 2.3b.  The effect of the amount of line of credit on the probability that a line credit 
will be enhanced with both collateral and a guarantee. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.3c.  The effect of the amount of line of credit on the probability that a line of 
credit will be enhanced with only collateral.  
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Figure 2.3d.  The effect of the amount of line of credit on the probability that a line of 
credit will not be enhanced.  
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.4a.  The effect of owner management on the probability that a line of credit will 
be enhanced with collateral only.   
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Figure 2.4b.  The effect of owner management on the probability that a line of credit will 
be enhanced with both collateral and a guarantee.  
  
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2.4c.  The effect of owner management on the probability that a line of credit will 
be enhanced with collateral only.   
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Figure 2.4d.  The effect of owner management on the probability that a line of credit will 
not be enhanced.   
 
Source: See text. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
ESSAY 3 - SMALL BUSINESS-LEAD BANK RELATIONSHIPS: WHAT MIGHT 
THEY TELL US? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Relationships between small businesses and financial intermediaries occupy a 
prominent place in the finance literature, but are generally viewed only as mechanisms 
that arise to mitigate informational asymmetries in credit markets.  In this essay I argue 
that the literature could benefit by recognizing that these relationships normally involve 
financial services other than credit and can be best understood as responses to a wide 
range of transactions costs which influence the costs and benefits of providing and 
consuming financial products of all kinds.  To support this argument, I develop a new 
empirical definition of the relationship between a small business and its lead bank and 
construct two measures of the strength of these relationships: duration and exclusivity.  I 
use this framework to extend the empirical relationship literature in three ways.  First, I 
document that the scope of small business relationships with their self-identified lead 
provider of financial services varies across different types of firms and over time.  
Secondly, I present evidence which indicates mechanisms other than mitigation of 
informational asymmetries influence the structure and benefits associated with 
maintaining relationships.  Finally, I show the two empirical measures of relationship 
strength decreased between 1988 and 2003 just as the small business credit market was 
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being transformed by bank consolidation, financial deregulation and technological 
innovation in small business lending.    
Introduction 
If small businesses obtained financial services in markets that had neither 
transactions costs nor informational imperfections, we would observe random bank-firm 
pairings both across time and across the range of payment, credit and investment services 
for which they contract.  In such a world of perfect markets, relationships between small 
businesses and their provider(s) of financial services would not exist.  The markets in 
which small businesses seek external debt capital and non-credit financial services are, 
however, far from perfect.  Informational asymmetries and transactions costs abound in 
this market.  These frictions result in pairings of small businesses and their provider(s) of 
financial services which endure over time and span a range of services.  These pairings 
are referred to as relationships.  In this essay, I use the extensive data from the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Small Business Finances on small businesses’ use of payment, credit 
and investment services to undertake a systematic, descriptive study of the relationships 
between small businesses and their primary source of financial services.  
The relationships between small and medium enterprises (SME) and banks have 
been investigated extensively within the existing literature, but primarily as mechanisms 
to mitigate informational asymmetries that arise in credit transactions.  I argue in this 
essay that this literature could benefit by recognizing that SME-bank relationships are 
shaped not only by the benefits they may yield in credit transactions, but also by the wide 
range of transactions costs that arise in relationships that span a range of services and 
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endure over time.  In doing so I do not attempt to provide a “better” definition of SME-
bank relationships or to derive a theoretical structure which explains why relationships 
arise in multi-product markets.  Rather, my objective is to take a first step towards 
developing a systematic empirical framework within which multi-product SME-bank 
relationships can be categorized and examined, and to use this framework to take a new 
look at the relationships between small businesses and their primary or “lead” bank. 
Towards this end, this essay makes three contributions.  First I develop a 
comprehensive categorization of the combination of services that SMEs contract for with 
all their financial service providers.  Second, I examine the subset of services that each 
SME receives from its self-designated primary provider of financial services and measure 
the duration and exclusivity of these SME-lead bank relationships.  The evidence shows 
that the product mix of these relationships varies across industries and that their duration 
and exclusivity have decreased over time.  Third, I use regression analysis to examine the 
determinants of variations across firms and over time in the duration of these SME-lead 
bank relationships.   
This analysis reveals two important patterns.  First, the data reveal that the 
relationship duration decreased between 1988 and 2003 even after a broad range of firm 
and market-level correlates have been controlled for.  The result is striking because the 
decrease in duration found here occurred just as consolidation and innovation in small-
business lending technology transformed the financial service industry in a way that 
could have made small business bank relationships less valuable.  Secondly, the 
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regression analysis indicates that duration is linked to a broad range of transactions costs 
which affect all financial services and not only those that arise because of informational 
asymmetries in the credit market.  This evidence challenges the conventional view in the 
literature that SME-bank relationships provide benefits only in the credit market and that 
these benefits are best measured by relationship duration.  
The essay begins with a brief review of the literature on SME-bank relationships 
that demonstrates how the reliance of previous work on informational asymmetries has 
led the literature to focus only on relationships in the credit market.  Data on Small 
Business Financial Relationships discusses the Survey of Small Business Finances and 
the data from it that will be used here to examine the multi-product scope of the SME- 
lead bank relationship.  The Use of Financial Products by Small Businesses discusses the 
types of financial services contained in the 1988 – 2003 SSBFs and how they may be 
combined into three broad categories: payment services, credit, and investments.  
Defining and Measuring SME Relationships with Their Lead Bank begins the analysis of 
the types of services that SMEs obtain from their self-identified lead bank.  This 
discussion sets up the empirical investigation of relationship duration in The Empirical 
Correlates of Durations of Lead Bank Relationships, 1988-2003.  Finally, Summary and 
Conclusions summarizes and discusses the main results of the essay.  
The Emphasis on Credit in the Literature on SME-Bank Relationships 
The study of relationships between businesses and financial intermediaries 
occupies a prominent position in the finance literature.  This literature has, however, 
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studied relationships almost exclusively in the context of mechanisms that mitigate credit 
market failures arising from informational asymmetries.  This context has narrowed the 
focus of study to only those relationships between SMEs and banks that include credit 
services or only to the credit service component of a multi-product relationship.  This 
emphasis is not surprising given that current theories of financial intermediation 
emphasize banks’ unique ability to produce and process information on the risk 
characteristics of otherwise highly opaque borrowers.58   
The narrow focus of study on credit has come, however, at the expense of 
ignoring a broader set of forces that could give rise to relationships in markets where 
small businesses contract for a broad range of credit and non-credit services.  Besides 
narrowing the focus of the discussion in this way, the credit-oriented view of 
relationships has also left the literature with a highly stylized view of the phenomenon.  
In his review of the relationship banking literature, Boot (2000) notes that “… 
relationship banking [is] not particularly sharply defined” and that “this lack of 
definitional sharpness is compounded by a lack of descriptive rigor”.59  
To illustrate the lack of definitional clarity engendered by the credit orientation of 
the literature, it is useful to briefly summarize some of the efforts to define or 
characterize relationships.  In a very early paper, Carry (1817) defined a relationship as a 
“closeness” that induces banks to “lean against the wind” when their borrowers suffer 
                                                          
58 See, for example, Leland and Pyle (1977); Diamond (1984); Ramakrishna and Thakor (1984); Fama 
(1985); or Boyd and Prescott (1986).   
59 A February 22, 2012 search on the phrase “Bank relationships” in EconLit & Business Source Complete 
generated 4852 references.  
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adverse business shocks.  Much more recently, Fama (1985) concludes that banks’ 
informational expertise makes them “inside debt holders” even when providing credit to 
transparent, publicly traded businesses.  Ongena (2001) describes relationships as a 
“kinship” between the bank and its borrowing customer.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) add 
the dimension of time by emphasizing that relationships involve a “close and continued 
interaction” between the bank and its business borrowers.  In further describing these 
interactions, Rajan (1998) notes that relationships are “not transaction driven.”  Ongena 
and Smith (2000) have embellished this theme by emphasizing that relationships are “the 
connection between a bank and customer [that]…goes beyond the execution of simple, 
anonymous, financial transactions.”  Finally, Cole et al (2004) note the important 
differences between loans that are underwritten based on the soft information generated 
within relationships and “cookie cutter” loans that are the product of a more objective, 
formula driven approach to screening credit demands.  
The important point for purposes here is that all of these observations are based 
on a theoretical framework which emphasizes how and why financial intermediation 
arises naturally in credit markets.  These models generate relationships in the form of 
repeated credit contracting between informationally-opaque small businesses and banks 
that specialize in lending to these types of borrowers.60  A common theme in this 
theoretical literature is that the incumbent bank obtains proprietary information on the 
true risk characteristics of the borrowers it deals with.  This stock of proprietary 
                                                          
60 There is an earlier relationship literature that addresses interactions between depository accounts and loan 
outcomes: Hodgman (1963), Kane and Malkiel (1965), and Nakamura (1993).  This literature studies the 
scope economies that arose from “reg Q” limitations on interest rates banks could pay on commercial 
deposits. 
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information gives the incumbent bank a comparative advantage when re-contracting 
credit with an existing borrower so that relationships arise because they allow the bank 
and borrower to share informational rents over time.  Examples of these contributions 
include Wood (1975), Fama (1985), Sharp (1990), Boot and Thakor (1992), Greenbaum, 
Kanastas and Venezia (1993), Greenbaum and Thakor (1995), and Baas and Schrooten 
(2006).  The emphasis on inter-temporal rent sharing in these models leads naturally to an 
emphasis on  duration as an empirical proxy for the amount of proprietary information, 
and so the strength and value, of the relationship between the bank and its small business 
customer.     
The empirical examination of small business-bank relationships has been shaped 
and motivated in large part by these same theoretical insights.  The primary focus of this 
work has been to examine the effect of relationship strength on outcomes in the small 
business loan market such as loan interest rates, loan amounts, the propensity for 
collateral use and the probability that a requested loan is approved.  Nearly all of these 
studies for the U.S. have used the duration of the SME-lender relationship (or its log) as 
the primary mechanism through which relationships influences the loan terms.61  
Prominent examples of this approach include Berger and Udell (1995) and Brick 
and Palia (2007) who examine the impact of duration on the interest rates and collateral 
requirements for lines of credit to small businesses.  Other investigators rely as heavily 
on duration measures, but supplement the empirical model with information about 
                                                          
61 All U.S. studies have used the SSBF as I do.  There is an extensive, parallel literature that studies these 
outcomes using data from throughout Europe, most of Asia and a large part of South America.  
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services in the relationship other than credit.  Petersen and Rajan (1994), for example, 
include not only duration to measure the impact of relationship strength on the terms for 
lines of credit, but also indicators for whether the small business also has a checking or, 
savings account with the bank.  These authors also control for relationship exclusivity by 
including the percentage of the firm’s external capital provided by the lender.  Cole 
(1998) adds dummies for four service types and a measure of credit relationship 
exclusivity to duration in his examination of the factors which determine the probability 
of success when a small business applies for a line of credit.  Finally, both Chatraborty 
and Hu (2006) and Chatraborty et. al. (2010), include counts of the number of credit and 
non-credit services used by the SME as well as duration in their examinations of the 
forces that determine loan terms and collateral requirements for small business.   
Even when non-credit dimensions of relationships are recognized in this way, 
their impact is assumed to be linked only to the additional proprietary information about 
the borrower that can be extracted when the scope of the relationship is expanded.  In this 
essay I develop a more comprehensive and systematic method of categorizing and 
measuring the strength of small business-bank relationships.  The objective of this essay 
is to show that a broader view of relationships between SMEs and their providers of 
financial service can contribute to a richer appreciation of the complex mechanisms 
which lead to the formation of relationships that endure over time and that span a range 
of services.   
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Data on Small Business Financial Relationships 
 In this essay I use the four Surveys of Small Business Finances conducted under 
the sponsorship of the Federal Reserve Board in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003.  The 
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) is the only publicly available data set that 
combines extensive small business financial statement and governance information with 
detailed information on the use of both credit and non-credit financial services.  The 
surveys also provide information on the providers of financial services used by each 
small business.  The public version of the 2003 SSBF was released by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in November, 2006.  It contains 4240 
observations of small businesses based on a sampling frame of domestic non-financial, 
non-agricultural, for-profit businesses with fewer than 500 employees.  The sample 
design is a stratified random sample with over-sampling of firms having 20 to 499 
employees in order to facilitate research on larger firms.  As a result, however, sample 
weights must be used to estimate population statistics.  The 1988, 1993, and 1998 surveys 
contain, respectively, 3224, 4637, and 3561 observations on small businesses and have a 
similar sample design.  The SSBF data, in fact, is sufficiently similar across all surveys so 
that consistent measures of relationship structure, relationship duration, and many firm, 
ownership, governance, and market characteristics can be obtained for all four years.62 
                                                          
62 Due to the expense of conducting this survey, the Fed has indicated that it has no plans for additional 
SSBF surveys. 
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The structure of the small business surveys is ideal for the study of relationships 
between SMEs and their institutional providers of financial services.63  The survey not 
only identifies the full range of both credit and non-credit financial services used by each 
firm, but also provides the identity of the financial institution from which it was obtained.  
For each provider of financial services, the public version of the survey identifies its 
institutional type (such as bank, thrift, credit union, brokerage firm, insurance company, 
etc.), its geographic proximity to the main office of the business, and the length of time 
that the SME has done business with that financial service provider.  Of particular 
importance to this study, each SME in the survey was also asked to identify the particular 
provider that it regarded as its primary or most important source of financial services.  
This information is used throughout this essay to identify the “lead bank relationship” for 
each SME.  
The SSBF provides a wealth of information about the characteristics of firms.  In 
the 2003 survey for example, the average age of firms under current ownership is 16 
                                                          
63  One of the few shortcomings of the SSBF data is that it includes no information on the entities that 
provide the SMEs with trade credit.  As a result, this essay focuses on the multi-financial product nature of 
relationships between firms and financial intermediaries, rather than on SMEs and their industrial suppliers.  
In addition to providing physical inputs to SME production functions, these trade suppliers who offer 
extended payment terms can be an important source of working capital finance.  There are a range of 
theories that seek to explain why suppliers offer trade credit in addition to the provision of goods. (See, for 
example, Petersen and Rajan (1997))  Several of these theories emphasize the roll of trade suppliers as 
financial intermediaries.  Incorporating trade creditors as potential “lead bank” relationships in this study of 
the product composition (scope), duration, and exclusivity of multiproduct financial relationships, would 
confuse rather than enrich the analysis.  What is interesting, however, is the impact that trade creditors 
might have on the benefits of lead bank relationships and the observable characteristics of their scope, 
duration, and exclusivity.  Some theories of trade credit suggest that trade credit substitutes for institutional 
sources of external working capital finance, particularly for young and for riskier firms.  Empirical studies 
have found evidence for this substitution effect.  The empirical analysis of lead bank relationship duration 
in The Empirical Correlates of Lead Bank Relationships, 1988-2003, therefore, includes a right-hand-side 
indicator variable for the presence of trade credit.  
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years, 83 percent of the firms are family owned, and 89 percent are managed by an 
individual who is one of the three primary owners of the business.64  Other characteristics 
of each firm that are provided in the surveys that will be used extensively here include 
asset size, industrial classification, rural/urban location, the competitive/non-competitive 
status of its local banking market, legal governance structure, and the number of locations 
from which each firm operates.   
To get a feel for the businesses examined here, Table 3.1 shows a variety of 
descriptive statistics.  Businesses in the sample are generally very small, as more than 50 
percent of the sample firms in each year have less than $100,000 in assets.  The firms 
also come from a wide range of industries including retail, wholesale, construction, 
manufacturing and services, the largest of all industrial groupings.   As mentioned earlier, 
firms in the survey were asked to identify their primary or “lead” provider of financial 
services.  Table 3.1 shows the distribution of lead financial service providers in each 
survey year.  In 2003, 84 percent of the firms indicated that a commercial bank was their 
primary source of financial services and another 13 percent identified a thrift or credit 
union.  In 1988, 91 percent of the small business indicated that a commercial bank was 
their primary source of financial services and 6 percent identified a thrift or credit union. 
Because of the dominance of these depository institutions as lead banks, I refer in this 
essay to the relationship between the SME and its most important provider of financial 
services as the “lead bank relationships” even though some “primary providers” are not, 
in fact, depository financial institutions.       
                                                          
64 The distribution of firm age is modestly skewed. The median age of firms sampled is 14 years.  
  
142 
 
The Use of Financial Products by Small Businesses 
 The SSBF provides information on small business use of fourteen separate types 
of financial services: checking accounts, transactional services, cash management 
services, the processing of credit card receipts, seven types of external credit access (lines 
of credit, equipment loans, finance leases, etc.), savings accounts, corporate trust 
services, and brokerage accounts.65  The SSBF surveys also indicate the number of 
institutions from which each product is obtained and provides the means to associate each 
product used with the institution(s) from which it is obtained.  
In this section I describe the fourteen products and combine them into three broad 
functional categories -- payment services, investment services, and credit services.  I 
argue that this classification scheme reduces the dimensions needed to measure the scope 
of financial services provided to SMEs while maintaining functional homogeneity.  I then 
use these three categories to examine the combinations of financial services that are used 
by SMEs without reference to the financial institution or institutions that provide them.  
The next section of the paper looks within these multi-product use patterns to examine 
the extent to which an SME contracts for them with, and only with, its lead bank.    
Three Categories of Financial Products  
The analytical approach taken here is related to that of Prager and Wolken (2008).  
Their study uses data on financial product use from the 1998 and 2003 SSBF to study the 
                                                          
65 In the 1998 and 1993 surveys, credit card processing services are included in the transactions category.  
The 1988 survey provides usage indicators for sixteen product types.    
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propensity of SMEs to use community banks as a source of financial services.66  They 
use the data, however, by counting the number of the fourteen financial services used by 
each SME as a measure of the “intensity of service use.”  They also aggregate these 
products into three broad categories of deposit services, credit services, and financial 
services.  These three service categories are then used to create (non-exclusive) 
subsamples which Prager and Wolken use to identify determinants of the likelihood that 
an SME will contract with a community bank for at least one of the services in that 
category.    
Like Prager and Wolker, I organize the fourteen financial service products into 
three different broad financial service categories.  The groupings I use, however, reflect 
similarities in the functions that each product provides:  Those that are used to make and 
receive payments, those that provide external debt capital, and those that facilitate 
investment of excess funds.  In general, services within each category can be thought of 
as substitutes or complements.  Across categories, however, services are generally 
unrelated.  Below I discuss each of the three product categories in more detail before 
examining how frequently small businesses use combinations of these categories.   
 Payment services consist of checking accounts, other payment services (night 
deposits, coin and currency, and wire transfers), credit and debit card processing, and 
cash management products.  Transaction services share a common association with the 
firm’s need to receive process and disburse payments from customers and to suppliers.  
                                                          
66 The public version of the SSBF does not contain the asset size data on banks used from which Prager and 
Wolken were able to classify banks as community banks.  
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Payment services are the most prevalent class of services since substantially all firms use 
at least a checking account.67  Beyond the ubiquitous checking account are transactional 
services, such as coin and currency processing and night depository, that are of particular 
importance to retail firms, and wire transfers that permit rapid, non-conditional payments. 
Card processing services are used by almost all retailers to facilitate the collection of 
payments from credit card sales.  Cash management services, such as lock box, remote 
disbursement, and sweep account products, reduce the opportunity costs of funds tied up 
in the payment process for larger businesses.  Table 3.4 summarizes the number of firms 
using each type of payment services in the 2003 SSBF and shows the type of institution 
from which it is obtained.  Checking account use is, as expected, ubiquitous.  Quite 
naturally, depository institutions are the providers of substantially all payment services.  
The one exception is the use of specialized vendors for credit card processing.  
 Credit services include all contractually repayable external debt capital raised 
from financial institutions.68  The seven categories of credit services in the SSBF are 
lines of credit, mortgage loans, equipment loans, vehicle loans, other loans, capital leases, 
and credit related services.  The credit related services category includes specialized 
credit instruments, such as acceptances and commercial letters of credit used to finance 
international trade, and sales finance and factoring services used predominantly by larger 
wholesalers and manufacturing firms.  
                                                          
67 A more interesting question is what type of small business does not have any transactional services.  The 
data indicates that the 3 percent of firms with no transactional services are businesses with limited assets 
that have limited reported sales activity, and apparently, deal in cash.  
68 Trade credit (accounts payable) is excluded by this definition.  Since my focus is on institutional 
relationships, I also exclude loans from the owner and family members when constructing relationship 
types and their measures.   
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The empirical relationship literature distinguishes between lines of credit and the 
other loan types that are generally defined by purpose and type of collateral.  Most of 
these other loans are non-revolving and structured as amortizing term loans.  Lines of 
credit, in contrast, are revolving loan commitments, typically extending for one year 
periods, which incorporate a wider range of credit enhancement structures.  Lines of 
credit are the major source of external debt capital in the 2003 SSBF and are used by an 
estimated 60 percent of small business in the 2003 SSBF frame.  Table 3.5 summarizes 
the number and source types of credit services used by firms in the 2003 SSBF sample.  It 
is interesting that no individual credit product is used by even half the firms in the 2003 
survey.  Depository institutions dominate the provision of lines of credit, mortgage loans 
and credit services, and are the primary source of equipment and other loans.  
Commercial finance and captive finance companies are important sources of vehicle 
loans, equipment loans and leases. 
Investment services include trust and pension services, brokerage services, and 
savings services.  These services provide for both the short term investment of excess 
business funds in instruments such as certificates of deposits and commercial money 
market accounts, as well as the longer term investment of funds for the benefit of 
employees and retirees in pension and 401K funds.  Only 28 percent of the small 
businesses surveyed in 2003 used an investment service and these were most likely 
provided by non-depository institutions, such as brokerage firms and insurance  
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companies, that frequently sell 401K and SEP plans to small businesses.  As indicated in 
Table 3.6, investment products is the least frequently used product category in the 2003 
SME financial services market.  
 Table 3.7 summarizes the population point estimate of the proportion of firms 
using each of these three categories of services in each SSBF survey.  Not surprisingly, 
payment services of some type are used by nearly all small businesses in all years.  The 
use of investment services, on the other hand, has trended up over time.  Least stable of 
the three broad categories was credit services, which the literature has emphasized is key 
to small business-bank relationships.  The number of SMEs using credit services 
decreased by one-sixth between 1988 and 1998, but more than half of the decrease was 
reversed by 2003.       
Patterns in the Scope of Financial Service Use by Small Businesses 
I have identified three broad categories of financial products in order to measure 
the breadth or scope of financial service use by small businesses.  To do so, I first 
examined all seven possible combinations of the three product types: payments only, 
credit only, investments only, payments and credit, payments and investments, 
investments and credit, and all three services.  It turns out that in each of the four SSBF 
surveys two of the combinations occur rarely: investments only, and credit and 
investments.   
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Henceforth, I combine these two with the “no service reported” category so that 
the scope of small business financial product use is captured by one of the following five, 
mutually exclusive patterns of service use:  
 1) Payment services only   
 2) Payment and Credit services only  
   3) Payment and Investment services only  
 4) All three service categories: payment, credit, and investment 
 5) Credit only 
It is important to emphasize that the combinations defined in this section do not take into 
account the number of providers that supplied the financial products to each small 
business.  Here we simply measure the scope of service use without regard to the 
provider(s) of these services.   
Table 3.8 provides estimates of the unconditional prevalence firms with these 
patterns of service use in the U.S. small business population for the years 1988, 1993, 
1998 and 2003.  The proportion of small businesses that do not use credit services rose 
from a low of 33 percent in 1988 to more than 40 percent ten years later, before falling 
back to just above one-third in 2003.  The many firms that use only non-credit services 
have been systematically omitted in prior examinations of SME-bank relationship 
because the literature has been focused solely on the benefits that relationships bring 
within credit transactions.  In contrast, they will play an important role here.  
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Defining and Measuring SME Relationships with Their Lead Bank 
The previous section looked at the pattern of SME financial service use without 
reference to the particular institutions from which services were obtained.  In this section 
I take advantage of the fact that the Surveys of Small Business Finance report the 
provider of each service used by an SME and designate the one provider that each SME 
identified as its primary or “lead bank.”  In this section I examine the distribution of 
relationships between SMEs and their lead banks across the categories defined in the 
previous section: payments only, payments and credit, payments and investments, 
payments, credit and investments, credit only, and the small category of no service or 
other service profiles.  I show that the patterns in these service profiles vary across 
different size and industry groups and examine two key measures of the strength of these 
lead bank relationships, duration and exclusivity.  This latter measure arises naturally 
within the framework developed in The Use of Financial Products by Small Businesses 
and Defining and Measuring SME Relationships with Their Lead Bank and is new to the 
literature.   
I have pointed out earlier that credit services have up to now dominated the 
literature on SME-bank relationships.  In this section, I begin to make the case that these 
relationships might also be explained by the transactions costs and economies of scope 
that are associated with the demand for and supply of banking services other than credit.  
Small businesses can reduce transactions costs, for example, by establishing and 
maintaining payment services with a lead bank that is conveniently located.  Banks, on 
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the other hand, could realize economies of scope by bundling payment and investment 
services.  Such factors could be important to our view of SME-bank relationships if it 
turns out, for example, that SMEs form persistent relationships with banks that do not 
supply them with credit services.  
Table 3.9 establishes, in fact, that the majority of SME-lead bank relationships did 
not include credit services in all four survey years.  Lead banks provided SMEs with 
credit services most frequently in 1988, but even then the combined share of relationships 
that included credit only, payments and credit, or payments, credit, and investment 
services was only 46 percent.  The share of profiles that include credit then fell to 39 
percent in 1993 and even lower in 1998 and 2003.  In contrast, we saw in the last section 
that two-thirds of SMEs contract for credit services with some financial institution.  The 
clear implication, of course, is that many SMEs seek credit from institutions other than 
their self-designated lead bank.   
The surprisingly low prevalence of credit services in lead bank relationships could 
indicate that SMEs did not apply this designation to the relationship that generated the 
largest amount of “informational rents” in its credit relationships.  But the high 
prevalence of “payment services only” within lead bank relationships suggests that 
something else might be at work.  It appears, in particular, that SMEs derive substantive 
value from ongoing and repeated interactions with banks even if credit is not part of the 
relationship.  This represents a first indication that the literature has been focused on an 
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incomplete or even misleading interpretation by emphasizing that the value of 
relationships are driven only by credit services. 
It turns out that the importance of credit in the lead bank relationship varies 
systematically with firm size.  Table 3.10 reports the distribution for 2003 of lead bank 
relationship types for seven asset size strata as well as the non-stratified proportion 
estimates for the entire population in the far right column.  The table clearly shows that 
the scope of SME relationships increases with asset size.69  The modal type of 
relationship for the smallest firms is payments only, but its share decreases sharply with 
asset size.  At the same time, lead relationships that span payment, credit and investment 
services are more common among larger firms — these multi-product combinations are 
rare in the 0-$25million asset category, but common in firms with more than $10 million 
of assets.  Relationships combining credit with payments also tend to increase with firm 
size, but only until assets reach somewhere between $500,000 and $2,000,000. 
Table 3.11 shows that the distribution of types of lead bank relationships also 
varies across industrial classifications.  Manufacturing and transportation firms generally 
require significant investments in plant, equipment, and vehicles, and 54 percent of these 
SMEs use their lead bank as a source of credit.  Service firms, on the other hand, 
generally lease office space, have limited needs for fixed assets and so, as shown in the 
table, are much less likely to receive credit services from their lead bank.  The proportion 
of lead bank relationships that include credit services lies between these two extremes for 
                                                          
69 Prager and Wolken (2008) report similar evidence in their study of community bank use; larger SMEs 
tend to use more types of services, more of each type of service and more service providers. 
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small businesses engaged in construction, wholesale, and retail services.  These empirical 
patterns suggest that the forces that lead to the formation of different types of lead bank 
relationships are multi-faceted and complex.  
In the informational paradigm that dominates this literature, duration of the SME-
bank relationship has been interpreted as “reflecting the private information available 
only to the potential lender” (Berger and Udall (1995)).  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that duration has served as the primary measure of relationship closeness or strength in 
the empirical literature.  It has not, however, been systematically examined for 
relationships that do not include credit.  Table 3.12 rectifies this oversight by reporting 
the mean lead bank relationship duration for each relationship type in each of the four 
SSBF surveys.  Several interesting patterns emerge.  First, lead bank relationship duration 
is shortest for credit-only lead bank relationships in all survey years.  Secondly, the 
difference between the average duration of payment only and payment and credit 
relationships is negligible in each survey year.  Finally, duration increases in length when 
investment services are added to the payment-only and payment and credit relationship 
types.  Each of these patterns suggests that the literature’s emphasis on credit elements in 
SME-bank relationships could be incomplete or even misleading. 
Table 3.13 provides information about the exclusivity of these SME-lead bank 
relationships across all survey years.  This second indicator of relationship strength has 
been derived by calculating the degree to which service use in each category is 
concentrated with the lead bank. The table shows two different measures of 
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concentration; the proportion of SMEs in each group that uses its lead bank for each 
service, and the proportion that uses only its lead bank for all services used.70  It turns 
out, to begin with, that most SMEs deal frequently with more than one bank at a time, so 
that lead bank relationships are generally maintained as part of a more complex financial 
network.  The exception are SMEs who use payment services only — nearly all of these 
firms use their lead bank for at least some payment services, and a very high percentage 
use only their lead bank.  In contrast, less than one-half of SMEs that report using credit 
secured some of each service from their lead banks in all years except 1988.  Even 
smaller shares of these firms used only their lead bank.  Across all types of relationship, 
moreover, the exclusivity of lead bank relationships as measured here decrease over time, 
and decreased monotonically in all categories that include borrowing.     
The remainder of the essay focuses on three stylized facts that have emerged from 
the analysis of this section.  First, most relationships between SMEs and their lead banks 
do not include credit services.  Second, there is no clear difference between the duration 
of SME-lead bank relationships that include credit and those that do not.  Third, it 
appears that the strength of SME-lead bank relationships as measured both by duration 
and exclusivity generally decreased between 1988 and 2003.  Taken together these 
patterns suggest that the credit-only view of small business bank relationships that has 
dominated the literature excludes interesting alternative explanations of SME-bank 
relationships that are changing in importance over time.   
                                                          
70 Comparing the percentages in the first line of each panel in Table 3.13 to those in Table 3.9 can be 
confusing.  The top line for each “panel” in Table 3.13 reports the percent of all firms that use only 
payment services regardless of provider.  The top row in Table 3.9 shows the percent of firms whose lead 
bank provides only payment services.  
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The Empirical Correlates of Durations of Lead Bank Relationships, 1988-2003 
In this section, I examine the correlates of the duration of the relationships 
between SMEs and their lead banks as measured in the Surveys of Small Business 
Finance.  The analysis is designed to address three research questions that are suggested 
by the patterns reported in the previous section.  First, does the duration of the 
relationship between SMEs and their lead banks depend positively, or at all, on the 
presence of credit services?  Second, do forces other than the mitigation of informational 
asymmetries in credit transactions matter in the formation and maintenance of 
relationships?  Finally, does the decrease in relationship duration over time shown in 
Table 3.12 remain after controlling for a variety of SME and market characteristics?  I 
answer each of these questions by examining the statistical relationship between 
relationship duration and a variety of firm-specific and market-wide factors that are likely 
to influence it.   
There is much to be gained from a consideration of these three questions.  To 
begin with, it provides an opportunity to assess the relevance of the information-based 
credit paradigm has dominated the literature with other feasible explanations for the 
temporal persistence in the relationships between small businesses and their lead banks.  
Factors such as the search costs involved in locating alternative providers of servicers, 
costs associated with switching to a new provider, and scope economies in the use and 
provision of different types of financial services are likely to be at work in the SME 
market for financial services.  Individually and jointly these other factors (referred to 
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hereafter as transaction costs) should lead to both repeated interactions between firms and 
their banks over time and to the procurement of multiple financial services that is 
concentrated at one or, at most, a few financial intermediaries.  We have seen evidence in 
the last two sections that persistent relationships are the norm throughout the SME 
banking market and not just in the market for credit services.  Though these alternative 
mechanisms are occasionally acknowledged in the SME relationship literature, they have 
not, to my knowledge, been systematically examined.71   
The research below also provides an opportunity to examine the possibility that 
the value of credit-based relationships has declined over the fifteen years spanned by the 
1988-2003 SSBFs.  Despite the formation of new community banks at historically high 
rates, merger and acquisition activity in the U.S. banking industry caused the net number 
of bank charters to fall by almost 40 percent.  Such changes in the institutional structure 
in the supply side of the SME credit market must have reduced stocks of proprietary 
information upon which credit based relationships depend.  At this same time, larger 
banking firms developed and began to adopt credit scoring models as a means of 
assessing small business credit risk scoring (Berger et al. (2005); Stein (2002)). 72  The 
formulaic screening approach eschews the use of proprietary information generated 
through relationships in favor of objective data.  The combination of these forces could 
                                                          
71 Several studies in the 1970s look at relationships in the context of deposit-loan ties in which bank rents 
on deposit accounts arising from Regulation Q interest rate limits are shared with borrowers in the form of 
lower loan rates and/or improved credit access during tight money.  There is a more developed literature 
that links consumer bank relationships to convenience factors 
72 Frame et al (2001) report that 63 percent of the 200 largest US banks were using Small Business Credit 
Scoring by January of 1998.  
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have made information-based relationships less prevalent and valuable in the SME 
banking market between 1998 and 2003.   
These issues and questions are not just of academic importance, they also should 
inform policy discussion.  There has been concern, for example, about the impact that 
bank consolidation has on the amount and terms of credit for small business because of 
the special role that independent, local banks play in providing “relationship banking.”  If 
these relationships arise for reasons that are non-informational, however, that concern 
might be misplaced.  In this case mergers between institutions serving different 
geographic markets may take advantage of economies of scale and scope that actually 
decrease cost and increase services to the SME market.  
 Data and Methods    
 In the analysis presented below I use the duration of the relationship between each 
SME and its lead bank as the dependent variable.  In doing so I interpret duration as a 
measure of the benefits associated with repeated interactions between the parties, as does 
most of the existing empirical literature.  I depart from that literature, however, in two 
important ways.  To begin with, I focus on duration as an outcome that is influenced by 
the interaction of a wide range of observable and unobservable characteristics of the firm, 
its lead bank, their owners and managers, and the markets in which they operate.  In 
contrast, the existing literature uses duration as explanatory variables in regressions that 
are designed to explain variations in the cost and availability of credit.  Second, I 
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examine the determinants of duration for all types of relationships whereas previous work 
has generally examined its impacts only for relationships that include credit transactions. 
The analysis presented here employs linear multiple regression to estimate the 
partial correlation between duration and a range of firm, ownership and market 
characteristics.  Since I am also interested in the average change in duration between 
surveys, I also add survey year dummy variables.  It is common within the empirical 
relationship literature to use this approach, especially when using the SSBF which is not 
a true panel survey.  Like the rest of the literature, therefore, I avoid attaching causal 
interpretations to the results of the analysis.  The goal, instead, is to identify patterns in 
the data which help to characterize the influences and mechanisms that determine the 
duration of the observed relationships between small businesses and their lead banks.   
The general form of the regression model I estimate is  𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑛𝑡𝛼 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
where: Dt is the duration of the relationship between the SME and its lead bank for firm i 
in survey t; Xit is a vector of observed firm, owner and market characteristics for firm i in 
survey t;  𝑛𝑡 is an indicator for the year of the survey ; 𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents the effects of 
unobserved characteristics on the observed measure of relationship strength; and 
𝛽,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 are the coefficients to be estimated.  The coefficient vector ?̂? can be interpreted 
as the average partial effect of X on relationship duration across all surveys.  The 
coefficient vector 𝑛� gives the average residual change in the average lead relationship 
duration after controlling for all other factors in X.  They are measured relative to the 
average for the original 1988 sample.  
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The regressions are estimated on pooled data from the four SSBFs, 1988, 1993, 
1998 and 2003 which represents a sample of 15,112 distinct SME-lead bank 
relationships.  These observations represent all of the observations in the four SSBF 
surveys except for 331 SMEs that reported using no financial services, 129 that reported 
using an individual as their lead source of financial services, 14 that reported using a 
government agency as their lead provider and 33 firms that did not identify a “lead” bank.  
These exclusions comprise less than 3 percent of all observations in the combined 
surveys.  I also exclude the small number of observations (less than 0.5 percent) with 
missing values for the duration of the lead bank relationship.  There are also a large 
number of SMEs that report a relationship duration with their lead bank greater than their 
own age; in these cases duration has been set to the firm’s age.73  Finally, because of 
differences in sampling strategies across the four surveys, weights are applied to all of the 
samples used in the regressions. 
The explanatory variables in the regression are firm, governance, and market 
characteristics that could influence the net benefits that accrue in these relationships and, 
hence, their duration.  The variables are common in the relationship literature and are 
consistently defined and measured across the four SSBFs.  Firm characteristics are firm 
age, industrial classification, asset size, an indicator for multiple operating locations, an 
indicator for operating with unlimited liability, and an indicator for the use of trade credit.  
                                                          
73 The majority of the instances in which lead bank relationship duration exceeds the age of the business are 
for firms with ages under five years.  Analysis of these observations suggests that owners of small business 
start- ups and acquisitions have used banks with which they had pre-existing relationships as the lead banks 
for their new ventures.  This phenomenon is consistent with both transaction cost and informational 
rationale for the formation and maintenance of long term bank relationships.   
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The two governance variables are indicators for owner management and for family 
ownership.  The two market characteristics in the specification are also indicator 
variables — one which designates firms that are located in a competitive banking market 
and a second for those located in a rural county.  Summary statistics for the explanatory 
variables are provided in Table 3.14. 
Firm age is an important explanatory variable in these regressions because it 
controls for both the lower and upper bound of relationship duration for a given SME-
lead bank pair.  Its estimated coefficient, moreover, measures the average linear effect of 
an additional year of firm existence on the duration of the relationship.  I interpret this 
coefficient, therefore, as an indicator of the average tendency within the sample for 
relationships to persist as the SME ages.   
 The specification also controls for the industrial classifications of the SME.  
These are categorized here, as they were above, into construction, services, retail, 
wholesale, and, the omitted group, all other.  We have seen that relationship types as 
measured by financial services product profiles vary substantially across these different 
industrial classifications.  However, these complex patterns do not map easily into 
specific predictions about whether relationships within any given industry should have 
higher or lower duration than the omitted “all other” group.  It is important, nonetheless, 
to control for potential industry-specific impacts with fixed effects.    
Three governance/ownership characteristics — owner management, unlimited 
liability, and family ownership — have been linked to informational rationales for 
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relationships in the literature.  Firms managed by their owner(s), for example, have less 
need to generate objective, verifiable financial information than do firms managed by 
hired, professional manager/agents.  These types of firms, as a result, tend to be 
informationally-opaque to external investors.  Firms organized with unlimited liability 
(proprietorships and general partnerships) present external investors with a different 
problem — a minimal separation between the profit object of the business and the 
personal utility function of its ownership.  For these reasons moral hazard tends to be a 
particularly important constraint in raising external funds for owner-managed and 
unlimited liability firms.  It is likely, as a result, that the value and, therefore, the duration 
of bank relationships will be high for both types of firms.  
Family owned firms, even if operating under limited liability, are likely to have 
informational characteristics similar to those for proprietorships and unlimited 
partnerships because there is even less need to generate formal records of financial 
performance in organizations where closely-related individuals share risks and rewards.  
It becomes more costly, as a result, for such firms to produce information for an outside 
creditor, and these high fixed costs should lead them to form longer-term and more 
persistent relationships with a lead bank.  As a result, I expect the estimated coefficient to 
be positive on all of the governance indicators, and particularly so in a subsample of lead 
bank relationships whose scope includes credit services.  
Two other firm characteristics are included in the regression to control for 
variations in the transactions costs of locating and establishing a relationship with a lead 
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bank.  Firm size as measured by total assets would lower the relative impact of any fixed 
cost that must be borne when establishing a relationship, so I expect its estimated impact 
on duration to be negative.74  I also include an indicator variable that designates firms 
that operate out of multiple locations to control for the added complexity and cost they 
face in establishing and in switching lead banks.  Since credit and investment services are 
generally managed at the firm’s headquarters location, I expect the impact of that the 
impact of multiple locations to operate primarily through the costs involved in switching 
payment services to a new bank.  As a result, the coefficient on multiple locations is 
expected to be positive and particularly important for firms that use their lead bank for 
payment services.  
Two characteristics of local banking markets are incorporated to capture the 
impact of factors that affect the costs and benefits of SME-bank relationships for all firms 
that operate within these spatial boundaries.  The first indicates whether the SME’s 
banking market is considered by regulators to be competitive; I presume that there are 
more and less costly opportunities to change lead banks in such a market.75  I also control 
for whether the main office of each firm is located outside of a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area as defined by the U.S. Census.  I interpret this indicator of a “rural” banking market 
to be associated with greater distances between alternative potential financial service 
providers and, therefore, higher transactions costs of switching lead banks than in more 
                                                          
74 In the unconditional analysis in section IV, we found that the lead bank relationships of larger firms 
exhibited less exclusivity than those of smaller firms.  
75 A competitive market is one with a Herfindahl index value of less than 1800.  Above this value, 
regulators consider the market to be concentrated.  Due to differences in data across surveys, I use the bank 
only Herfindahl index and the 1800 threshold to define a competitive market for financial services. 
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dense, urban markets.  The effects of both competitive and rural banking markets are 
expected to be independent of the types of services used within a relationship.  
A trade credit variable is included to see if access to trade credit has a systematic 
effect on lead bank relationship duration.  A negative and statistically significant 
coefficient would suggest that access to trade credit is a substitute for bank relationships 
and reduces their importance.  Conversely, a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient would suggest either that access to trade credit complements bank 
relationships or that one of the benefits associated with a strong bank relationship is 
increased access to trade credit.  The empirical relationship literature has supported the 
latter association especially in relationships that include credit services.76   
I report three different versions of the empirical duration model.  The first 
estimates the model for the pooled sample of all SME-lead bank relationships in all years.  
This full sample model provides estimates of factors that are correlated with duration 
across the entire spectrum of relationship types, industrial classifications, firm 
characteristics, market settings, and time.  Notably absent from these regressions are 
controls for the types of relationships as defined by their product mixes.  The earlier 
descriptive analysis showed that relationship scope is correlated with several of the 
explanatory variables included in these regressions, such as industry and firm size.  
Preliminary analysis revealed that including separate controls for relationship type did 
                                                          
76 Some research indicates that this effect differs by firm age.  Trade credit substitutes for bank working 
capital finance in younger, more opaque firms.  Later, bank credit enables firms to obtain trade credit on 
more favorable terms.   
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not change the important results in the empirical models, and so the results including 
them are not reported below.77 
I also report two sets of regression results for distinct subsamples of the data — 
one for firms younger than five years in age and older firms, and another for firms with 
relationships that include credit separately from those that do not.  The rationale for 
running fully interacted versions of the model across age categories is to assess whether 
the complex informational dynamics associated with the maturation of a firm over time 
has a substantial change on the factors associated with duration.  The literature associates 
increase age with an increase in “reputation” or a track record that reduces informational 
opacity (Diamond, 1989).  The lack of reputation causes young firms to be more 
informationally opaque.  Estimating the model separately for relationships that involve 
credit transactions, on the other hand, provides evidence about the stylized assumption 
that has driven much of the existing literature — are the benefits of SME-bank 
relationships as measured by duration due primarily to informational problems in the 
SME credit market? 
Full Sample Results         
Table 3.15 reports the results of the regression analysis for the full sample of 
pooled cross sectional data.78 Model 1 shows the unconditional change in the mean 
average length of all lead bank relationships relative to its 1988 level.  The mean length 
fell by eight months between 1988 and 1993 and twenty-five months between and 1993 
                                                          
77 These results are available upon request.  
78 Descriptive statistics for the estimating sample are provided in Table 3.14.  
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and 1998 before increasing by twenty-seven months between 1998 and 2003.  Over the 
full fifteen years spanned by the surveys the survey year fixed effects, relative to the 
omitted 1988 category, are negative and statistically significant at the 1percent level.  
Model 2 adds a control for the age of the firm.  As expected, the effect of firm age on 
relationship duration is positive and both economically and statistically significant.  The 
point estimate implies that lead bank relationship increases by six months for each 
additional year of firm age.  The impact of firm age remains stable throughout the 
remaining models shown in the table.  The estimated year fixed effects are also stable 
across specifications, even after controlling for firm age.  
Model 3 adds dummy variables for different industry types.  The average effect of 
industry type on lead bank duration is not different from zero at conventional significance 
levels for any industrial classification.  The absence of any systematic partial correlation 
between industry type and duration is surprising given the variation in the product 
profiles of these relationships that was identified earlier.  This lack of significant industry 
effects persists in all subsequent specifications.    
Models 4 and 5 add the six firm, ownership, and governance variables.  The 
estimated partial effect of firm asset size (in $1,000,000s) on duration is, as expected, 
negative and statistically significant at less than the 1percent significance level.  The 
magnitude of this effect, however, is modest with a $1,000,000 increase asset size being 
associated with a 21-day decline in average lead bank duration.  The estimated effect of 
operating out of multiple locations for the full sample is negative but not statistically 
distinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels.  I had conjectured that its 
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effect would be positive, particularly the relationship scope was payments only.  The 
indicator for use of trade credit is also insignificant in all models.  
Model 6 adds the indicator variables for a competitive banking market and rural 
location.  It was argued that both market characteristics serve as proxies for transactions 
cost factors that might explain greater persistence in SME-bank relationships for all types 
of firms.  The results are consistent with these expectations.  The partial effect of being 
located in a more competitive banking market is negative, though not statistically 
significant.79  The partial effect of being located in a rural market, on the other hand, is 
significant at the 1 percent level and is estimated to increase the duration of lead bank 
relationships by an average of fifteen months.   
The main results of this full sample analysis can be summarized as follows.  First, 
there is evidence that the mean length of lead bank relationships declined strongly 
between 1988 and 1998 just as bank consolidation and the increased use of credit scoring 
could have decreased the value of these interactions.  The estimated increase in 
relationship duration in 2003 is not consistent with this interpretation, although this effect 
does not reverse the overall trend towards shorter duration between 1988 and 2003.  
These impacts, moreover, are estimated across all relationship types including those that 
did not include credit services.  Second, the impact of firm age is positive, robust and 
statistically and economically important in the full sample.  Third, I find no evidence of a 
                                                          
79 Model 6 was also estimated with the rural and competitive variables individually.  When only the 
competitive variable was included, its coefficient was negative and both economically and statistically 
significant.  The rural variable is strongly and positively correlated with the competitive variable (a 0.31 
correlation coefficient) and likely masks some the effects of competition in reducing relationship duration.  
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systematic effect of industry on duration.  Given the differences in relationship type 
across industries that we have seen earlier, it appears that industrial characteristics affect 
relationship scope without influencing its duration.  There was also no apparent 
association between access to trade credit and lead bank relationship duration.  
Finally, the estimated effects of three proxies for transactions cost—firm size, 
market competition and rural location—were of the expected sign and statistically 
significant. This suggests that a broad set of transactions costs are important in 
determining the benefits and duration of relationships.   
Analysis of Duration by Age of Firm 
Table 3.17 reports results when the model is estimated separately for young (aged 
five years or less) and for old (aged over 5 years) firms.  Recall that the motivation for 
examining this model is to assess whether the processes affecting duration vary with the 
age of the firm.  These two groups are, in fact, very different as the mean age and lead 
bank duration for young firms are, respectively, 3.2 and 2.7 years which is much lower 
than the means of 17.6 and 10.8 years for the older firms.80  The younger firm subsample 
is also much smaller in size and exhibits less variation in duration because this measure is 
confined to be between zero and five years for these firms.  
The signs of the estimated year fixed effects are the same for young and old firms 
as average duration fell between 1988 and 1993 and between 1993 and 1998 before 
increasing in 2003.  The magnitude of change was much greater for the older firms, 
                                                          
80 Summary statistics for the two subsamples are shown in Table 3.16.   
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however, while the changes in 1993 and 2003 were significant only at lower levels of 
statistical significance for the younger firms.  The latter result is not surprising given the 
lower variation in duration in the young-firm sample.  Moreover, the estimated year 
effects for younger firms are all of significant size relative to the 1988 base.  The mean 
lead duration for old firms, on the other hand, fell by a full 19 months between 1988 and 
1993 and by another 25 months between 1993 and 1998.  Though there was an increase 
in average duration between 1998 and 2003, the duration of the lead bank relationships 
for older firms decreased by a total of 16 months over the 15 years spanned by the 
surveys.  This pattern suggests that the value of relationships between lead banks and 
older firms were more likely to have been influenced by bank consolidation, financial 
deregulation, and changes in small business lending technologies.  
A particularly interesting result from the analysis of the two samples is the large 
difference in the estimated impact of age on duration.  For young firms a one year 
increase in age is associated with a 10 month increase in the duration of the lead bank 
relationship.  For older firms, the same increase in age is associated with only a 5 month 
increase in duration.  Both effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  I 
interpret this as evidence that there is a greater tendency for lead bank relationships to 
persist for young firms than for those that are older.81  The estimates also reveal that age 
explains more of the variation in duration for younger than older firms.82  These patterns 
                                                          
81 This is crudely consistent with Ongena and Smith (2001) who find positive duration dependence for the 
lead bank relationship duration in a panel of publicly traded Norwegian firms.  
82 Firm age accounts for 79 percent of the variation in duration for younger firms, and only 42 percent for 
the older old firms.  This is reflected in the R2  statistics which are 0.60 for the younger and 0.32 for the 
older firms. 
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suggest that young firms are relatively informationally-opaque and so find it valuable to 
remain with their initial bank until they have built a “public” reputation (Diamond 
(1991).   
Coefficients on two of the ownership-governance variables suggest that 
informational problems influence the lead bank duration of both young and old firms, but 
in different ways.  Duration is estimated to be seven months longer for older firms that 
operate as a proprietorship or general partnership, while family ownership is associated 
with a two month increase in lead bank duration for younger firms.  The latter effect is 
significant at the 1percent level and substantial in size since the average duration of lead 
bank relationships for these young firms is only thirty-three months.  The family 
ownership control is not significant in the large firm sample, however.  This pattern 
suggests that relationships are particularly important for “new” firms where informational 
problems are most acute.  For neither group is there a systematic association between 
family governance and duration.  
I have argued that firm size, rural location, and multiple office location all proxy 
for variations in transactions costs that could influence duration.  As expected, the effect 
of asset size is negative and significant within the old firm sample at the 1 percent level.  
The size of the impact, moreover, is substantial as an increase in asset size of $1 million 
is associated with a 2 month reduction in the duration of the lead bank relationship.  In 
contrast, asset size has no significant effect on duration for younger (and generally 
smaller) firms.  In contrast, rural location is associated with an economically and 
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statistically significant increase in duration for both young and older firm samples which 
suggests that the transactions costs in less dense markets represent an impediment for 
switching banks for new as well as established businesses.  The coefficient on multiple 
location, on the other hand, influences duration significantly only for older firms, and 
then in a direction opposite to its predicted positive effect.  The estimated 4 month 
decline in lead bank relationship duration for this class of firms could reflect that bank 
consolidation during the era spanned by these surveys created more convenient branch 
networks that were particularly attractive to SMEs with multiple office locations. 
The results of this section suggest that the process generating duration between 
SMEs and their lead banks differ in important and interesting ways for younger and older 
firms.  For the former group, firm age is of paramount importance.  While age also 
matters for older firms, relationship duration for this group is shaped to a greater degree 
by firm and market characteristics that are likely to be associated with a broad range of 
transactions costs that influence the value of setting up and maintaining a lead bank 
relationship.  In addition, the unexplained decreases in average lead bank relationship 
duration captured here by year fixed effects appear to have been felt primarily by older 
firms.  These firms were most likely to have been affected by the massive changes in the 
banking industry and the introduction of credit scoring that occurred between 1988 and 
2003.  
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Analysis of Duration for Relationships With and Without Credit  
 
A consistent theme throughout this essay is that the existing literature on SME-
bank relationships has been narrowly focused only on credit transactions.  To examine 
the argument more fully, Table 3.19 reports the results of regressions run separately for 
firms that contract for credit services with their lead banks and those that do not.  By 
grouping the full sample in this way I hope to assess whether the benefits of SME-bank 
relationships are, as the literature implies, due primarily to informational problems in the 
SME credit market or if other forces and transactions costs play a role.   
Each sub-sample contains approximately half of the observations in the full 
pooled sample.83  The estimated survey year fixed effects on relationship duration are 
statistically the same for both sub-samples.  Earlier, I argued that bank consolidation and 
the rapid adoption small business credit scoring should have disproportionately weakened 
informational rationales for the formation and maintenance of relationship involving 
credit.  Under these assumptions, there should not be similar year effects for relationships 
that do not include credit.  The lack of differences in survey year fixed effects between 
the two columns of Table 3.19, therefore, can be interpreted as a failure to find empirical 
evidence that changes in the supply side of the SME financial market were particularly 
detrimental to the value of relationships based on informational rationales.  In addition, 
                                                          
83 The unconditional mean duration of the lead bank relationship for firms that do and do not obtain credit 
from their lead bank is 8.78 and 8.59 years respectively — these are statistically indistinguishable at a 95 
percent confidence level.  The unconditional mean age of firms that do not obtain credit from their lead 
bank is 13.7 years and 14.2 years for those that do borrow from their lead bank.  These means are 
statistically different at a 95 percent confidence level. Summary statistics for the two subsamples are 
reported in Table 3.18. 
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the estimated increase in relationship duration due to another year of firm age is greater 
for the “no credit use” sample (6 months) than it is for the “use credit” sample (only 5 
months).  The difference is statistically significant and suggests that firms that do not 
enter credit transactions with their lead bank are more likely to maintain that relationship 
over time than those that do. This result also calls into question the value of duration as 
an empirical proxy strictly for the measure of informational benefits of relationships. 
In contrast, the coefficients on unlimited liability and family ownership are 
positive and economically and statistically significant only when lead relationships 
include credit.  Since these variables proxy for the degree of the firm’s informational 
opacity these results are consistent with informational motivations for relationships.  
Finally, effect of a rural market location, which proxies for the transactions costs 
of changing lead banks, is positive and highly significant for both lead relationships with 
and without credit.  This suggests, as expected, that transactions costs play a significant 
role in shaping the benefits of maintaining relationships.    
Summary of Regression Results  
The regression analysis of lead bank relationship duration was designed to 
address three research questions.  The answers, to begin with, is that there is no evidence 
that duration length is longer when the lead bank supplies credit services to the SME.  It 
appears, instead, that firms whose lead bank relationship scope does not include credit are 
more likely to maintain their lead bank relationship as they age.   Second, the regressions 
all show evidence that transaction costs are important in determining duration across all 
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types of lead bank-SME relationships.  Rural location, in particular, appears to increase in 
relationship duration for lead relationships with and without a credit component.  I also 
found evidence, however, that variables associated with greater informational opacity 
also increased the duration of relationships.  All told, the evidence in this section suggests 
that both informational and transactional mechanisms are operative in generating lead 
bank relationships that endure over time.  
Finally, the evidence shows that the decrease in the average duration of lead bank 
relationships between 1988 and 2003 decreased even after controlling for characteristics 
or the firm, its lead bank, and its local market.  The regression analysis, moreover, 
provides two additional insights into this result.  First, the decrease in average duration 
over time appears to have been centered primarily among older firms.  Second, the 
unexplained decrease in duration over time occurred equally in relationships that 
incorporated credit services, and those that did not.  Together these results suggest that 
the impact of consolidation, financial deregulation, and technical innovations in small 
business lending on small business-bank relationships was complex and multifaceted.   
Summary and Conclusions 
This essay can be thought of as a response to Boot’s (2000) observation that the 
relationship banking literature suffers from “a lack of definitional sharpness… 
compounded by a lack of descriptive rigor.”  I have used the Survey of Small Business 
Finances conducted by the Federal Reserve in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003 to address this 
gap in knowledge for the relationships between small-to-medium enterprises (SME) and 
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their lead provider of financial services.  The building blocks of the analysis are the 
reports made in the surveys by each SME about whether and from whom they contract 
for the fourteen separate financial services.  Each of these was mapped into one of three 
functionally defined service categories: services that facilitate the making and receipt of 
payments, credit services that provide external debt capital, and investment services that 
employ excess funds.  A financial services product profile could then be assigned to each 
SME in the survey as one of the seven possible combinations of these three broad 
categories of services.   
With the data organized in this way, the bank relationship for each SME was 
defined to be the subset of its total product profile that was supplied by its lead provider 
of financial services.  This approach provides “definitional sharpness” to the literature 
because it is based on a systematic and comprehensive categorization of the best 
available empirical evidence for the financial services actually used by SMEs in the U.S.  
The definitions which dominate the literature on bank relationships, in contrast, are 
generally based on theoretical rationalizations for repeated contracting in credit services 
between a SME and a bank.  As Boot points out, these highly stylized definitions of 
relationships become arbitrary when applied in empirical investigations of the much 
broader and complex portfolio of financial services used by real-world SMEs.  
With relationships defined in this manner, this essay has also provided the 
descriptive rigor Boot called for by characterizing the variation in prevalence of the five 
different types of relationships across SMEs of different size, across different industries, 
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and over time.  The essay also examined two empirical measures of relationship strength: 
duration and exclusivity.  Duration as measured here as the length of time the lead bank 
has supplied any financial service to the SME, so it recognizes important 
complementarities in the provision of different kinds of financial services.  Relationship 
exclusivity, which has generally been ignored in the literature, has a natural definition 
here — whether or not the SME receives all of the financial services that it uses from 
only its lead bank.  Finally, a reduced form regression analysis was undertaken to 
characterize the influences that that determined the duration of relationships across nearly 
all of the firms captured in the Surveys of Small Business Finance.   
Three main results arise from this analysis.  The first is that there is considerable 
variation in the types and exclusivity of lead bank relationships.  The scope of these 
relationships falls overwhelmingly into four of the possible seven categories: payments 
only, payments and credit, payments and investments, and all three.  Lead bank 
relationships that consist of credit only, investments only, and credit and investments are 
rare.  Perhaps most strikingly, less than half of all relationships provide access to external 
credit.  The evidence also shows that substantial proportions of SMEs contract for similar 
types of financial services with providers other than their lead banks.  These patterns 
contradict the stylized fact that has dominated the theoretical literature: SME-bank 
relationships are strictly bilateral relationships for credit services.  
Secondly, I find evidence that both the duration and exclusivity of SME- lead 
bank relationships declined in the U.S. between 1988 and 2003.  In an environment of 
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bank consolidation, technological innovation and deregulation , the conditional changes 
in lead bank relationship duration measured by the survey year fixed effects in the 
regression analyses indicate that relationship duration decreased between 1988 and 1998, 
increased over the next five years, but on net showed  a significant decrease over the 
entire fifteen period.  Though not monotonic across the four surveys, the overall pattern 
of change suggests a weakening in relationship persistence.  Unconditional analysis 
showed a similar pattern of decline over time in lead bank exclusivity, defined as the 
percentage of services used that were procured only from the SME’s lead bank.  An 
obvious and important area of research identified by this essay, therefore, is to identify 
the forces that drove the apparent weakening in SME-lead bank relationships after 1988.  
Finally, I find evidence that mechanisms other than mitigation of informational 
asymmetries influence the structure and benefits associated with maintaining 
relationships.  Lead bank relationships persist for all relationship types and there is no 
evidence that the presence of credit within the scope of lead bank relationship is 
associated with longer relationship duration.  Nor does it appear that relationships 
involving credit are more likely to persist than are those that do not include credit.  
Moreover, to the extent that firm asset size and rural location are valid proxies for 
transactions costs, the regressions provided further evidence that transactions costs as 
well as informational advantages influence the benefits of SME-lead bank relationships.  
The results of this essay indicate that much work remains to be done before we 
will fully understand the role that relationships play in the SME market for financial 
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services.  These results also suggest that relationship duration, the preeminent empirical 
proxy for the strength of informationally motivated credit relationships, may also proxy 
for other mechanisms that influence the benefits obtained from durable relationships 
between small businesses and their providers of a broad range of financial products.  
These generalizations have often been set to the side, or simply ignored, as the literature 
has pursued a model of relationship based only on credit transactions.  The evidence 
presented here suggests that we can learn much more about these relationships by 
adopting a broader and more integrated perspective of small business finance.   
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Tables 
 
 
Table 3.1.   Distribution of Firms by Asset Size 
 
Asset Size 
Range       1988       1993       1998       2003 
none 0.10% 0.10% 2.50% 2.60% 
0-$25m 17.60% 29.50% 32.80% 29.10% 
$25m-$100m 33.00% 28.20% 26.90% 25.70% 
$100m-$500m 35.00% 27.90% 24.60% 26.00% 
$500m-$2mm 9.70% 10.00% 9.50% 11.70% 
$2mm-$10mm 4.10% 3.70% 3.10% 4.00% 
Over $10mm 0.60% 0.70% 0.60% 1.00% 
Totals  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Notes: Sampling weights used to obtain population estimates. 
 
        No adjustments made for changes in price levels between surveys.  
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Table 3.2.   Distribution of Firms by Detailed Industrial Classification 
 
 Classification       1988 1993 1988 2003 
Mining & Drilling 
 
0.70% 0.50% 0.40% 0.30% 
Construction 
 
12.50% 13.60% 11.50% 11.50% 
Transport & 
Communications 
 
9.10% 8.10% 8.40% 7.10% 
Manufacturing 
 
2.90% 2.80% 3.70% 3.80% 
Wholesale 
 
10.00% 8.50% 7.20% 5.90% 
Retail 
 
26.40% 21.70% 19.00% 18.40% 
Finance, Insurance, & 
RE 
 
 6.80% 7.10% 6.50% 7.20% 
Professional Services 
 
 9.60% 15.10% 15.00% 16.90% 
Other Services 
 
22.00% 22.60% 28.30% 28.90% 
Total  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Notes: Based on 2 digit sic codes.  Sampling weights used to obtain population estimates. 
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Table 3.3.   Institution Type of Self Identified Primary Providers of Financial 
Services  
 
Lead type        1988 1993 1998 2003 
Commercial Bank 91.40% 84.50% 84.30% 82.50% 
Thrift* 5.50% 7.70% 6.40% 9.30% 
Credit Union 0.80% 2.10% 3.70% 3.50% 
Finance Company 0.70% 1.50% 1.90% 1.20% 
Brokerage Firm 0.20% 1.00% 0.90% 1.10% 
Individual 0.60% 1.50% 1.30% 0.90% 
Other Business 0.60% 0.90% 0.60% 0.40% 
Other Intermediary  0.20% 0.80% 0.90% 1.20% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Notes: Unweighted sample statistics.  
 
*Thrift category includes both savings banks and savings & loans.  
 
In each survey the small business is asked to identify one provider of financial 
services that it regards as primary or most important provider.  I refer to this 
provider as the "Lead Bank." 
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Table 3.4.   Sources and Uses of Payment Services - 2003 Sample 
 
Notes: Unweighted sample count of the number of small businesses in the 2003 
SSBF that use each service and the primary institution type from which it is 
procured. 
 
 
   
Card Cash 
Source type:  Checking Transactional Processing Management 
     Commercial Bank 3594 1772 1036 592 
Savings Bank 311 145 62 35 
Savings & Loan 38 16 8 0 
Credit Union 106 51 9 3 
Finance Company 1 6 59 8 
Insurance Company 0 0 5 0 
Brokerage Firm 30 18 5 21 
Leasing Company 0 0 1 0 
Mortgage Company 1 0 0 0 
Venture Firm or SBIC 0 0 0 0 
Other Business - Supplier 2 4 40 4 
Owner or Family Member 1 1 0 1 
Government Agency  0 0 0 0 
Other 3 8 551 1 
Service not used 153 2218 2464 3575 
n: 4240 4240 4240 4240 
Table 3.5.   Sources and Uses of Credit Services from the 2003 Sample  
 
   
 
Line 
of  Vehicle Mortgage Equipment Other  Finance Credit 
Source type :  Credit Loan Loan Loan Loans Lease Services 
Commercial Bank 1656 475 481 350 199 83 303 
Savings Bank 107 42 57 23 9 2 15 
Savings & Loan 11 6 14 5 1 0 2 
Credit Union 28 86 10 8 4 0 6 
Finance Company 65 583 29 161 37 245 26 
Insurance Company 3 4 8 0 9 1 0 
Brokerage Firm 15 1 5 5 4 2 6 
Leasing Company 1 11 0 32 10 161 1 
Mortgage Company 6 0 38 2 4 0 0 
Venture Firm or SBIC 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 
Other Business - Supplier 8 5 2 27 27 43 9 
Owner or Family Member 4 8 32 19 183 3 1 
Government Agency  4 0 16 4 14 0 0 
Other 4 0 4 5 11 12 4 
Service not used 2330 3027 3543 3598 3726 3688 3866 
n: 4240 4240 4240 4240 4240 4240 4240 
        
Notes: Unweighted sample count of the number of small businesses in the 2003 SSBF that use each type of 
credit product and the primary institution type from which it is sources. 
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Table 3.6.   Sources and Uses of Investment Services from the 
2003 Sample 
 
       Source type Savings Accounts 
Trust 
Services 
Brokerage 
Accounts 
     Commercial Bank 881   243 51 
 Savings Bank 74 41 1 
 Savings & Loan 14 0 0 
 Credit Union 71 3 1 
 Finance Company 19 38 13 
 Insurance Company 7 262 16 
 Brokerage Firm 105 525 229 
 Leasing Company 0 2 1 
 Mortgage Company 0 0 0 
 Venture Firm or SBIC 1 4 1 
 Other Business - Supplier 2 75 8 
 Owner or Family Member 0 101 3 
 Government Agency  1 0 0 
 Other 2 13 1 
 Service not used 3036 2943 3915 
 n: 4240 4240 4240 
  
Notes: Unweighted sample count of the number of small businesses 
in the 2003 SSBF that use each type of credit product and the 
primary institution type from which it is sourced. 
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Table 3.7.   Estimated Population Prevalence of Service Type Usage in Each 
Survey   
 
 
Service type 1988   1993   1998      2003 
Use Payment  Services   98.80%   99.00%   97.50%   97.40% 
Use Credit Services   64.80%   59.00%   55.00%   60.40% 
Use Investment Services   29.60%   31.40%   31.50%   35.50% 
 
Notes: Shows the proportion of firms in each survey that use at least one service of the 
type indicated in the rows. 
 
Sample weights are used to estimate population statistics. 
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Table 3.8.   Distribution of the Scope of Service Use: Population Estimates  
 
Service Types Used 
   1988 
  n = 3224 
   1993 
  n = 4637 
   1998 
  n = 3561 
   2003 
  n = 4240 
Payment & Credit 44.00% 38.10% 33.60% 36.30% 
Payment only 24.80% 27.00% 30.20% 24.20% 
Payments Credit & Investment 21.40% 20.80% 20.80% 24.40% 
Payments & Investment  8.10% 10.20% 10.30% 10.80% 
Credit only* 0.50% 0.90% 1.00% 0.50% 
No Services/Other** 1.20% 3.10% 4.10% 3.80% 
Notes: Sample weights are used to estimate population proportions in each survey year. 
Shows the relative frequency with which the scope of small business financial service 
use spans the categories of payment services, credit services, and investment services. 
 
*Credit only category is shown to facilitate later comparison to Lead Bank Relationships. 
**No Services/Other includes the infrequent cases where the SME used no financial services, 
used only investment services, or used only credit and investment services. 
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Table 3.9.   Distribution of Lead Relationship Scope in All Surveys 
 
  
Lead Relationship Scope 
 
1988 
n = 3224 
1993 
n = 4637 
1998 
n = 3561 
2003 
n = 4240 
Payments only  43.10% 47.00% 47.40% 46.90% 
Payments & Investments  9.60% 9.80% 10.30% 11.10% 
Payments & Credit 32.20% 23.10% 23.30% 26.10% 
Payment, Credit, & Invest  10.20% 9.20% 8.40% 8.10% 
Credit only  3.20% 6.70% 5.70% 3.20% 
No Services/Other* 1.70% 4.20% 4.90% 4.60% 
 
Notes: 
*No Services/Other category contains the infrequent cases where the SME used no 
financial services, used only investments services, or used only credit and investment 
services. 
 
Sample weights are used to provide estimates of population proportions. 
 
 
Table 3.10.   Distribution of Lead Relationship Type by Asset Size Using the 2003 SSBF   
 
Asset Size:  (m = 000) 
< 0  
n = 75 
0 to 
$25m 
n = 873 
$25m to 
$100m 
n = 808 
$100m to 
$500m 
n= 973 
$500m 
to $2mm 
n = 710 
$2mm to 
$10mm 
n= 567 
 Above 
$10mm 
n = 234 
Full Sample 
n = 4240 
No Services/Other* 41.50% 8.90% 1.60% 1.80% 0.60% 0.10% 0.80% 4.60% 
Payments only  39.60% 63.50% 51.80% 37.40% 28.10% 24.20% 10.00% 46.90% 
Payments & Invest  4.50% 11.00% 12.70% 12.40% 8.20% 7.40% 5.60% 11.10% 
Credit only  5.20% 3.10% 1.70% 3.60% 4.50% 6.60% 4.30% 3.20% 
Payment & Credit 6.40% 12.00% 25.80% 33.50% 42.90% 42.30% 40.50% 26.10% 
All Three  2.70% 1.60% 6.40% 11.30% 15.80% 19.50% 38.70% 8.10% 
 
Notes: Sample weights are used to provide estimates of population proportions. 
*No Services/Other category contains the infrequent cases where no financial services were used, where the scope of the lead  
bank relationship was only investment services, or was credit and investment services.  
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Table 3.11.   Distribution of the Five Primary Lead Relationship Types by Industry Using the 2003 SSBF 
 
Relationship Type Construction n = 426 
Transport & Manufacturing 
n = 682 
Wholesale 
n = 288 
Retail 
n = 821 
Services 
n = 2019 
All Industries 
n = 4236 
Payments only  43.30% 31.80% 42.70% 50.60% 50.20% 46.90% 
Payments & Invest  9.20% 11.60% 7.50% 9.20% 12.50% 11.10% 
Credit only  2.60% 6.10% 4.00% 2.40% 3.00% 3.20% 
Payment & Credit 29.30% 36.00% 31.10% 29.80% 21.40% 26.10% 
All Three  12.80% 12.20% 13.10% 4.80% 6.80% 8.10% 
No Services/Other* 3.80% 2.40% 1.60% 3.00% 6.10% 4.60% 
 
Notes: Sample weights are used to provide estimates of population proportions. 
 
*No Services/Other category contains the infrequent cases where no financial services were used, and where the scope of the lead 
bank relationship was only investment services, or just credit and investment services.  
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Table 3.12.   Mean Duration (years) for the Five Primary Lead Relationship 
Types  
 
Lead Relationship Scope   1988   1993   1998     2003 
Payments only 9.8 9.2 6.8 9.1 
Payment & Investments  11.6 9.9 7.7 10.0 
Credit only 8.1 6.8 5.2 6.0 
Payments & Credit 9.2 8.8 6.9 9.4 
Pay, Invest, & Credit 9.7 9.7 8.8 10.8 
Average Relationship Duration 9.7 9.1 7.0 9.3 
Average Firm Age  13.3 14.2 13.4 14.4 
 
Notes: Sample weights are used to obtain estimates of population proportions. 
 
The table excludes the infrequent cases where no financial services were used or 
where the scope of the lead bank relationship included only investment services or only 
credit and investment services.  In cases where the reported duration of the lead bank 
relationship exceeded the age of the firm, duration was set equal to the age of the firm.  
 
 
Table 3.13.   Scope and Exclusivity of Lead Relationship by Pattern of Service Use for All Survey Years 
 
                                                                                                                1988              1993             1998           2003    
PAYMENT SERVICES ONLY 
% Firms using only payment services*  23.80% 27.00% 30.20% 24.10% 
           % who use lead bank for some of these services** 23.80% 26.60% 28.90% 23.40% 
           % using ONLY lead bank for these services***  23.10% 25.00% 28.30% 21.10% 
BORROWING & PAYMENT  
% Firms using borrowing and payment services*  39.50% 38.10% 33.60% 36.10% 
           % who use lead bank for both these service types** 23.50% 17.00% 15.40% 18.40% 
           % using ONLY lead bank for these services***  20.50% 14.10% 13.80% 9.00% 
PAYMENT & INVESTMENT  
% Firms using only payment & investment services*  9.00% 10.20% 10.30% 10.30% 
           % who use lead bank for both these service types** 3.90% 5.60% 6.20% 5.80% 
           % using ONLY lead bank for these services***  2.50% 4.40% 5.70% 5.00% 
PAYMENT, BORROWING, & INVESTMENT 
% Firms using payment, borrowing, & investment services*  25.90% 20.80% 20.80% 24.40% 
           % who use lead bank for all these service types** 9.30% 7.30% 7.60% 7.50% 
           % using ONLY lead bank for these services***  7.00% 5.20% 4.60% 2.40% 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the exclusivity of lead bank relationships for the four primary relationship types. 
*Shows the percentage of firms in each survey whose scope of product use is defined by the heading above it 
**Shows the percentage of firms whose lead bank relationship scope of the firm's service use  
***Shows the percentage of firms who use only their lead bank for all financial services 
Percentages are unweighted sample averages.  
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Table 3.14. Full Sample Regression Means  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Lead Duration (years)  10.30 10.20 
Year 1988 0.21 0.41 
Year 1993 0.30 0.46 
Year 1998 0.22 0.42 
Year 2003 0.27 0.44 
Firm Age (years) 15.20 12.80 
Retail 0.22 0.41 
Wholesale 0.08 0.28 
Services 0.36 0.48 
Construction 0.12 0.32 
Manufacturing & Other 0.22 0.41 
Assets ($000,000) 1.70 7.00 
Multiple Locations 0.23 0.42 
Owner Managed 0.87 0.34 
Unlimited Liability 0.40 0.49 
Family Owned 0.84 0.37 
Use Trade Credit 0.73 0.45 
Competitive 0.49 0.50 
Rural 0.27 0.44 
 
Notes: n = 15112 
The table shows the unweighted sample means and standard errors for r 
variables used in the full sample regression. 
 
Duration of the lead bank relationship is limited to the reported age of 
the firm. 
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Table 3.15. 
Correlates of Relationship Duration for All Relationship Types 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year 1993: -0.65*** -1.10*** -1.10*** -1.10*** -1.09*** -1.05*** 
Year 1998: -2.72*** -2.77*** -2.76*** -2.80*** -2.80*** -2.80*** 
Year 2003: -0.46*** -0.98*** -0.95*** -0.95*** -0.94*** -0.92*** 
Firm Age: 
 
0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 
Retail: 
  
  0.19 0.06 0.06 0.01 
Wholesale: 
  
  0.16 0.22 0.22 0.03 
Services: 
  
0.05 -0.1 -0.1 -0.05 
Construction: 
  
0.23 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Assets: 
   
-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
Multiple 
Locations: 
   
-0.23 -0.22 -0.21 
Owner 
Managed: 
   
0.18 0.17 0.13 
Unlimited 
Liability: 
   
0.54** 0.54*** 0.43* 
Family 
Owned: 
   
0.32* 0.32* 0.30* 
Use Trade 
Credit: 
    
0.03 -0.02 
Competitive: 
     
-0.12 
Rural: 
     
1.24*** 
Constant: 9.72*** 3.61*** 3.49*** 5.59*** 5.42*** 5.33*** 
R-squared:  0.02 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Notes: n=15112 
Categories not included are the 1988 year dummy and manufacturing/other industrial 
classifications. 
All models use sampling weights.  Significance levels are based on Huber/White robust 
standard errors.  
***significant at <1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.16. 
Sample Means for Age Subsample Regressions 
  
Variable 
Firm Age Five Years 
or Less 
Firm Age Greater 
than Five Years 
Mean 
n = 3423 Std. Dev. 
Mean 
n = 
11689 Std. Dev. 
Lead Duration (years)  2.80 1.39 11.00 9.09 
Year 1988 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 
Year 1993 0.31 0.44 0.27 0.46 
Year 1998 0.22 0.43 0.25 0.41 
Year 2003 0.28 0.42 0.24 0.45 
Firm Age (years)  3.24 1.36 18.71 12.51 
Retail 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 
Wholesale 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.28 
Services 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 
Construction 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 
Manufacturing & Other 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 
Assets ($000,000) 1.13 7.67 1.89 6.71 
Multiple Locations 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.43 
Owner Managed 0.90 0.30 0.86 0.35 
Unlimited Liability 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.49 
Family Owned 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.36 
Use Trade Credit 0.67 0.47 0.74 0.44 
Competitive 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Rural 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 
 
Notes: The table shows the unweighted sample means and standard errors 
for variables used in regression on subsamples defined by the age of the 
firm. 
 
Duration of the lead bank relationship is limited to the reported age of 
the firm. 
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Table 3.17. 
Firm Age and Correlates of Relationship Duration  
 
 Variable 
 
Firm age <5 yrs 
n = 3423 
Firm age >5 yrs 
n = 11689 
Year 1993 -0.08* -1.84*** 
Year 1998 -0.24*** -3.93*** 
Year 2003 -0.12*** -1.46*** 
Firm Age 0.79*** 0.42*** 
Retail 0.04 0.25 
Wholesale 0.03 0.35 
Services -0.01 -0.03 
Construction -0.05 0.12 
Assets 0.0  -0.07*** 
Multiple Locations 0.03 -0.32* 
Owner Managed -0.01 0.09 
Unlimited Liability -0.05 0.6 
Family Owned 0.14*** 0.2 
Use Trade Credit 0.04 -0.18 
Competitive 0.01 -0.19 
Rural 0.10** 1.51*** 
Constant 0.19*** 4.66*** 
R-squared  0.6 0.33 
 
Notes: Categories not included are the year 1988 dummy and the manufacturing/other 
industrial classifications.  
 
Sampling weights are used.  Significance levels are based on Huber/White robust 
standard errors. 
 
***significant at <1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.18. 
Sample Means for Credit/Non Credit Subsample Regressions 
   
Variable 
No Credit 
Mean 
n = 7527 
Std. Dev. 
Credit 
Mean 
n = 7585 
Std. Dev. 
Lead Duration (years)  9.10 8.87 9.20 8.61 
Year 1988 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.42 
Year 1993 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 
Year 1998 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 
Year 2003 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 
Firm Age (years)  14.32 12.20 16.09 13.30 
Retail 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 
Wholesale 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 
Services 0.42 0.49 0.30 0.46 
Construction 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 
Manufacturing & Other 0.18 0.39 0.26 0.44 
Assets ($000,000) 0.64 3.78 2.79 8.87 
Multiple Locations 0.15 0.36 0.32 0.46 
Owner Managed 0.89 0.31 0.85 0.36 
Unlimited Liability 0.51 0.50 0.29 0.45 
Family Owned 0.87 0.33 0.80 0.40 
Use Trade Credit 0.64 0.48 0.81 0.40 
Competitive 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 
Rural 0.24 0.42 0.30 0.46 
 
Notes: The table shows the unweighted sample means and standard errors for variables 
used in regression on subsamples defined the presence or absence of credit in the lead 
bank relationship.   
 
Duration is limited to the reported age of the firm.   
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Table 3.19. 
Lead Bank Credit Provision and Correlates of Relationship Duration  
 
Variable 
No Credit Services 
in Lead Relationship 
n = 7527 
 Lead Relationship 
Includes Credit Services 
n = 7585 
Year 1993 -0.98*** -1.12*** 
Year 1998 -2.72*** -2.72*** 
Year 2003 -0.92*** -0.80*** 
Firm Age 0.50*** 0.40*** 
Retail 0.2 -0.18 
Wholesale 0.64 -0.07 
Services 0.12 -0.3 
Construction 0.29 -0.09 
Assets -0.07 -0.03 
Multiple Locations 0.0 -0.22 
Owner Managed 0.35 -0.14 
Unlimited Liability 0.28 0.50** 
Family Owned 0.02 0.55** 
Use Trade Credit -0.06 0.2 
Competitive -0.2 0.02 
Rural 1.17*** 1.44*** 
Constant 2.46*** 3.27*** 
R-squared 0.48 0.37 
 
Notes: Categories not included are the year 1988 dummy and the 
manufacturing/other industrial classification.  
 
Sampling weights are used.  Significance levels are based on 
Huber/White robust standard errors. 
 
***significant at <1% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*significant at 10% level  
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